United States of America Agencies


While I have tried to present as much  information as possible here, it is by no means comprehensive. I have only included relevant espionage agencies for game play. If you want more info on organisations mentioned here but not described you'll need to find it yourself.


Executive Office of the President
National Security Council
Senior Director for Intelligence Programs
National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Office of National Drug Control Policy
Chemical and Biological Defence Information Analysis Centre [CBIAC]
Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office [CIAO]
Interagency Operational Security Support Staff
National Infrastructure Protection Centre [NIPC]
National Interagency Counterdrug Institute (NICI)
National Response Team
Security Policy Board
Technical Support Working Group

Director of Central Intelligence
National Intelligence Council [NIC]
Community Management Staff [CMS]
Arms Control Intelligence Staff (ACIS)
Counterintelligence Centre [CIC]
DCI Centre for Security Evaluation [CSE]
DCI Crime and Narcotics Centre [CNC]
DCI Counterterrorist Centre (CTC)
DCI Nonproliferation Centre [NPC]
National Counterintelligence Centre [NACIC]
Central Intelligence Agency
Special Collection Service
National Security Agency
National Reconnaissance Office
National Imagery and Mapping Agency

Defence Department
Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence Oversight Official
Under Secretary of Defence for Policy
Office of Emergency Preparedness Policy
Assistant Secretary of Defence for C3I
Defence Dissemination Program Office (DDPO)
Defence Support Program Office
Defence Intelligence Agency
Central MASINT Office Official
Defence Information Systems Agency
National Communications System Official
Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency Official
Defence Protective Service Official
Defence Security Service Official
US Special Operations Command Un-Official

Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Intelligence and Security Command
US Army Intelligence Centre
Office of the Surgeon General - NBC Defence
Chemical, Biological Defence Command
United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)
United States Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defence (USAMRICD)
Military Police Corps

Office of Naval Intelligence
Naval Security Group Command
Naval Criminal Investigative Service Official
Marine Corps
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force Official

Air Force
Air Force Technical Applications Centre
Air Intelligence Agency
9th Reconnaissance Wing
55th Wing
93rd Air Control Wing
Air Force Office of Special Investigations
Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness Agency
Air Force Security Forces [Security Police] Official

Other Federal Agencies
Commerce Department
CIAO - Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
NIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology
NIST - Computer Security Division Official

Energy Department
Non-Proliferation and National Security
Nuclear Emergency Support Team Official
Health and Human Services Department
PHS - Public Health Service
PHS/OEP - Office of Emergency Preparedness
PHS/OEP - Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams Official

Justice Department
OIG - Office of the Inspector General
OSLDPS - Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support
OIPR - Office of Intelligence Policy and Review
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
NIPC - National Infrastructure Protection Centre
NDPO - National Domestic Preparedness Office
DEST - Domestic Emergency Support Team
DEA - Drug Enforcement Administration
NDIC - National Drug Intelligence Centre
USNCB - U.S. National Central Bureau Official

State Department
INR - Bureau of Intelligence & Research
INL - Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
S/CT - Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
FEST - Federal Emergency Support Team
DS - Bureau of Diplomatic Security

Transportation Department
USCG - US Coast Guard
USCG - National Response Centre
USCG - Intelligence Coordination Centre
FAA - Federal Aviation Administration
FAA/CAS - Civil Aviation Security Official

Treasury Department
Office of Intelligence Support
Office of the Under Secretary (Enforcement)
ATF - Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
USCS - US Customs Service
USSS - US Secret Service
FINCEN - Financial Crimes Enforcement
OFAC - Office of Foreign Asset Control
FLETC - Federal Law Enforcement Training Centre
General Services Administration
Federal Protective Service
Office of Information Security (OIS)
National Archives and Records Administration
Information Security Oversight Office


National Intelligence Council

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) is best known as the organization that produces National Intelligence Estimates, which are intelligence community-wide forecasts of issues and challenges facing the security of the United States. The NIC reports to the Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity as head of the intelligence community. In an attempt to engage creative thinking from outside the intelligence community's classified bunker the NIC has increasingly participated in joint sponsorship of conferences with non-governmental institutions and has produced a number of unclassified publications.

Central Intelligence Agency

The United States has carried on foreign intelligence activities since the days of George Washington, but only since World War II have they been coordinated on a government wide basis. Even before Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was concerned about American intelligence deficiencies. He asked New York lawyer William J. Donovan to draft a plan for an intelligence service. The Office of Strategic Services was established in June 1942 with a mandate to collect and analyze strategic information required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to conduct special operations not assigned to other agencies. During the War, the OSS supplied policy makers with essential facts and intelligence estimates and often played an important role in directly aiding military campaigns. But the OSS never received complete jurisdiction over all foreign intelligence activities. Since the early 1930s the FBI had been responsible for intelligence work in Latin America, and the military services protected their areas of responsibility.

In October 1945, the OSS was abolished and its functions transferred to the State and War Departments. But the need for a postwar centralized intelligence system was clearly recognized. Eleven months earlier, Donovan, by then a major general, had submitted to President Roosevelt a proposal calling for the separation of OSS from the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the new organization having direct Presidential supervision. Donovan proposed an "organization which will procure intelligence both by overt and covert methods and will at the same time provide intelligence guidance, determine national intelligence objectives, and correlate the intelligence material collected by all government agencies." Under his plan, a powerful, centralized civilian agency would have coordinated all the intelligence services. He also proposed that this agency have authority to conduct "subversive operations abroad," but "no police or law enforcement functions, either at home or abroad."

Donovan's plan drew heavy fire. The military services generally opposed a complete merger. The State Department thought it should supervise all peacetime operations affecting foreign relations. The FBI supported a system whereby military intelligence worldwide would be handled by the armed services, and all civilian activities would be under FBI's own jurisdiction. In response to this policy debate, President Harry S. Truman established the Central Intelligence Group in January 1946, directing it to coordinate existing departmental intelligence, supplementing but not supplanting their services. This was all to be done under the direction of a National Intelligence Authority composed of a Presidential representative and the Secretaries of State, War and Navy. Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, USNR, who was the Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence, was appointed the first Director of Central Intelligence. Twenty months later, the National Intelligence Authority and its operating component, the Central Intelligence Group, were disestablished. Under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (which became effective on 18 September 1947) the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency were established. Most of the National Security Act's specific assignments given the CIA as well as the prohibitions on police and internal security functions, closely follow both the original 1944 Donovan plan and the Presidential directive creating the Central Intelligence Group. The 1947 Act charged the CIA with coordinating the nation's intelligence activities and correlating, evaluating and disseminating intelligence which affects national security. In addition, the Agency was to perform such other duties and functions related to intelligence as the NSC might direct. The Act also made the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods.
In 1949, the Central Intelligence Agency Act was passed supplementing the 1947 Act by permitting the Agency to use confidential fiscal and administrative procedures and exempting CIA from many of the usual limitations on the expenditure of federal funds. It provided that CIA funds could be included in the budgets of other departments and then transferred to the Agency without regard to the restrictions placed on the initial appropriation. This Act is the statutory authority for the secrecy of the Agency's budget. In order to protect intelligence sources and methods from disclosure, the 1949 Act further exempted the CIA from having to disclose its "organization, functions, names? Officials, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed."
The office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) evolved gradually. Until 1953, Deputy Directors were appointed by the Director, and it was General Walter Bedell Smith, the fourth DCI, who established the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in the role he has since played in CIA. Congress recognized the importance of the position in April 1953 by amending the National Security Act of 1947 to provide for the appointment of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. This amendment also provided that commissioned officers of the armed forces, whether active or retired, could not occupy both DCI and DDCI positions at the same time. The DDCI assists the Director by performing such functions as the DCI assigns or delegates. He acts for and exercises the powers of the Director during his absence or disability, or in the event of a vacancy in the position of the Director.
Under these Statutes, the Director serves as the principal adviser to the President and the National Security Council on all matters of foreign intelligence related to national security. CIA's responsibilities are carried out subject to various directives and controls by the President and the NSC.
Today the CIA reports regularly to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, as required by the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 and various Executive Orders. The Agency also reports regularly to the Defense Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees in both houses of Congress. Moreover, the Agency provides substantive briefings to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Armed Services Committees in both bodies as well as other Committees and individual members.
CIA Organizational Development
The Central Intelligence Group was authorized in spring of 1946 to establish an Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE). ORE's functions were manifold -- the production of national current intelligence, scientific, technical, and economic intelligence as well as interagency coordination for national estimates. With its own research and analysis capability, the CIG could carry out an independent intelligence function without having to rely on the other departments for data. The change made the CIG an intelligence producer, while still assuming the continuation of its role as a coordinator for estimates. Yet acquisition of a research and analysis role meant that independent production would outstrip coordinated intelligence as a primary mission. Fundamentally, it would be far easier to assimilate and analyze data than it had been or would be to engage the Departments in producing "coordinated" analysis. The same 1946 directive which provided the CIG with an independent research and analysis capability also granted the CIG a clandestine collection capability.
The passage of the National Security Act in July 1947 legislated the changes in the Executive branch that had been under discussion since 1945. The Act established an independent Air Force, provided for coordination by a committee of service chiefs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and a Secretary of Defense, and created the National Security Council (NSC). The CIG became an independent department and was renamed the Central Intelligence Agency.
Under the Act, the CIA's mission was only loosely defined, since efforts to thrash out the CIA's duties in specific terms would have contributed to the tension surrounding the unification of the services. The four general tasks assigned to the Agency were to advise the NSC on matters related to national security; to make recommendations to the NSC regarding the coordination of intelligence activities of the Departments; to correlate and evaluate intelligence and provide for its appropriate dissemination and "to perform such other functions ... as the NSC will from time to time direct...."
The Act did not alter the functions of the CIG. Clandestine collection, overt collection, production of national current intelligence and interagency coordination for national estimates continued, and the personnel and internal structure remained the same. The Act affirmed the CIA's role in coordinating the intelligence activities of the State Department and the military-determining which activities would most appropriately and most efficiently be conducted by which Departments to avoid duplication.
In 1947 the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) was created to serve as a coordinating body in establishing intelligence requirements 2 among the Departments. Chaired by the DCI, the Committee included representatives from the Departments of State, Army, Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Stag, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Although the DCI was to establish priorities for intelligence collection and analysis, he did not have the budgetary or administrative authority to control the departmental components. Moreover, no Department was willing to compromise what it perceived as-its own intelligence needs to meet the collective needs of policy makers as defined by the DCI.
As the CIA evolved between 1947 and 1950, it never fulfilled its estimates function but continued to expand its independent intelligence production. In July 1949 an internal study conducted by a senior ORE staff member stated that ORE's emphasis in production had shifted "from the broad long-term type of problem to a narrowly defined short-term type and from the predictive to the non-predictive type." In 1949 ORE had eleven regular publications. Only one of these addressed national intelligence questions and was published with the concurrence or dissent of the other departments. Less than one-tenth of ORE's products were serving the purpose for which the CIG and the CIA had been created.
By the time Walter Bedell Smith became DCI in 1950, it was c]car that the CIA's record on the production of national intelligence estimates had fallen far short of expectation. ORE had become a directionless service organization, attempting to answer requirements levied by all agencies related to all manner of subjects -- politics, economics, science, and technology. The wholesale growth had only confused ORE's mission and ]ed the organization into attempting analysis in areas already adequately covered by other departments.
Smith embarked on a program of reorganization. His most significant change was the creation of the Office of National Estimates (ONE), whose sole purpose was to produce National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). There were two components in ONE, a staff which drafted the estimates and a senior body, known as the Board of National Estimates, which reviewed the estimates, coordinated the judgments with other agencies, and negotiated over their final form.
Smith also attempted to redefine the DCI's position in relation to the departmental intelligence components. From 1947 to 1950 the DCIs had functioned at the mercy of the Departments rather than exercising direction over them. By formally stating his position as the senior member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, Smith tried to assume a degree of administrative control over departmental activities. Nonetheless, the obstacles remained, and personal influence, rather than recognized authority, determined the effectiveness of Smith and his successors in interdepartmental relationships.
In January 1952, CIA's intelligence functions were grouped under the Directorate for Intelligence (DDI), ORE was dissolved and its personnel were reassigned. In addition to ONE, the DDI's intelligence production components included: the Office of Research and Reports (ORE), which handled economic and geographic intelligence; the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), which engaged in basic scientific research; and the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), which provided current political research. Collection of overt information was the responsibility of the Office of Operations (NO). The Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD) engaged in the dissemination of intelligence as well as storage and retrieval of unevaluated intelligence.
The immediate pressures for information generated by the Korean War resulted in continued escalation in size and intelligence production. Government-wide demands for the Agency to provide information on Communist intentions in the Far East and around the world justified the increases. By the end of 1953 DDI personnel numbered 3,338. Despite the sweeping changes, the fundamental problem of duplication among the Agency and the Departments remained. DDI's major effort was independent intelligence production rather than coordinated national estimates.
The establishment of the office of National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (NIPE) in 1963 was the first major effort by a DCI to insure consistent contact and coordination with the community. Yet, from the outset DCI McCone accepted the limitations on his authority; although Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara agreed to provide him with access to the Defense Department budget (which still constitutes 80 percent of the intelligence community's overall budget), McCone could not direct or control the intelligence components of the other departments. The NIPE staff directed most of its attention to sorting out intelligence requirements through USIB and attempting to develop a national inventory for the community, including budget, personnel and materials. Remarkably, this had never before been done.
The most pressing problem for the community was the adjustment to the impact of technical collection capabilities. The large budgetary resources involved, and the value of the data generated by overhead reconnaissance systems precipitated a major bureaucratic battle over their administration and control. From 1963 to 1965, much of McCone's and the senior NIPE staff officer's community efforts were directed toward working out an agreement with the Air Force on development, production, and deployment of overhead reconnaissance systems.
Internally, the Agency was also adjusting to the impact of technical and scientific advances. In 1963, the Directorate for Science and Technology (DDS&T) was created. Previously, scientific and technical intelligence production had been scattered among the other three directorates. The process of organizing an independent directorate meant wresting personnel and resources from the existing components. Predictably, the resistance was considerable, and a year and a half passed between the first attempts at creating the Directorate and its actual establishment.
The new component included the Office of Scientific Intelligence and the office of ELINT (electronic intercepts) from DDI, the Data Processing Staff from DDA, the Development Projects Division (responsible for overhead reconnaissance) from the DDP, and a newly created Office of Research and Development. Later, the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center was added.
The Directorate's specific functions included, and continue to include, research, development, operation, data collection, analysis, and contributions to National Intelligence Estimates. The Directorate was organized on the premise that close cooperation should exist between research and application on the one hand, and technical collection and analysis all the other. This close coordination along with the staffing anti career patterns in the Directorate have contributed to the continuing vitality and quality of the DDS&T's work.
The DDP began and remained a closed, self-contained component; the DDI evolved into a closed, self-contained component. However, the DDS&T was created with the assumption that it would continue to rely on expertise and advice from outside the Agency. A number of arrangements insured constant interchanges between the Directorate and the scientific and industrial communities. First, since all research and development for technical systems was done through contracting, the DDS&T could draw on and benefit from the most advanced technical systems nationwide. Second, to attract high-quality professionals from the industrial and scientific communities, the Directorate established a competitive salary scale. The result has been personnel mobility between the DDS&T and private industry. It has not been unusual for individuals to leave private industry, assume positions with DDS&T for several years, then return to private industry. This pattern has provided the Directorate with a constant infusion and renewal of talent. Finally, the Directorate established the practice of regularly employing advisory groups as well as fostering DDS&T staff participation in conferences and seminars sponsored by professional associations.
Current methods of intelligence collection generally fall into one of two major categories: they are either manpower- or hardware-intensive. As its name indicates, human-source intelligence or HUMINT requires a considerable investment in people to obtain the desired results. In contrast, the satellites and other sophisticated hardware systems that yield enormous amounts of data are themselves extremely costly to develop and operate. Two of the CIA's four directorates engage in collection:

Directorate of Operations (DO)
The Directorate of Operations (DO), headed by the Deputy Director for Operations (DUO), has primary responsibility for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence, including HUMINT. Domestically, the DDO is responsible for the overt collection of foreign intelligence volunteered by individuals and organizations in the United States, and in some cases, data on foreign activities collected by other US Government agencies. Since 1992, the DDO has been assisted by an Associate Deputy Director for Military Affairs (ADDO/MA), who facilitates Agency cooperation with the military. The DO is divided administratively into area divisions, as are the State Department and CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, with the addition of a domestic collection division, two topical centers, one tasking center, and one defector resettlement center. Several staffs deal with issues specific to the work of the DO.

Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T)
Directorate of Science and Technology headed by the Deputy Director for Science and Technology provides support to CIA and the Intelligence Community (IC) in the collection, processing, and exploitation of intelligence from all sources - imagery, HUMINT, open source, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and other forms of intelligence data collected by clandestine technical means. The support includes research, development, acquisition, and operations of the technical capabilities and systems. For open source and imagery exploitation, the DS&T serves as a service of common concern for the IC through, respectively, its Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and National Photographic Interpretation Centre. For HUMINT, the DS&T components provide a wide range of technical support, including agent communication. The National Photographic Interpretation Centre is also managed within the DS&T. NPIC is a joint CIA/Defence Department centre, and its product is disseminated to its parent agencies, which, in turn, incorporate it into all-source intelligence reports. NPIC also produces imagery interpretation reports, briefing boards, videotapes for national-level consumers, and provides support for the military.

Directorate of Intelligence
The CIA produces a wide variety of finished intelligence. Its substantive scope is worldwide. It covers functional as well as regional issues, and its products range from quick-reaction, informal oral briefings to complex, long-term research studies that may take months or years to complete. Virtually all of CIA's finished intelligence is designed to support national-level policy deliberations. The Directorate of Intelligence (DI), headed by the Deputy Director for Intelligence, produces the bulk of CIA's finished intelligence products and is the executive agent for meeting CIA's responsibility to produce national-level current intelligence. Since 1981, the Directorate's analysis of regional and country-specific topics has been performed in five regional offices. Each of these offices generates multi-disciplinary studies encompassing military, economic, political, and other factors and produces the full range of finished intelligence. These offices structured largely to mirror the way their policy maker consumers are organized in the State Department, Defence Department, NSC Staff, and other departments - are:
Office of African and Latin American Analysis
Office of East Asian Analysis
Office of European Analysis
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis
Office of Slavic and Eurasian Analysis
The Directorate also has four offices that are worldwide in responsibility but focus on particular issues or kinds of analysis:
The Office of Resources, Trade and Technology (RTT) has the broadest responsibility, covering such translational issues as sanctions monitoring, economic negotiations support, foreign efforts to unfairly aid business, questionable foreign financial practices, international arms market trends, defence industry strategies, energy and resource analysis, geographic and demographic issues, and environmental trends and civil technology challenges-from both a technical and policy perspective.
The Office of Scientific and Weapons Research (OSWR) produces assessments of foreign developments in science, technology, and weapons. Major issues currently addressed by OSWR include: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear security and safety, technology surprise, and the proliferation of advanced conventional weaponry.
The Office of Leadership Analysis (LDA) integrates the work of biographic, psychological, and medical specialists to provide comprehensive assessments of the major leaders, groups, and institutions of foreign countries that exercise formal or informal power.
The Office of Imagery Analysis (OIA) which, effective I October 1993, is managed and staffed on behalf of the Directorate by the National Photographic Interpretation Centre - provides analyses on the full range of substantive intelligence topics worldwide and develops and applies methodologies used to maximize the utility of current and future imaging systems.
Two offices in the Directorate provide support to Directorate analysis and to other agencies:
The Office of Information Resources (OIR) provides all-source library and reference services within CIA and retrieves CIA documents for the IC. It supports Directorate of Intelligence information systems and is developing an electronic open-source delivery system with connectivity to the IC. OIR also develops methodologies to support quantitative research and analysis.
The Office of Current Production and Analytic Support (CPAS) publishes national-level current intelligence, fulfills the CIA's warning and alert functions via its Operations Center, coordinates foreign intelligence liaison activities, and supports CIA's finished intelligence production with cartographic, design, and editorial expertise.
In May 1992, the DCI's Nonproliferation Center (NPC) was established as the focal point for all IC activities related to nonproliferation. The NPC, structurally located in the Directorate of Intelligence, develops and updates strategic plans, provides assessments, manages operations, and enhances collection efforts in order to provide the policy maker with a coordinated view on nonproliferation issues for decision making.

NSA is the nation's crypto logic organization, tasked with making and breaking codes and ciphers. In addition, NSA is one of the most important centres of foreign language analysis and research and development within the government. NSA is a high-technology organization, working on the very frontiers of communications and data processing. The expertise and knowledge it develops provide the government with systems that deny foreign powers knowledge of US capabilities and intentions.

The National Security Agency (NSA) is charged with two of the most important and sensitive activities in the US intelligence community. The information systems security or INFOSEC mission provides leadership, products, and services to protect classified and unclassified national security systems against exploitation through interception, unauthorized access, or related technical intelligence threats. This mission also supports the Director, NSA, in fulfilling responsibilities as Executive Agent for interagency operations security training.

The foreign signals intelligence or SIGINT mission allows for an effective, unified organization and consists of all the foreign signals collection and processing activities of the United States. NSA is authorized to produce SIGINT in accordance with objectives, requirements and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.

Although code making and breaking are ancient practices, modern cryptologic communications intelligence activities in the United States date from the World War I period and radio communications technology. In 1917 and 1918 the US Army created, within the Military Intelligence Division, the Cipher Bureau (MI-8) under Herbert O. Yardley. MID assisted the radio intelligence units in the American Expeditionary Forces and in 1918 created the Radio Intelligence Service for operations along the Mexican border. The Navy had established a modest effort, but it was absorbed, by mutual agreement in 1918, into Yardley's post-war civilian "Black Chamber."
The Army (and State Department) continued to support Yardley until the termination of his "Black Chamber" in 1929. Army continuity was assumed, however, in the small Signal Intelligence Service of the Army Signal Corps under the direction of William F. Friedman. The Navy's cryptanalytic function reappeared formally in 1924 in the "Research Desk" under Commander Laurance F. Safford in the Code and Signal Section, OP-20-G, within the Office of Naval Communications. While emphasis was on the security of US military communications (COMSEC), both organizations developed radio intercept, radio direction finding, and processing capabilities prior to World War II; they achieved particular successes against Japanese diplomatic communications. Exploitation successes of their respective counterpart service communications had to await the shift of resources until after hostilities commenced. However, wartime successes by the United States and Britain proved the value of COMINT to military and political leaders, and, as a result, both service organizations expanded greatly in terms of manpower resources and equipment.
In the latter stages of the war, the services created a coordinating body to facilitate COMINT cooperation, the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (ANCIB) with a subordinate coordinating committee (ANCICC). These became the instruments for negotiating joint post-war arrangements. In late 1945, with the addition of the Department of State to its membership, ANCIB became the State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (STANCIB). STANCIB evolved in 1946 into the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB), which added the FBI as a member.
With the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, Congress reinforced the direction in which the intelligence community was moving toward increased centralization - and built the framework for a modern national security structure. Among other things, the Act established the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). CIA became a member of USCIB, which received a new charter as the highest national COMINT authority in the form of an NSC Intelligence Directive, NSCID No. 9, dated 1 July 1948.
As the Air Force sought to expand its cryptologic organization, Secretary of Defence James V. Forrestal contemplated cutting defence expenditures. One solution was a unified cryptologic agency. He appointed a special board under Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone , Director of Naval Communications, to formulate a plan for merging all military COMINT and COMSEC activities and resources into a single agency. Only the Army favoured the Stone Board's recommendations for merger at this time, and the plan was shelved.
In 1949, a new Secretary of Defence, Louis A. Johnson, also seeking ways to economize, reviewed the Stone Board's report and began to take steps for its implementation. After much discussion among the services regarding the concept of merger, on 20 May194 9 Secretary Johnson ordered the issuance of JCS Directive 2010. This directive established the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), which had as its mission the conduct of communications intelligence and communications security activities within the National Military Establishment. AFSA thus had the actual responsibility for running COMINT and COMSEC operations, excluding only those that were delegated individually to the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The JCS directive also established an advisory council within the AFSA structure. Known for a time as the Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory Council (AFCIAC), it later was renamed Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSAC). The organization became the mechanism through which AFSA reported to the JCS.
On 15 July 1949 RADM Stone became AFSA's first director, appointed by the JCS. By January 1950 the Army and Navy cryptologic organizations had transferred enough civilian and military personnel, as well as equipment, so that AFSA could operate. AFSA did not however, have its own facilities.
Admiral Stone was succeeded in 1951 by Army Major General Ralph J. Canine. By this time, various difficulties in defining powers and areas of jurisdiction were painfully obvious. Further, both directors experienced grave difficulties in obtaining the Advisory Council's approval of proposed courses of action because of AFSAC's policy requiring unanimous decisions. Finally, the potentialities of expanding technical COMINT capabilities of the late 1940s could not always be realized. During the Korean War the quality of strategic intelligence derived from COMINT fell below that which had been provided in World War II. Consumers were disappointed and increasingly critical. By late 1951, AFSA had clashed with the service cryptologic agencies, with consumers, wit h CIA, and with the State Department, although not all at one time nor with all on one issue. Despite the intentions, AFSA had in fact become a fourth military cryptologic agency.
On 13 December 1951 President Truman ordered a searching analysis to be conducted by a special committee to be named by the Secretaries of State and Defence, aided by the Director of Central Intelligence. Chaired by George Brownell, an eminent New York lawyer, the Brownell Committee surveyed the situation and in June recommended that a unified COMINT agency receive greater powers commensurate with clearly defined responsibilities. It also advised that the agency be freed of the crippling line of subordination through AFSAC to the JCS and, instead, be directly subordinate to the Secretary of Defence, acting with the Secretary of State on behalf of the NSC. It further proposed that the unified agency be controlled in policy matters by a reconstituted USCIB, under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence, in which the representation of military and nonmilitary intelligence interests would be evenly balanced.
In October 1952 the President and National Security Council adopted most of the Brownell Committee's recommendations and issued a revised version of NSCID No.9 on 24 October 1952.
A mingling of military and nonmilitary interests was expressed in the word "national." The production of COMINT was declared to be a national responsibility. In place of an Armed Forces Security Agency, the US government was to have a National Security Agency, an organization with the same resources plus a new charter. The AFSA Council, while not specifically abolished, thus had the agency pulled out from under it. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were no longer in the chain-of-command. The Director, NSA, report ed to the Secretary of Defence through a unit in the latter's office that dealt with sensitive operations. The Secretary himself was declared to be executive agent of the government for COMINT and subordinate to a special committee for the NSC, of which h e and the Secretary of State were the two members and the Director of Central Intelligence was an advisor.
The Secretary of Defence was instructed to delegate his COMINT responsibilities to the Director, NSA, and to entrust to him operational and technical control of all US military COMINT collection and production resources. The Director, NSA, was ordered to bring about the most effective, unified application of all U. S. resources for producing national COMINT to meet requirements approved by USCIB. In addition, the DIRNSA was ordered to assume the COMSEC responsibilities previously assigned to AFSA. Promulgation of NSCID No.9 brought about a greater participation by civilian members (CIA and State) of the community in the COMINT process. At the same time it was recognition of the necessity for more centralized technical operations. On 4 November 1952, Major General Ralph J. Canine, USA, became the first Director, NSA.
Unlike the DIA, the National Security Agency (NSA) is a presidential creation, established in response to a Top Secret directive issued by President Truman in October 1952. In this directive. the President designated the Secretary of Defence as Executive Agent for the signals intelligence and communications security activities of the Government. A specific National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) defines NSA's functions. It is augmented by Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs ) and internal Department of Defence and NSA regulations
NSA assumed the responsibilities of its predecessor, the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), which had been created after World War II to integrate the national cryptologic effort. NSA was established as a separate agency responsible directly to the Secretary of Defence. In addition, it was granted SIGINT operational control over the three Service Cryptologic (collection) Agencies (SCAs): the Army Security Agency, Naval Security Group Command, and Air Force Security Service. Under this arrangement, NSA encountered initially the same jurisdictional difficulties that were to plague DIA.
In an effort to strengthen the influence of the Director of the National Security Agency (DIRNSA) over their activities, the SCAs were confederated in 1971 under a Central Security Service (CSS) with the DIRNSA as its chief. The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/ CSS) provides centralized coordination, direction, and control of the Government's Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Communications Security (COMSEC) activities. The Central Security Service (CSS) was established by a Presidential memorandum in order to provide a more unified cryptologic effort within the Department of Defence. With the establishment of the CSS, NSA underwent a major internal reorganization to become the institution it is today. As Chief, CSS, the Director of NSA exercises control over the signals intelligence activities of the military services. NSA, while not a military organization, is one of several elements of the intelligence community administered by the Department of Defence.
The Agency was charged with an additional mission, computer security, in a 1984 Presidential directive, and with an operations security training mission in a 1988 Presidential directive. Like the Department of State and Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency has its own civilian career service, established by Congress in 1959. To maintain this career service, the agency conducts its own recruiting and employment programs. From its beginning, NSA has been hiring promising college graduates from all sections of the country - including the Baltimore/Washington area - to augment its growing staff of professionals.
The Secretary of Defence approved the Plan for Restructuring Defence Intelligence on 15 March 1991, and subsequently forwarded it to Congress. The plan emphasized the centralization of management within the DOD for more effectively dealing with the changing world situation. However the National Security Agency was only peripherally affected by the plan, under which the Office of the Secretary of Defence for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence does not exercise the same degree of control, direction and authority over the National Security Agency as was instituted for the Defence Intelligence Agency. 
The SIGINT or foreign intelligence mission of NSA/CSS involves the interception, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information derived from foreign electrical communications and other signals. SIGINT itself is composed of three elements: Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), and Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT). COMINT is intelligence information derived from the interception and analysis of foreign communications. ELINT is technical and intelligence information derived from electromagnetic radiations, such as radars. TELINT is technical and intelligence information derived from the interception, processing, and analysis of foreign telemetry.
The COMSEC mission protects United States telecommunications and certain other communications from exploitation by foreign intelligence services and from unauthorized disclosure. COMSEC systems are provided by NSA to 18 Government departments and agencies , including Defence, State, CIA, and FBI. The predominant user, however, is the Department of Defence. COMSEC is a mission separate from SIGINT, yet the dual SIGINT and COMSEC missions of NSA/CSS do have a symbiotic relationship, and enhance the performance of the other.
Initially, most SIGINT was collected by personnel of the Service Cryptologic Agencies located around the world. The Director, NSA/Chief, CSS has authority for SIGINT missions. NSA responds to requests by other members of the intelligence community, such as CIA, DIA, and FBI, to provide "signals" intelligence on topics of interest. An annual list of SIGINT requirements is given to NSA and is intended to provide the NSA Director and the Secretary of Defence with guidance for the coming year's activities. These requirements are usually stated in terms of general areas of intelligence interest, but are supplemented by "amplifying requirements," which are time-sensitive and are expressed directly to NSA by the requesting agency. NSA exercises discretion in responding to these requirements; it also accepts requests from the executive branch agencies. NSA does not generate its own requirements.
All requirements levied on NSA must be for foreign intelligence. Yet, the precise definition of foreign intelligence is unclear. NSA limits its collection of intelligence to foreign communications and confines its activities to communications links having at least one foreign terminal. Nevertheless, this is based upon an internal regulation and is not supported by law or executive branch directive. Although NSA limits itself to collecting communications with at least one foreign terminal, it may still pick up communications between two Americans when international communications are involved. Whenever NSA chooses particular circuits or "links" known to carry foreign communications necessary for the production of foreign intelligence, it collects all transmissions that go over those circuits. Given current technology, the only grey for NSA to prevent the processing of communications of US citizens would be to control the selection, analysis, or dissemination phases of the process.
Communications intelligence has been an integral element of United States intelligence activities. Foreign communications have been intercepted, analysed, and decoded by the United States since the Revolutionary War. During the 1930s elements of the Army and Navy collected and processed foreign intelligence from radio transmissions. Much of their work involved decryption, as well as enciphering United States transmissions. Throughout World War II, their work contributed greatly to the national war effort
Since President Truman authorized NSA's establishment in 1952 to coordinate United States cryptologic and communications activities, tremendous advances have been made in the technology of communications intelligence. These advances have contributed to add expansion in demands for a wider variety of foreign intelligence and of requirements placed upon NSA/CSS SIGINT personnel and resources. As new priorities arise in the requirements process, greater demands will be placed upon NSA.
SIGINT is not finished intelligence, but NSA provides its specially controlled SIGINT product directly to military commands worldwide and to governmental consumers, as well as to producers of all-source intelligence. NSA supports each NIO with a senior topical or regional specialist called a Signals Intelligence NIO (SINIO). SINIOs and other representatives of the Director, NSA, and the NSA Deputy Director for Operations are assigned to facilitate the exchange of information and conduct liaison on operational matters throughout the IC and with the consumers of SIGINT. The SIGINT product is extremely sensitive and is normally handled in special channels available to only specifically designated personnel.
The SIGINT Digest
This compilation is published Monday through Friday. Although not considered finished intelligence, the Digest apprises readers of the most significant developments of the day that were derived from SIGINT. The Digest is distributed in hardcopy to Washington-area customers and electronically to customers in the field .
Subject to the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 6 (NSCID No. 6), and the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and pursuant to the authorities vested in the Secretary of Defence, the National Security Agency is a separately organized agency within the Department of Defence under the direction, supervision funding, maintenance and operation of the Secretary of Defence.
The National Security Agency is a unified organization structured to provide for the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) mission of the United States and to insure secure communications systems for all departments and agencies of the US Government. The Central Security Service will conduct collection, processing and other SIGINT operations as assigned.
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is a category of intelligence information comprising all Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), and Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT).
COMINT is technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communication by other than the intended recipients. COMINT is produced by the collection and processing of foreign communications passed by electromagnetic means, with specific exceptions stated below, and by the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted. Collection comprises search, intercept, and direction finding. Processing comprises range estimation, transmitter/operator identification, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysts, decryption, study of plain text, the fusion of these processes, and the reporting of results. COMINT does not include: intercept and processing of unencrypted written communications, except the processing of written plain t ext versions of communications which have been encrypted or are intended for subsequent encryption. Intercept and processing of press, propaganda and other public broadcasts, except for processing encrypted or "hidden meaning" passages in such broadcasts ; oral and wire interceptions conducted under DoD Directive 5200.24; or censorship.
ELINT is technical and intelligence information derived from foreign, non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources. ELINT is produced by the collection (observation and recording), and t he processing for subsequent intelligence purposes of that information.
TELINT is technical and intelligence information derived from the intercept, processing, and analysis of foreign telemetry.
SIGINT operational control is the authoritative direction of SIGINT activities, including tasking and allocation of effort, and the authoritative prescription of those uniform techniques and standards by which SIGINT information is collected, processed an d reported. SIGINT resources comprise unit, activities and organizational elements engaged in the conduct of SIGINT (COMINT, ELINT or TELINT) activities.
The National Security Agency consists of a Director, a Headquarters, and such subordinate units, elements, facilities, and activities as are assigned to the National Security Agency by the Secretary of Defence as the executive agent of the Government for the conduct of SIGINT.
The NSA provides technical guidance to all SIGINT or SIGINT-related operations of the Government. It formulates programs, plans, policies, procedures and principles, and manages assigned SIGINT resources, personnel and programs.
NSA produces and disseminates SIGINT in accordance with the objectives, requirements and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence. This function does not include the production and dissemination of finished intelligence which are the e responsibilities of departments and agencies other than the National Security Agency / Central Security Service.)
In relation to the Department of Defence SIGINT activities, NSA prepares and submits to the Secretary of Defence a consolidated program and budget, and requirements for military and civilian manpower, logistic and communications support, and research, development, test and evaluation, together with his recommendations pertaining thereto. NSA conducts research, development and systems design to meet the needs of the National Security Agency / Central Security Service and coordinate with the departments an d agencies their related research, development, test and evaluation in the SIGINT field. The Agency determines and submits to the Secretary of Defence logistic support requirements for the National Security Agency, and the Central Security Service, together with specific recommendations as to what each of the responsible departments and agencies of the Government should supply.
It also develops requisite security rules, regulations and standards governing operating practices in accordance with the policies of the US Intelligence Board and the US Communications Security Board. The Director prescribes within the field of authorize d operations requisite security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling, and distribution of SIGINT material within and among the elements under his control; and exercise the necessary monitoring and supervisory control to ensure compliance with the regulations.
The Director makes reports and furnish information to the US Intelligence Board or the US Communications Security Board, as required. The Director also responds to the SIGINT requirements of all DoD components and other departments and agencies, eliminate s unwarranted duplication of SIGINT efforts, standardizes SIGINT equipment and facilities wherever practicable, and provides for production and procurement of SIGINT equipments.
NSA provides the Director of Central Intelligence through the Secretary of Defence with such information as required on the past, current and propose plans, programs, and costs of the SIGINT activities under the Agency's control. It also provides guidance to the military departments to effect and insure sound and adequate military and civilian SIGINT career development and training programs, and conduct, or otherwise provide for, necessary specialized and advanced SIGINT training. The Agency provides technical advice and support to enhance SIGINT arrangements with foreign governments, and conduct, as authorized, SIGINT exchanges with foreign governments.
The Central Security Service is comprised of a Chief, Central Security Service, a Deputy Chief, jointly staffed headquarters, Army, Navy/Marine Corps and Air Force operating elements, and such other subordinate elements and facilities as may be assigned t o the Central Security Service by the Secretary of Defence.
The Director, National Security Agency, is also the Chief, Central Security Service. The Director of the National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service has a Deputy Director for the National Security Agency and a Deputy Chief, Central Security Service. To provide continuity in SIGINT matters, the Deputy Director, National Security Agency, is a technically experienced civilian. The Deputy Chief, Central Security Service, is a commissioned officer of the military Services, of not less than two star rank, designated by the Secretary of Defence. The Deputy Chief is normally not be selected from the same military Service as the Chief. The Director and Deputy Director of the National Security Agency are designated by the Secretary of Defence, subject to the approval of the President. The Director is a commissioned officer of the military Services, on active or reactivated status, and enjoys not less than three star rank during the period of his incumbency.
The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service reports to the Secretary of Defence.
The Commanders of the Service cryptologic organizations and their subordinate activities which conduct SIGINT operations are subordinate to the Chief, Central Security Service, for all matters involving SIGINT activities. In this role they are designated as Service element Commanders and subordinate activities of the Central Security Service. The Service cryptologic organizations will remain in their parent Services, for the purpose of administrative and logistic support. The Secretary of Defence with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may specifically designate other SIGINT related resources of the Department of Defence which will be subordinate to the Chief, Central Security Service for SIGINT operations.
Subject to the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defence, the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service accomplish the SIGINT mission of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service. The Director acts a s principal SIGINT advisor to the Secretary of Defence, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As principal SIGINT advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director, National Security Agency keeps the Joint Chiefs of Staff fully informed on SIGINT matters.
The Director exercises SIGINT operational control over SIGINT activities of the US Government to respond most effectively to military and other SIGINT requirements. In the case of mobile military SIGINT platforms, the Director shall state movement requirements through appropriate channels to the military commanders, which retain responsibility for operational command of the vehicle.
Subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defence, the Director, National Security Agency / Chief, Central Security Service, is specifically delegated authority to exercise SIGINT operational control over SIGINT activities of the United States, issue directives to any operating elements such instructions and orders necessary to carry out his responsibilities and functions, and have direct access to, and direct communications with, any element of the US Government performing SIGINT functions.
The NSA Director may adjust as required, through the Service cryptologic organizations, personnel resources under SIGINT operational control, and centralize or consolidate SIGINT operations for which he is responsible to the extent desirable, consistent with efficiency, economy, effectiveness, and support to field commanders. The Director submits, as appropriate, concurrent letter of evaluation efficiency / fitness reports on the commanders of subordinate elements of the Central Security Service in accordance with parent Service procedures, and delegates SIGINT operational tasking of specified SIGINT resources and facilities for such periods and for such operational tasks as required or as directed by the Secretary of Defence.
NSA prescribes SIGINT procedures for activities to whom he provides technical guidance, and prescribe, reviews and approves security rules, regulations and instructions. It conducts the SIGINT operations undertaken in support of certain missions within the purview of NSCID No. 5, and obtains such information and intelligence material from the departments and agencies (military departments, other Department of Defence agencies, or other departments or agencies of the Government) as may be necessary for the performance of the National Security Agency / Central Security Service functions.
In the performance of its responsibilities and functions, the National Security Agency / Central Security Service coordinates actions, as appropriate, with other DoD components, and other Departments and agencies of the Government. The Agency maintains direct liaison, as appropriate, for the exchange of information and advice in the field of its assigned responsibility with other DoD components and other departments and agencies of the Government. It provides for direct liaison by representatives of the intelligence components of individual departments and agencies regarding interpretation and amplification of requirements and priorities within the framework of objectives, requirements, and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence.
Other DoD components provide support, within their respective fields of responsibility, to the Director, National Security Agency / Chief, Central Security Service as may be necessary to carry out assigned responsibilities and functions. The National Security Agency / Central Security Service will be authorized such personnel, facilities, funds and other administrative support as the Secretary of Defence deems necessary for the performance of its functions. Other DoD components shall provide support for the Agency / Service as prescribed in specific directives or support agreements.
The Naval Security Group Command is the Navy component of the Central Security Service. The Army CSS component is the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).
"INSCOM organizations which perform national SIGINT functions are being restructured from conventional OCONUS lines of sight and HF collection mission units into jointly manned organizations, at CONUS locations, with the access to enemy signals provided via remote collection technology and communications linkages.... The Army Technical Control and Analysis Element (A-TCAE) in the 704th Ml Brigade at Fort Meade will direct the Army's SIGINT exploitation efforts in support of operational commanders and national collection needs, and will assist in technical training and support for all Army Intelligence forces as part of preparations for deployment. "
The 694th Intelligence Group (formerly the 694th Intelligence Wing), headquartered at Fort Meade, MD, steers Air Force Intelligence Agency's mission operations on the east coast. It is a vital part of AIA's continuing support to national missions in support of US intelligence activities. The Air Force's 694th Intelligence Group (formerly 694th Wing) is the largest military unit on Fort Meade. It is subordinate to the Air Intelligence Agency, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas. With a widely varied mission the 69 4th Intelligence Wing has more than 2,000 officers and airmen within its subordinate units at Fort Meade. In addition, the 694th provides operational, technical, administrative and resource management to include representation al support to the commander of the Air Intelligence Agency and other government elements in the Washington, DC area. Responsible for an integral part of the US worldwide communications network, the unit provides rapid radio relay, secure communications an d command, control and communications countermeasures support to US and allied forces. Unit members develop and apply techniques and materials designed to ensure that friendly command and control communications are secure and protected from enemy countermeasures. The 694th Intelligence Group also advises US and allied commanders on procedures and techniques which could be used to counter enemy command and control communications. Additional functions include research into electronic phenomena.
Unlike other intelligence organizations such as CIA or DIA, NSA is particularly reticent concerning its internal organizational structure. The following description is based on the best available current information.  
The National Security Agency is organized into five Directorates, each of which consists of several groups or elements. The Operations Directorate is responsible for SIGINT collection and processing. The Technology and Systems Directorate develops new technologies for SIGINT collection and processing. The Information Systems Security Directorate is responsible for NSA's communications and information security missions. The Plans, Policy and Programs Directorate provides staff support and general direction for the Agency, while the Support Services Directorate provides logistical and administrative support activities.
A Group - Former Soviet Bloc
This Group performs worldwide SIGINT operations at fixed sites and with assigned and attached mobile assets to collect against targets in the Former Soviet Bloc. It maintains liaison with service CSS components on SIGINT operations of direct interest to t his area of responsibility, under the SIGINT OPCON of the DIRNSA or the Chief, Central Security Service (CHCSS). (The current designation of this Group is uncertain)
B Group - Asia
This Group performs worldwide SIGINT operations at fixed sites and with assigned and attached mobile assets to collect against targets, including China, North Korea, and Vietnam. It maintains liaison with service CSS components on SIGINT operations of direct interest to this area of responsibility, under the SIGINT OPCON of the DIRNSA or the Chief, Central Security Service (CHCSS). (The current designation of this Group is uncertain)
C Group - Policy & Resources
This Group establishes immediate, short and long range policy and resource requirements for Information Security activities to satisfy current and future requirements. It identifies needs, criteria development, and program development of projects for operation and maintenance of current assets and acquisition or construction of new facilities.
D Group - Director
The Director of the NSA directs and controls the National Security Agency (NSA) in the accomplishment of assigned missions, programs, plans, and projects. This Group serves as the NSA focus for DIRNSA Central Security Service (CSS) activities, and for the US Signals Intelligence Directive System. The Group also represents NSA on other SIGINT community coordinating committees, such as the DCI Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Committee, SIGINT Requirements Validation and Evaluation Subcommittee (SIRVES) and SO RS.
E Group - Contract Support 
This Group provides acquisition and management services and support to other NSA program offices in the development of technical and nontechnical support facility requirements and concepts. It develops facility acquisition strategies, plans, master schedules, cost estimates, and management plans. It provides engineering management services, plans for maintenance and operation of facilities, and coordinates with host nations or commands. The Group acts as principal staff advisor and assistant to the Direct or, NSA, in the development and application of NSA contracting policy, plans, programs, and systems as related to contracting of supplies and services; production management; industrial preparedness planning; DAR; FAR; and contracting reporting; DoD Coordinated Acquisition Program; market research and analysis; DoD Procurement Management Review (PMR) Program; NSA field contracting activities; ADP/T contracting; Pricing and Competition, and management improvement initiatives; and exercises staff program direction over assigned programs. (The identity of this Group is tentative)
F Group (No Group with this designation has been identified)
G Group - Operations (?) / All Others (?)
This Group performs worldwide SIGINT operations at fixed sites and with assigned and attached mobile assets to collect against targets areas not covered by A and B Groups. It maintains liaison with service CSS components on SIGINT operations of direct interest to this area of responsibility, under the SIGINT OPCON of the DIRNSA or the Chief, Central Security Service (CHCSS). (The current designation of this Group is uncertain)
H Group (No Group with this designation has been identified)
I Group - Information Security Programs
This Group develops, establishes, and administers comprehensive programs for information security, classification management, security education and motivation, and industrial and personnel security. It represents NSA on the Security Career Program Policy Council.
J Group - Legislative Affairs
Acts as the principal staff advisor and assistant to the Director, NSA, and other staff elements on all NSA matters with respect to Legislative Affairs.
K Group - Operations Research (?)
This Group directs NSA Cryptologic research activities to provide theoretical and other support for all US Communications Security (COMSEC) and SIGINT activities. (The identity of this Group is tentative)
L Group - Logistics
Serves as the principal focus for on matters relating to the implementation of the NSA logistics support activities, including support by the Defence Courier Service.
M Group - Administration
Acts as the principal staff advisor and assistant to the Director, NSA, and other staff elements on all NSA matters, exclusive of equipment (ADP and non-ADP) and software, with respect to printing and publications; library; postal and mail; travel; audiovisual facilities, productions and exhibits; records, forms, and correspondence; committee management; authentication of publications, directives, and communications.
N Group - Programs
This Group determines, in conjunction with the entire NSA staff, immediate, short and long range planning requirements for facility development to satisfy current and future mission requirements. It identifies facility need, facility criteria development, and program development of projects for operation and maintenance of current assets and acquisition or construction of new facilities.
O Group (No Group with this designation has been identified)
P Group - Production
This Group is NSA's principal element for the production of finished SIGINT (ELINT and COMINT) products in support of other consumers in the intelligence community. The Group provides signals intelligence research, retrieval and dissemination services for NSA programs, associated contractors and other government agencies and contractors. It maintains manual and automated classified data bases to facilitate the acquisition, storage and dissemination of signals intelligence information. The Group identifies and establishes NSA requirements for SIGINT production based on consumers' present and future needs. It serves as the focal point for intelligence documentation support and processing and dissemination requests through national automated intelligence data bases.
Q Group - Plans & Policy
This Group acts as the principal staff advisor and assistant to the Director, NSA, and other staff elements on the initiation, development, integration, coordination, and monitoring of NSA policy, plans, programs, and projects and is responsible for oversight of designated NSA/CSS programs; mission and organization control; command control and contingency planning; NSA studies and projects, operations research and. economic analysis; NSA strategic planning and personnel authorizations and position management.
R Group - Research & Engineering
This Group transforms SIGINT collection requirements into system performance parameters, requirements, and system configurations. It establishes and maintains system performance specifications and supports the configuration controls. The Group develops an d monitors internal and external interface requirements, defines test and target requirements and provides cost, schedule, produce ability, manufacturing, basing, logistics, and other support necessary for SIGINT collection system development and deployment. The Group serves as a centre for research and development on signals intelligence technologies, and provides for evaluation of algorithms, data bases, and display concepts in signal processing. The Group maintains facilities for research and development on audio and speech signal processing, the supports test and evaluation of speech processing technology to intelligence related problems.
S Group - Standards & Evaluation
This Group develops, establishes, and evaluates implementation of comprehensive standards for information security, classification management, security education and motivation, and industrial and personnel security. The Group provides staff supervision and guidance for industrial security program, performs industrial security functions of review and approval, serves on contract requirements and technical review boards, and performs industrial security inspections of classified contractor activities. It is the primary COMSEC community focus for development and certification of COMSEC equipment and procedures.
T Group - Telecommunications
This Groups manages all government and contractor activities associated with the design, development, production and operation of Special Intelligence Communications (SPINTCOM) networks and systems for the transmission of SIGINT data and products.
U Group - General Counsel
Provides legal advice and services to the Director and the Heads of NSA staff elements on matters involving or affecting NSA, exercises supervisory and professional control over personnel providing legal services in NSA, provides liaison with other agencies on legal issues relating to NSA, and manages assigned programs.
V Group - Network Security
This Group develops, establishes, and administers comprehensive programs for communications network security and related industrial security. (The identity of this Group is tentative)
W Group - Space
This Group implements operational control of space-based sensors. It documents, maintains, and implements operational requirements, monitors capabilities, and coordinates activities for sensors. Provides resource management for collection, transmission an d processing of SIGINT derived from space-based sensors. The Group monitors and performs analysis on sensor operations, system capabilities, and performance. It manages technical service support (TSS) contracts to ensure operational support for ground stations. Interfaces with NRO on system acquisition. The Group coordinates and monitors system testing for space-based sensors, and interfaces with the Air Force Satellite Control Facility (SCF) for operational tasking. It also coordinates and provides input on future sensor requirements.
X Group - Special Access Systems (The function and designation of this Group is undetermined)
Y Group - (The function and designation of this Group is undetermined)
Z Group - (No Group with this designation has been identified)
The National Reconnaissance Office was created on 25 August 1960 following months of intense controversy between the White House, CIA, the Air Force and the Department of Defence over the allocation of responsibilities for satellite reconnaissance. In the aftermath of the 1 May 1960 downing of Gary Powers' U-2 over the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower on 10 June directed Defence Secretary Thomas Gates develop recommendations on the future of space intelligence collection. Gates appointed a panel headed by Under Secretary of the Air Force Joseph Charyk, who was joined by Deputy Director of Defence Research and Engineering John Rubel and Presidential Science Adviser George Kistiakowsky. Their report to the National Security Council (NSC) on 25 August marked the formation of the NRO. The decision to form a "national" agency was intended to ensure that the interests of all parties, including the military and civilian intelligence communities, would be represented in the utilization of space systems.
By 1961 the Agency and the Air Force had established a working relationship for overhead reconnaissance systems through a central administrative office, whose director reported to the Secretary of Defence but accepted intelligence requirements through USIB. By informal agreement, the Air Force provided launchers, bases, and recovery capability for reconnaissance systems, while the Agency was responsible for research, development, contracting, and security. Essentially, the agreement allowed the Agency to decide which systems would be deployed, and the Air Force challenged the CIA's jurisdiction.
A primary mission was at stake in these negotiations, and the struggle was fierce on both sides. Control by one agency or another did not involve only budgets and manpower. Since the Air Force and CIA missions were very different, a decision would affect the nature of the reconnaissance program itself -- tactical or national intelligence priorities, the frequency and location of overflights, and the use of data.
The agreement that emerged in 1965 attempted to balance the interests of both the Air Force and the CIA. A three-person Executive Committee, (EXCOM) for the administration of overhead reconnaissance was established. Its members included the DCI, an Assistant Secretary of Defence, and the President's Scientific Advisor. The EXCOM reported to the Secretary of Defence, who was assigned primary administrative authority for overhead reconnaissance systems. The arrangement recognized the DCI's authority as head of the community to establish collection requirements in consultation with USIB; it also gave him responsibility for processing and utilizing data generated by overhead reconnaissance. In the event that he did not agree with a decision made by the Secretary of Defence, the DCI was given the right to appeal to the President.
The agreement represented a compromise between Air Force and CIA claims and provided substantive recognition of the DCT's national intelligence responsibility. As a structure for decision-making, it has worked well. However, it has not rectified the inherent competition over technical collection systems that has come to motivate the intelligence process. The development of these systems has created intense rivalry principally between the Air Force and the Agency over program deployments. With so much money and personnel at stake with each new system, each organization is eager to gain the benefits of successful contracting. As a result the accepted solution to problems with the intelligence product has come to be more collection rather than better analysis.
In late 1992, the NRO released the text of the Defence Department Directive establishing the Organization:
The National Reconnaissance Office will be organized separately within the Department of Defence under the Director, National Reconnaissance Office, appointed by the Secretary of Defence. The Director will be responsible for consolidation of all Department of Defence satellite and air vehicle overflight projects for intelligence into a single program, defined as the National Reconnaissance Program, and for the complete management and conduct of this Program in accordance with policy guidance and decisions of the Secretary of Defence.
In carrying out his responsibilities for the National Reconnaissance Program the Director National Reconnaissance Office shall:
Work directly with the Defence Space Operations Committee (DSOC) on policy budgets, requirements and programs. The Defence Space Operations Committee is the principal advisory body to the Secretary of Defence for the National Reconnaissance Program. (Its members include the Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Review; the Assistant Secretary of Defence for Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence; and the Secretary of the Air Force, who will be the Chairman of the Committee.) The Director shall respond to tasks approved by the Defence Space Operations Committee and will keep the DSOC informed, on a regular basis, on the status of projects of the National Reconnaissance Program.
Similarly inform other Department of Defence personnel as he may determine necessary in the course of carrying out specific project matters.
Establish appropriate interfaces between the National Reconnaissance Office and the United States Intelligence Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defence Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.
Where appropriate, make use of qualified personnel of services and agencies of the Department of Defence as full time members of the National Reconnaissance Office.
Officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defence, military departments, and other DoD agencies shall provide support within their respective fields of to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office as may be necessary for the Director to carry out his assigned responsibilities and functions, Director, National Reconnaissance Office. The Director, National Reconnaissance Office will be given support as required from normal staff elements of the military departments and agencies concerned, although these staff elements will not participate in these project matters except as he specifically requests.
The Director, National Reconnaissance Office, in connection with his assigned responsibilities for the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Reconnaissance Program, is hereby specifically delegated authority to:
Organize, staff and supervise the National Reconnaissance Office.
Establish, manage and conduct the National Reconnaissance Program.
Assist the Secretary of Defence in the supervision of aircraft, and satellite reconnaissance, photographic projects, and be his direct representative both within and outside the Department of Defence.
Review all Department of Defence budget requests and expenditures for any item falling within the definition of the National Reconnaissance Program, including studies and preliminary research and development of components and techniques to support such existing or future projects.
All projects falling within the definition of the National Reconnaissance Program are assigned to that program and will be managed as outlined herein unless specific exception is made by the Director, National Reconnaissance Office. Announcements of any such exceptions will be made by numbered enclosures to this directive.
The Director, National Reconnaissance Office will establish the security procedures to be followed for all matters in the National Reconnaissance Program to protect all elements of the National Reconnaissance Office.
All communications pertaining to matters under the National Reconnaissance Program will be subject to special systems of security control under the cognisance of the Director, Defence Intelligence Agency, except as specifically exempted by either Director, National Reconnaissance Office or the Secretary of Defence.
With the single exception of this directive, no mention will be made of the following titles or their abbreviations in any document which is not controlled under the special security control system(s) referred to: National Reconnaissance Program; National Reconnaissance Office. Where absolutely necessary to refer to the National Reconnaissance Program in communications not controlled under the prescribed special security systems, such reference will be made by use of the terminology: "Matters under the purview of DoD TS-5105.23."

1960-1989 - Initial Organization
Since its formation on 25 August 1960, the Navy, Air Force and CIA had each managed their own stable of satellites, with both Air Force and CIA managing both SIGINT and IMINT assets, although CIA usually handled IMINT and Air Force had primary responsibility for SIGINT. Program D included aerial assets. Initially the NRO was organized into four programs, each of which was responsible for system design and development, coordination with contractors, and operations.
Program A included all Air Force satellite intelligence programs, which were managed by the Special Projects Office located at the Air Force Space and Missiles System Centre at Los Angeles AFB, El Segundo, CA.
Program B encompassed Central Intelligence Agency satellite programs, which were the responsibility of the Agency's Deputy Director for Science and Technology, discharged the Assistant Deputy Director for Research and Engineering.
Program C embraced the Naval component of NRO, responsible for ocean surveillance satellites. Development activities were conducted by the Naval Space and Warfare Systems Command (NAVSPAWAR) in Crystal City, VA, and the Navy Space Project Office at Los Angeles AFB, El Segundo, CA. Operational control of Naval systems is the responsibility of the Naval Security Group Command, headquartered in Washington, DC.
Program D covered aerial surveillance programs, such as the U-2 and A-11, prior to 1969. These aircraft were subsequently operated by the Air Force Strategic Air Command, until the establishment of Air Combat Command, whereupon control of the remaining U-2s reverted briefly with NRO. Responsibility for these activities was subsequently removed from the NRO and ultimately lodged in the Defence Airborne Reconnaissance Office in late 1993.
This use of service executive agents mirrored the pattern initially established by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, and later by the Strategic Defence Initiative Organization, and its successor, the Ballistic Missile Defence Organization. A small central agency staff directed and supervised work conducted by much larger service organizations, which in turn managed relations with the even larger contractor base.
Although the NRO is a national organization, since its formation the NRO has operated under the cover of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, and the Office of Space Systems [SAF/SS], which serves as the organization's staff director. However, during the Carter and Bush Administrations, the NRO was headed by an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force -- on both occasions the Under Secretary was a woman, who was presumably not qualified to discharge this responsibility. Exceptionally, Reagan Administration Air Force Under Secretary Edward Aldridge retained responsibility for the NRO when he became Secretary of the Air Force. For over a decade the NRO Deputy Director has been an Air Force civilian, Jimmie Hill, and the current identity of the NRO Director can be readily tracked by observing who Jimmie Hill works for.
The Under Secretary of the Navy is also specifically tasked to operate the Department of the Navy's programs which are part of the NRO.
The Director of Central Intelligence chairs the National Reconnaissance Executive Committee, which directly supervises the NRO.

1989-1990 Consolidation
In mid-1989, David Boren, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence requested a jointly approved plan for the reorganization of the National Reconnaissance Office. In 1989 the Senate Intelligence Committee stated that:
"the best approach to ensuring a robust national reconnaissance program is to reorganize the NRO in a way which facilitates greater communication, cross-system and cross program fertilization, and common security, support, and administrative practices. Thus, the Committee directs that, unless an Alternative plan approved by the Secretary of Defence and the DCI is submitted prior to November 1, 1989, the NRO begin, no later than November 1, 1989, a reorganization according to the plan outlined in a letter to the Intelligence Committee dated November 21, 1988 by then Secretary of the Air Force Edward C. Aldridge, Jr....
" ... (2) collocation of remaining activities in a central facility in the Washington, D.C. area; ... [under] ... the Aldridge Plan...Ultimately, circa 1991-1992, the plan called for the collocation of the CIA Air Force, and Navy Program offices in a new facility in Northern Virginia. The Committee believes these goals and the timetable are realistic. Moreover, additional realignment of program office functions are made feasible by the collocation and should be pursued....
"Accordingly, the Committee directs that all activities of the various program offices be collocated according to the 1991-1992 timetable unless the Director, NRO decides, based on compelling reasons, that certain sub-elements of the three program offices should not collocate. In such a case, the Director should notify the Intelligence Committees of his decision and describe his rationale for it.
In a 3 July 1989 letter to Boren regarding the NRO restructure, Defence Secretary Richard Cheney and Director of Central Intelligence William Webster stated their intent to:
Form a Joint Senior Advisory Board (now referred to as the National Reconnaissance Review Board) of senior Intelligence Community managers to advise us and the DSRO regarding NRO issues; Establish a strong Planning, Analysis, and Evaluation capability within the NRO to support the architectural development and programmatic decision processes; Designate the CIA's Director of Development and Engineering as the Director of Program B to provide a full-time manager for Program B; and Establish, within the NRO, a Deputy Director for Command Support position (now referred to as the Deputy Director for Military Support) to improve NRO support to the military.
In addition to these initial steps, the DNRO Restructure Study recommended:
Realignment of the NRO and Defence Support Project Office (DSPO) staffs to improve management effectiveness and facilitate a more integrated and effective organizational response to military requirements. The DSPO continued as a distinct organizational entity providing the principal focus for the DSPO/NRO interface with the military. However, common support functions, such as budget administration and planning and analysis support, were combined into single organizational entities that provided support to both the NRO and DSPO. Establish, within the NRO, National Security Agency responsible for ensuring that consistent and adequate implementation standards are applied across government and contractor organizations in order to minimize wasteful resource expenditures and maximize the effectiveness of security protection. Continued use of a small, centralized, Inspection and Audit (IG) function, supported by the IG activities of the NRO Program Offices' parent organizations, to accomplish the necessary NRO IG functions. With the recent agreement between the NRO and CIA, the final issue preventing successful implementation of this concept has been removed and all NRO Program Offices and their parent organizations support the charter of the NRO Inspector General.
Defence Secretary Richard Cheney and Director of Central Intelligence William Webster endorsed the DNRO's decision not to pursue further collocation. They shared his belief that the combination of restructure initiatives being implemented had the potential to achieve the same benefit as a total collocation without the downside risk of disrupting the NRO's program execution ability and support infrastructure. However, they did express the belief, as did DNRO, that it was important to continue to protect the option to implement additional collocation initiatives if required. The DNRO's facility acquisition strategy supported this objective.
The Defence Secretary and the Director of Central Intelligence reaffirmed their previous conviction, supported by the DNRO's 1989-90 reassessment, that a business-line structure, that would attempt to give each Program Office the responsibility for a unique mission area, was neither a viable or effective restructure alternative. They wanted to preserve a beneficial degree of competition between the Program Offices and the ability to apply the resources of all three Program Offices, as appropriate, to a problem. Competition was also viewed as vital to sustaining the motivation of the Program Offices and the ability to develop creative solutions to intelligence requirements.
The Defence Secretary and the Director of Central Intelligence shared the DNRO's concern regarding the House Appropriations Committee guidance to shift program management responsibility for the Defence Reconnaissance Support Program (DRSP) and Airborne Reconnaissance Support Program (ARSP) from the DNRO to the Assistant Secretary of Defence for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (AND (C3I)). In their view, no matter what external lines of authority existed, or are established, to the NRO, the fundamental principle must remain that NRO Program Offices must work for one program manager, the DNRO, regardless of the source of the funding for the programs they are executing. Subsequent to the preparation of the Restructuring Report on 8 January 1990, the ASD(C3I) and the DNRO developed a recommendation which maintained this principle while providing for appropriate direction from the ASD(C3I). Under this plan, the NRO's Deputy Director for Military Support would also serve as the Director of the DSPO under the day-to-day operational control of the DNRO. In this capacity, he will receive programmatic oversight, requirements, guidance, and funding through the ASD(C3I). The DSPO would be a DoD staff element (not a NRO Program Office) with budgeting, coordination, and architectural responsibilities. Specific relationships among the ASD(C3I), DSPO, DNRO, and the DCI were to be formulated and provided at a later date.
The DNRO recommended implementation of an NRO headquarters collocation that included the DNRO, his deputies, their staff support, management elements from the three Program Offices, and appropriate centralized support functions in order to facilitate a more integrated organizational approach to the accomplishment of the NRO mission, built upon the unique capabilities of the individual Program Offices.
Throughout most of its history, the small NRO staff consisted of personnel seconded from other agencies. The January 1990 NRO Restructure Report noted the problems this created, and considered the possibility of creating:
" ... a more integrated organizational structure. Multiple civilian personnel systems may result in individuals doing similar jobs for different levels of pay and benefits. Additionally, our ability to make the personnel changes necessary to accommodate programmatic changes in our programs might be improved if the NRP budgeted, and perhaps directly controlled, its personnel resources. "This area is very important to the long term success of our restructure efforts. However, I am not prepared to recommend a definitive solution for our personnel requirements beyond the approach for the additional requirements described above. I intend to work with the Administration and the Congress to develop a solution as quickly as possible."
The restructure activities required additional personnel to support the centralized security function.
To support the additional personnel requirements associated with the new facilities and the centralized security function, 111 additional personnel were authorized to be paid with funds available to the National Reconnaissance Program, which would require funding increasing gradually from $5.6 million in 1991 to $7.9 million in 1995.
1992 Functional Reorganization
As early as mid-1989 it was reported that the Defence Department (Air Force) was in charge of the photographic intelligence bureau of the NRO. And by late 1989 it was reported that the NRO had initiated a major restructuring, with each CIA assigned responsibility for all satellites under the Imagery Branch, and Air Force assigned responsibility for all satellites under the SIGINT Branch. Least affected was the Navy, which retained responsibility for the satellites of the Ocean Surveillance Branch. Although these reports were in error at the time, they reflected the options under consideration in 1989, and ultimately implemented in 1992.
The Woolsey panel recommended reorganization of NRO into several directorates and collocation of major NRO elements as expeditiously as possible. These recommendations were approved by the DCI, the Secretary of Defence, and the President. The Restructure Plan approved by the SECDEF and DCI collocated most of the NRO to a single location as soon as possible. Full collocation would be supported with the occupancy of the NRO Westfields facility in 1996. According to the NRO, the Westfields consolidation would: strengthen the technical capability of the organization; improve decision making; promote closer, more active, interfaces with customers; improve ability to develop more integrated architecture; allow merging of similar functions to minimize redundancy; and facilitate functional organization structure.
The process of reorganization along product rather than service lines began in late 1992. In mid- November, DCI Robert Gates announced:
"... we have implemented a far-reaching internal restructuring of the National Reconnaissance Office (including declassification of its existence). These changes, from an organizational to a functional structure, are the most comprehensive in the NRO's history."
Under the new structure, the designation of CIA as IMINT Branch manager and Air Force as SIGINT Branch-manager was replaced by IMINT and SIGINT Branches staffed by workers from CIA and the military services. According to NRO Director Martin Faga, under the new structure:
"We will have the CIA and the [Defence Department] people intertwined to carry out the particular functions we need."
Faga suggested that the NRO organization prior to 1989, with each service working competitively and independently, had contributed to excessive proliferation of competing satellite designs and a lack of technical coordination.
The leading public authority on NRO, Jeff Richelson, suggested that:
"The advances have been so great that maybe they don't need the degree of competition they have had in the past. You're not going to have the Air Force and the CIA competing for the design of the next signals intelligence spacecraft in the way you have in the past."
As of early 1994, NRO reported that "significant progress has been made in our efforts to reorganize into an integrated functional organization."
As part of the continuing baseline review of NRO support functions, it was determined that the support function needed to be consolidated and expanded in the NRO. Consequently a Management Services and Operations (MSO) organization was established in FY 1992. MSO provides consolidated support in the areas of communications, human resources management, administrative services, facility acquisition, logistics support,, and facility security. Additionally, the Centralized Security Function has expanded its original support function in the areas of communications security training and personnel security.
The Miscellaneous Support and Operations element of the Mission Support expenditure centre includes the facilities required in the NRO reorganization, airlift support, personnel costs, security operations, NRO communications and non-program specific logistics and support. The FY 1992 increase in Miscellaneous Support and Operations includes a functional transfer from the Air Force for the operational costs of the NRO communications.
As a result of the restructure actions the NRO became responsible for new or increased infrastructure and administrative support which it had previously received from other organizations. These functions necessitated an increase in NRO personnel. In addition to the personnel requirements to support the NRO restructure initiated in 1990, the recent organizational changes and the declassification of the existence of the NRO increased the requirement for additional personnel to support FOIA facility activities and an expanded NRO Inspector General function.


The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) is a combat support agency of the Department of Defence (DoD), supporting the Secretary of Defence, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and other national-level policymakers in the areas of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. NIMA is a member of the national Intelligence Community and the single entity upon which the U.S. Government relies to coherently manage the disciplines of imagery and mapping. NNIMA was established on 1 October 1996 to address these expanding requirements. It was created from the former Defence Mapping Agency (DMA), Central Imagery Office (CIO), and the Defence Dissemination Program Office (DDPO) in their entirety; the missions and functions of the National Photographic Interpretation Centre (NPIC); and the imagery exploitation, dissemination and processing capabilities of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Defence Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO). The National Imagery and Mapping Agency's (NIMA's) role is to support the war fighter through priorities established by the commanders in chief (CINCs). This support comes in the form of imagery, imagery intelligence, and GI (including standard maps and data sets) in support of national security objectives. The agency's vision is to guarantee ready access to the world's imagery, imagery intelligence, and GI. NIMA has technical and liaison representatives at the CINC level who work with the staff and the GI&S officer to establish requirements and priorities and to identify the best products and services that NIMA can provide. These representatives prioritise, validate, and consolidate requirements identified by major subordinate commands (MSCs).

NIMA has a global mission, as established by the NIMA Act of 1996. It has the unique responsibilities of managing and providing imagery and GI to national policy makers and military forces. NIMA is also an established part of the US intelligence community in recognition of its unique responsibilities and global mission. NIMA brings together in a single organization the imagery tasking, production, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) responsibilities and the mapping, charting, and geodetic functions of eight separate organizations of the defence and intelligence communities. NIMA continues to improve support to national and military customers through comprehensive management of US imaging and geospatial capabilities. The NIMA mission is to provide timely, relevant, and accurate imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information in support of national security objectives. NIMA is responsible for providing support to military operations, defence agencies, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), and other Federal Government Agencies on matters concerning imagery and geospatial information relating to national security. NIMA was created by consolidating several agencies into a single entity which requires consolidating several distinct missions into the NIMA mission. Under this mission NIMA is assigned the responsibility to prescribe and mandate standards and end-to-end technical architectures related to imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information for the DoD Components and for non-DoD elements of the Intelligence Community. NIMA is chartered to provide management and operation (collection tasking, imagery analysis and geospatial information production) of the imagery and geospatial services for National customers and for support to military operations, planning, training, and weapons systems. It is to ensure access and dissemination of primary and secondary imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. NIMA is responsible for the acquisition, design, development, implementation, installation, transition, and sustainment of systems, standards, and technology pertaining to the United States Imagery and Geospatial Information Systems (USIGS) for the imagery, imagery analysis, and geospatial information community. NIMA ensures that imagery intelligence, geospatial information, and other needs for imagery are managed effectively and efficiently in a manner conducive to national security and consistent with the authorities and duties of the Secretary of Defence and the DCI.

United States Imagery and Geospatial Information Systems (USIGS)

The United States Imagery and Geospatial Information System (USIGS) is an umbrella term for the suites of systems formerly called the United States Imagery System (USIS) and the Global Geospatial Information and Services (GGIS). USIGS will be defined by the migration of the former USIS and GGIS architectures, with the goal of common graphical interfaces, and seamless information exchanges. In addition to the former USIS and GGIS framework, USIGS will include new capabilities, and leverage the pre-existing architecture work. USIGS will use the DII/COE C4ISR Architecture Framework, and the Joint Technical Architecture as its baseline.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Since the 1930's, the FBI has had the primary responsibility for investigating most federal crimes. Espionage and treason are such crimes, and so the FBI has been responsible for most of America's counterintelligence work. Although the Bureau has close to 100,000 agents, only about a thousand are involved in counterintelligence work. These agents are occasionally assisted by other FBI  agents or officers of local or state police agencies. The FBI also has Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams.

Delta Force

The 1st SFOD-Delta (Delta force) is one the Federal Government's CT (Counter Terrorist) groups. Also known as CAG (Combat Applications Group) the Pentagon manages to tightly control what is known about this Unit. Their soldiers are recruited from the U.S. Army, mainly from the Special Forces Green Berets and Rangers. Their main compound is in a remote area of Fort Bragg and it is rumoured that up to 2,500 personnel are present at this facility.

The TO (Table of Order) for Delta consists of three operational squadrons, a support squadron, a signal squadron, an aviation platoon, and what is termed the "Funny Platoon". This funny platoon is reported to be the only JSOC unit including female operators. Selection for all of these units is rigorous with more focus on mental abilities and toughness than physical

Training involves runs through CQB (Close Quarters Battle) killing houses designed to teach teams and individuals how to assault buildings that have been captured by terrorists. Selective firing (whether or not to shoot a target) as well as the double tap (shooting the target twice to make sure that the target does not get up again) are instilled in the Counter-terrorism specialists.

Their facility at Bragg is reported to be considered the best special operation training facility in the world. The CQB indoor training range has earned the ominous nick-name, "The House of Horrors". The Facility comes equipped with mock-up of trains and buses for practice in tubular assaults, and there is reported to be a section of a wide-body jet in the units "aircraft room".

As a counter-terrorist group, Delta's main function is in hostage rescue. During Operation Just Cause Delta got their chance to do just that. Kurt Muse, an American businessman operating an underground radio station, had been jailed in the city of Modelo. A 160th SOAR MH-6 transported a team of troopers to the rooftop of the jail. The team fought its way down to the second floor and blew the door to Muse' cell, freeing him without injury. As the team and Muse made their way to the roof and the waiting MH-6, Kurt Muse counted at least five bodies. Not all had been killed; one terrified guard had been handcuffed to a staircase railing. Lifting off, the small helicopter was hit by small arms fire and fell to the street below. The pilot slid the aircraft along the ground to a parking lot and attempted to take off again. The aircraft was hit by ground fire again and hit the ground, this time permanently. A passing UH-60 spotted the infrared spotlight held up by a Delta trooper, and soldiers from the 6th Infantry Regiment came to their rescue. Four Delta operators were wounded, but Delta had "officially" validated their existence and saved Kurt Muse' life.

Delta also saw action in Desert Storm, although the full extent of what they did there has not been revealed. Delta Troopers provided security for General Norman Schwartzkopf and also took part in some missions into Iraq to locate Scud missile launchers for destruction. Delta received some unwanted publicity in the disastrous UN Campaign to stabilize the country of Somolia. During their mission in Mogadishu, Somolia, they assaulted different safe houses containing high-ranking members of warring clans and took them prisoner. Unfortunately, during their last mission two of the support helicopters from the 160th SOAR were shot down. Two Delta operators were killed defending the survivours of the second crash, and at least one was killed in an on-foot extraction through a city populated with locals riled up against the Americans.

Delta works closely with the 160th SOAR for air support, but they also have their own fleet of helicopters (the aviation platoon). Painted in civilian colours and with fake registration numbers, the helicopters can deploy with Delta operators and mount gun pods to provide air support as well as transportation. Delta/CAG also works with the CIA's Special Activities Staff.

Much of what DEVGRU, or the Naval Special Warfare Development Group, is and does remains classified and unknown. What is know is that they were formed in the mid 1990's after SEAL Team Six, the Navy's Counter-terrorism was disbanded. DEVGRU was created after Richard Marcinko, the original commander of ST6 published a series of books that outlined the history and purpose of the original Team. According to the US Navy, DEVGRU was formed to create, test, and evaluate new tactics, weapons, and equipment. However with the disbanding of ST 6 the Navy was left without a maritime CT unit, although SEAL Team 8 was tasked with maritime deployments and takedowns. Recent rumours have appear to confirm that DEVGRU is actually a CT unit created (although current officers will deny its existence) to replace the lime-light stricken ST6. This is born out, in no small significance, buy the structure surrounding DEVGRU. While under the command of NAVSPECWARGRU (Navy Special Warfare Group, DEVGRU is also a component of JSOC, with other such units as the US Army's 1at SFOD-D and 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, both units that list counter-terrorism in their primary activities.

What weapons and equipment DEVGRU uses has not been revealed. However, given their SEAL parentage it is a safe bet that the MP55 is used mainly in COB and the Colt M4 is the primary assault weapon. The SOCOM pistol has been issued but it is reported that the Sig-Sauer P-228 is preferred for personal defence. DEVGRU is thought to consist of around 400 operators and support personnel, divided into four combat teams and one training team. The combat assault teams are Red, Gold, and Blue, with Gold being the premier assault team. Grey team is the transportation unit containing the SDVs and boats used to transport the assault teams. Green Team consists of the new operators who have just joined DEVGRU and are in training. Each operator inside the Teams has a specialty, but all are experts in underwater and HALO insertion. They are also rumoured to have their own helicopter assets within the unit. 18 HH-60 helicopters optimised for CSAR are said to exist within the unit, but I doubt this. Maybe one or two, but the navy has only 18 HH-60s in two reserve squadrons so it makes little sense to me to have 18 in one top-secret unit.

Military Police Special Reaction Teams
Throughout the last few decades of the Twentieth Century a wave of violent protest and viscous terrorist attacks swept across the Western world. Many of the these incidents were specifically directed at US Army personnel and installations. These attacks, coupled with the increased amount of violent crimes being encountered by Army Military Police (MP) personnel, caused great concern amongst senior Army law enforcement officials. At the time that the Army was studying how to deal with this new threat, the Air Force had been conducting tactical team training for its Security Police (SP) units Emergency Services Teams (EST) at Lackland AFB. The Army sent a small team of MP's to Lackland, to attend the course. The results were deemed so successful that the Dept. of the Army (DA) mandated that all Army MP units, assigned to a major installation, form specially trained teams to respond to potential crisis situations. As a result, of this directive, all major Army posts now maintain the ability to deploy a MP Special Reaction Team, or SRT. SRTs are the Army's version of a civilian SWAT team. SRT's are deployed in the event that a situation develops that is beyond the scope of the regular MP units, assigned to that installation. Possible scenarios that may call for the deployment of an SRT include:

Hostage situations

Counter terrorist operations

Barricaded criminals

Sniper incidents

VIP protection duties

High risk searches

Threatened suicide

Barricaded mentally disturbed persons

In the event that a SRT is deployed, the teams primary focus would be to insure the safety of all parties involved. Teams would also try to apprehend any offenders, and secure the area for investigators. Potential SRT members are selected from the ranks of experienced MPs. After passing an initial selection which includes a physical fitness test, a psychological screening, and a records review; candidates then attend a two week long SRT 1 course at the US Army Military Police School. During the 160 hr. course of instruction students receive instruction in selective firing, physical training, rappelling, breaching techniques, and tactics. Students must successfully complete eight scenarios, including some conducted at night, to graduate. SRT marksman-observers (snipers) attend a separate one week long SRT 2 course. Team members receive additional training at US Army, civilian, and military training courses. A standard SRT consists of a least 9 men led by a team leader, who holds the rank of E-6, or above. 5-6 men compromise the entry team, with the remaining four men making up two-2 man marksman-observer teams. The entry team is broken down into:

1 Team leader- E-6 or above

1 Pointman- E-4 or above

2 Defensemen - E-4 or above

1 Rear Security E-4 or above

The teams are outfitted with standard Army BDUs, black kevlar helmets, tactical thigh holsters, and various tactical vests with built in radios. Weapons available for employment by team members include: M-9 Barretta pistols, M-16 and M-4 rifles, HK MP-5 SMGs, Remington 870 shotguns, and M-24 sniper rifles (modified Remington 700s).

Joint Special Operations Command
After the failed attempt to rescue US hostages being held prisoner in Iran, the US military immediately began planning for a second rescue attempt. As part of this panning a number of new special operations units were formed within the armed forces. To help prevent some of the confusion that developed during the planning, and execution phases of the first rescue attempt, a new command structure was activated to control these new units. This new command would eventually evolve into the Joint Special Operations Command or JSOC. Activated on December 15, 1980 and based at Pope AFB, NC JSOC's publicly-released posture statement states that JSOC performs the following missions:
provides a standing joint special operations task force provides joint special operations planning studies joint special operations requirements and techniques ensures interoperability and equipment standardization conducts joint special operations exercises. Although JSOC's stated purpose is to provide a unified command structure for conducting joint special operations and exercises, numerous reports have stated that JSOC is actually the command responsible for conducting US counter-terrorism (CT) operations. According to published reports, JSOC commands the US military's Special Missions Units (SMUs). These SMUs are tasked with conducting CT operations, strike operations, reconnaissance in denied areas, and special intelligence missions.

JSOC units have reportedly been involved in a number of covert military operations over the last two decades. Some of the operations that have come to light include providing assistance to Italian authorities during their search for kidnapped US Army Gen. James Dozier, participating in Operation Urgent Fury; the US invasion of Grenada, planning a rescue attempt of US hostages being held in Lebanon, rescuing hostages being held aboard the cruise liner Achille Lauro, participating in Operation Just Cause; the US intervention in Panama, directing US Scud hunting efforts during Operation Desert Storm, conducting operations in support of UN mandates in Somalia, and searching for suspected war criminals in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. Recently the veil of secrecy surrounding JSOC has been lifted a little more. Press reports have indicates that US SMUs have been tasked with conducting counter-proliferation operations against countries producing weapons of mass destruction. Currently JSOC is believed to command the following units:

1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta " Delta" ( also known as the Combat Development Group, or Combat Applications Group)

Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) - operates under various cover names

Naval Special Warfare Development Group- DEVGRU

USAF 24 Special Tactics Squadron - (24 STS)

Joint Communications Unit- (JCU)

A joint aviation unit (operating under various cover names)

A technical intelligence unit

Other US special operations forces may operate in support of JSOC depending on their operational needs. The primary units that operate in this manner include the following:

75th Ranger Regiment

160th SOAR, primarily the 1st Bn. with its "Little Bird" helicopters

USAF Special Operations Squadrons, especially the 55th SOS and their MC-130 squadrons.

JSOC units regularly conduct training with similar units from around the world, and provide training to nations that request US support. JSOC has also provide support to domestic law enforcement agencies during high profile, or high risk events such as the Olympic;, the World Cup; political party conventions; and Presidential inaugurations.

Joint Communication Unit
In the investigation that followed the failed attempt to rescue US hostages from Iran a number of deficiencies were identified. One of the main factors contributing to the confusion at Desert One was the lack of compatibility between communications systems, and the fact that each service involved had different standard operating procedures. To alleviate some of the confusion and standardize communication procedures when conducting joint special operations, the Joint Chiefs of staff ordered the formation of a new joint-service communication unit. The new unit was designated the Joint Communication Unit (JCU), and was activated in 1980 at Ft. Bragg, NC, and assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). The unit's initial cadre of personnel was drawn from special operations communications personnel assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's (JCS) Joint Communication Support Element (JCSE). The JCU is tasked with ensuring standardization of communications procedures and equipment used by JSOC, and its subordinate units. It is also tasked with providing a link between deployed JSOC units, other special operations and military units, other government agencies, and the National Command Authority (NCA). JCU is required to maintain doctrinal expertise in the use all the services communications equipment. JCU is also proficient in the use US governmental agency's and allied military communications systems. In June of 1981 JCU assumed the responsibility of providing communications support for US special operations conducting counter terrorist (CT) operations, from the JCSE. Prior to this specially selected, airborne trained Army and Air Force personnel assigned to JCSE Quick Reaction Element teams supported CT exercises, and missions. Since its initial activation JCU personnel have supported every JSOC deployment.

In october of 1983 the JCU deployed as part of JSOC task force conducting operations on the Caribbean island of Grenada. For its actions during the operation, the unit was awarded a Joint Meritorious Unit Award. JCU personnel also deployed to provide support to JSOC forces during the planned attempt to rescue hostages being held on the hijacked Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro. In 1990 JCU communicators were deployed to the desert Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The US deployment was code named Operation Desert Storm, and was the largest deployment of US forces since Vietnam. As part of the build up of US troops, JSOC had covertly deployed a a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), composed of several military Special Mission Units (SMUs), to the area. With the JSPTF initial mission no longer necessary, the task force was used to hunt form Iraqi mobile SCUD launchers, in an operation code named Elusive Concept. JCU personnel provided critical support between JSOC units operating in the field, and and higher headquarters elements. For its support of JSOC units during the Gulf Conflict, the JCU and its personnel, were awarded a third Joint Meritorious Unit award. In the fall of 1993 JCU personnel once again deployed in support of JSOC units operating in a hostile environment. The US had deployed a military force in support of UN peace keeping operations in the nation of Somalia. As part of that support the US had ordered the secret deployments of a JSOC JSOTF. The JSOTF was tasked with capturing rouge Somali warlord Gen. Mohammad Farh Adid. The JCU provided a communications link between the JSOTF, the US CINC, NCA, and other UN forces operating in the country. Most recently JSOC units have been operating in the Balkans supporting NATO peace keeping operations in the Former Yugoslavia. JCU personnel have provided support to these operations.

US Air Force Special Operations
The US Air Force Special Operations Wings provide US forces with the ability to insert or extract or perform search and rescue missions behind enemy lines at night or in bad weather. The USAF Special Operations Wings have a history that dates back to W.W.II. Officially, the 1st Air Commando Group came into being on March 29, 1944. However, the group had existed before under different names. Army General Arnold had tasked Lt. Colonel Phil Cochran (a war hero and basis for the comic strip "Terry and the Pirates") and John Alison (former deputy commander of the 75th Fighter Squadron; the USAAF group that the AVG Flying Tigers became when they were absorbed back into the American force structure) with the creation of an Air Corps unit to support a guerrilla force being created to harass the Japanese in Burma in early 1943. Cochran and Alison succeeded in training 523 men to operate as a cohesive, highly effect special operations force. It should be noted that the normal compliment of an Air Corps Wing was around 2,000 soldiers, nearly four times what they had on hand. Moreover, their training was cut short and they were deployed to the Pacific theatre after only a month of flying. After training with the Chindits (the force they were supporting) for three months they performed their first mission. The unit eventually operated 346 aircraft; including L-1 and L-5 scout aircraft for scouting and light medivac, P-51 Mustang's for fighter/attack cover, B-25H's for heavy attack, C-47's and CG-4A Waco Gliders for assaults and resupply, and four YR-4 helicopters. They were the first to use the helicopter in combat, and perfected the "glider snatch" technique, in which an loaded glider on the ground would be grabbed and towed aloft by a low-flying C-47 cargo plane. The unit was so under staffed that it was not a rare occurrence for the pilots of one type of aircraft to hop into another and go up for a second flight after finishing the first mission.

The early USAAC (United States Army Air Corps; the forerunner of the US Air Force) built a tradition of excellence and determination, coining the still-used motto of "Anytime, Anyplace." The motto came into being after one of the gliders crashed in a night-time training accident. The Chindit's commander, British General Wingate, was very impressed with the ability of the newly-formed air commandos and sent them a message that despite the crash, "we will go with your boys ant place, any time, any where." The 1st Air Commando Group went on to take place in Operation Thursday, a disruptive action that successfully stopped the Japanese invasion of India. On the first night, March 5 1944, they successfully delivered over 500 men and 15 tons of supplies behind Japanese lines to landing zone Broadway using gliders and C-47 cargo aircraft. Two nights later Operations reached a high tempo and no less than 92 planes loads ( roughly one every 4 minutes) arrived in the small jungle clearing in a night. Because of the Chindits (made possible by the air commando's insertion and resupply abilities) raids and sabotage, the Japanese invasion failed. The Army Air Corps also had a unit that operated in the European Theatre. Choosing the name "Carpetbaggers," the 801st/492nd Bombardment Group began to train for their mission of agent insertion and resupply behind enemy lines. Using modified ex-Navy PB they began practicing low-level flights in single ship formations, a far different way of operating than the high-level massed-formation daytime operations the pilots were used to. One of the modifications was the removal of the ball turret on the bottom of the aircraft. This allowed an easy exit from the aircraft for any agents being inserted. Another was the installation of a radio navigation device that lead a good navigator to within three miles of his target--at night in pitch black conditions. The cockpit instruments were also redesigned, putting the critical instruments front and centre so the pilot could keep his eyes on the ground as much as possible.

They began operations in January of 1944 and flew until September of that year, taking place in many important actions, including the build up to the D-day invasion of the French coast. Two days before the invasion, on June 3, 1944, they flew 17 missions in a single night. Before the invasion a need arose to pick up agents and ferry them back to England. The venerable C-47 Dakota was added to their inventory, and after two months of training the were ready for their first nighttime covert short field landing and take off. All in all, the Carpetbaggers C-47 inserted 78 agents with 104,000 pounds of supplies and extracted 213 agents from occupied territory. In part because of the Carpetbaggers actions, guerrillas were able to cut 885 rail lines and destroy 322 locomotives, 295 alone in the month following the D-Day landing, when their services were needed most. By September of 1944 the Allied army had captured the area the carpetbaggers operated, and the need for their night-time flights almost disappeared. There was still a need for their expertise, so they were simply moved forward and began operating from liberated bases in France. In one operation, a stripped-down C-47 smuggled a captured German V2 rocket out of Sweden for examination. They also inserted agents into Norway, although the weather caused many of their flights to abort due to bad conditions and inability to see the drop zone through the clouds and storms. When General Patton's drive into Germany stalled (His tank drive was so effective it ran ahead of the supply chain and they ran out of gas and had to stop) the Carpetbaggers modified their bombers-turned-cargo planes into flying fuel trucks, with the capacity to carry 2,500 gallons of non-aviation fuel each flight. All told, they airlifted almost a million gallons of fuel to Patton's gas-starved tanks and allowed them to resume their drive to Germany.

With the success of the Carpetbaggers came the need for more special operations capabilities in other areas. Fledgling units within conventional Air Forces (such as the Twelfth Air Force's 885th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) (Special) ) were created to aid in the supply of OSS agents and Eastern European Guerrillas in their fight to oust German occupation forces. The forerunner to today's Special Tactics Teams, BATS (Balkan Air Terminal Service) Teams, were created to coordinate the creation and use of covert airstrips, including guiding the aircraft in and unloading/loading cargo. The smaller units and the Carpetbaggers continued to operate until the end of the war, inserting agents behind enemy lines and resupplying covert and conventional units. New aircraft, such as the A-26 Invader (Later used in the Vietnam War) and British Mosquito were adopted to enable them to operate deeper and with greater safety to the aircrews. One innovation (which must have been quite the wild ride) was the use of the A-26's bomb bay doors as a platform for the agents to lay on. When the drop zone was reached, the pilot simply opened the bomb bay doors (with the proper warning, of course) and away the two agents went. With the close of the Second World War, all Army Air Corps Special Operations Air assets went away. Pilots were either discharged or transferred to conventional units. The planes were almost always scrapped. The United States had no unit dedicated to the resupply of forces behind enemy lines. Although the newly created United States Air Force began to look into covert operations in the late 1940's, there was nothing in place when the Korean War broke out in 1950. As ad-hoc units took on the airborne special operations role, an "official" squadron was rushed into readiness.

It was named the "Air Resupply and Communications Service," and although there was another unit that operated unofficially (det 2 of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron) earlier, the ARCS was the USAF's primary Special operations unit in the Korean War and was the only one to survive the draw down after the war (although it was also eventually dissolved). There were a total of six ARCS squadron's planned; only three became operational and served in any capacity. The ARCS were a combination of many functions, much like the different groups that make up the USAF's special operations forces today. B-29 Stratofortress bombers were used to bombard North Korean troops with Psychological leaflets designed to make them surrender or to lower moral. Helicopters were used to rescue American pilots shot down behind enemy lines, in many cases evading deadly enemy fire to do so. In addition, the Pararescue squadrons were first officially started in the ARCS. With the close of the Korean War, the immediate need for aviation special operations forces decreased. In an attempt to survive the budget cuts, the ARCS squadrons came up with new missions for themselves; such as rescuing U2 spy plane pilots. For various reasons, some missions could not make it successfully back to their bases. Two pilots were rescued by the ARCS SA-16 amphibious planes after coming down in the Caspian and Black Sea. Even with some of the new missions, there was not enough of a perceived need for special operations forces and the ARCS were shut down in the late 1950's.

There was another less known special unit that performed deep penetrations of Chinese Airspace in the late 1950's. Det 2 of the 1045th Observation, Evaluation, and Training Group was responsible for resupplying Tibetan guerrilla's resisting the Chinese Acquisition of Tibet. Flying into mountainous terrain, the group would insert Guerrilla's that had been trained in the US. One of the later missions that was performed was the a real resupply of the Dali Lama as he and his entourage escaped from Chinese forces. Det 2 was the first group in the US Air Force to use C-130 transports for special missions, the beginning of a long tradition that remains today. In 1961 the special operations capabilities of the Air Force were again established with the creation of the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (aka "Jungle Jim"). The 4400th was headquartered at Hurlburt Field located at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida and began training aircrews for counter-insurgency operations. The squadron was then changed to a group, and then changed again to become part of the new Special Air Warfare Centre. Initially, the unit operated with C-47 Dakota cargo planes, T-28 attack trainers, and B-26K's (heavily modified A-26 invaders from W.W.II). Despite the antiquated aircraft, the aircrews fought well and developed many tactics to use their slow-flying machines to good effect. For example, fares would be dropped off to the side of a fort being defended so that the airplane would not be silhouetted as it flew over the enemy's heads. Attacks would be made from different directions on different passes so that the enemy would not find a pattern and set up traps. These tactics made their missions more effective and safer, but there was still a high toll of airframes and crew.

Structural problems caused by the age of the aircraft and compounded by their heavy usage, and rough operating conditions lead to a series of accidents caused by structural failure. As a result these original aircraft were retired and A-1E Skyraiders were brought in. The Air Force would continue to use these aircraft for Search And Rescue (SAR) for the rest of the Vietnam War. The Vietnam war saw the not only the rebirth of the Air Forces Special Operations forces, but also the addition of new abilities and the aircraft to carry these missions out. U-10 Helio Courier aircraft were used to transport personnel and material into virtually any airfield or dirt road in Vietnam and Laos. The U-10's were also used in Psychological Operations, dropping propaganda leaflets or broadcasting voice messages over loudspeakers as the aircraft flew low and slow over the jungle. Also used in the Psychological Operations theatre was the MC-130 Combat Talon. Using their larger capacity, higher ceiling, and longer range, the MC-130's would haul large bundles of counterfeit money up to altitude near Hanoi and dump them so that they would land where the citizens would pick them up and hopefully read the propaganda message attached. They were so successful and the counterfeit money so effective that the North Vietnamese Government refused to negotiate in 1969 until that bombing campaign stopped. It was also about this time that the Air Force began seriously use helicopters for recovery of airmen shot down behind enemy lines (which was pretty much everywhere in Vietnam). HH-53 Jolly Greens that the Air Force acquired from the Navy were outfitted with refuelling probes, radios and extra weapons to enable them to fly into enemy controlled country to conduct SAR Operations. In addition, the Pararescue forces began developing the ability for extended operations of the ground, performing searches for friendly pilots hiding from enemy forces.

One of the more popular weapons to come out the war (at least for ground forces) was the gunship. seeking to overcome the problems caused by forward speed on accuracy, the Air Force came up with a design where the guns were mounted on the side of an aircraft and fired while the aircraft was circling around the target, able to keep the guns on target as long as there was ammunition and fuel. It should be noted that initially the USAF was HIGHLY resistant to this new concept and it was the motivated efforts of some crucial people (such as Ronald Terry, who paid for parts and fuel out of his own pocket when the Air Force cut funding) that kept the program alive. To this day the Gunship is an integral part of any USAF special opsforce and most conventional assaults. The Vietnam War saw more than the creation of new aircraft and squadrons; new units without aircraft were also created such as the Combat Controllers. The soldiers in these units were trained to jump out of aircraft and perform vital tasks on the ground, such as guiding rescue aircraft in or acting as a Forward Air Controller on the ground. Although they were trained to insert via jumping from fixed-wing aircraft, usually they were based at forward locations or were inserted via helicopter. Both the Combat Controllers and Pararescue teams, participated in many missions and saved countless lives. In particular, note should be made of the citations received. In a war dominated by medal-happy officers, enlisted ranks rarely received the commendations they deserved. Only 19 enlisted airmen received the Air Cross Medal, given for extreme bravery and heroism on the battlefield. Of those 19, ten were members of the Pararescue teams.

Ultimately, the Vietnam War saw the USAF field three Aircraft that remain in service today (AC-130, MC-130, and H-53), foster the Combat Controllers and PJ's, and raise at least three Squadrons (15th, 20th SOS). Following the Vietnam War, the Air Force once again diminished the size of their special operations capabilities, but this time they did not get rid of them. Special operations crews were present in two actions following the war. In May of 1975 (shortly after the close of the Vietnam War) an American freighter, the USS Mayaguez, was boarded and seized by the crew of a Cambodian gunboat while sailing in international waters. The order came down from Washington to immediately recapture the boat and free the crew. After a brief search the ship was located on Tang Island. Members and helicopters of the 21st SOS and US Marines were dispatched to the USS Coral Sea. The plan seemed simple, the helicopters would drop a USMC raiding force that would overpower the guards and free the captives, which would then be loaded onto the helicopters for the ride back to the carrier. Unfortunately for the aircrew and US Marines present, there was no proper intel and the planners of the mission forgot some lessons that had been learned in Vietnam. The members of the force were briefed that they could expect eleven guards, and lightly armed ones at that. A later inquiry revealed that a passing gunship had counted up to 50 campfires, but that no one had shown any interest in passing the information on. Operating on the assumption of light defence no attack aircraft were attached to provide defence for the helicopters and ground troops.

In the end it was very nearly a total disaster. The eleven "lightly armed" Khmer Rouge soldiers turned out to be in excess of 300, and some were armed with rocket-powered Grenades and heavy machine guns. Two aircraft were immediately shot down and several more limped away, one losing its last engine on the way to the carrier and another so full of holes that it had to stay connected to an MC-130 tanker the entire flight back to the carrier to keep from running out of fuel. In the end fifteen soldiers had been killed and three were missing, with another 50 wounded. The crew of the Mayaguez was found to be on the mainland and were rescued by an American destroyer after being set adrift on a fishing boat. The second action was the attempted rescue of American hostages from Tehran, Iran. This operation also ended in disaster, with at least eight American servicemen losing their lives. Although the operation ended badly, there were many positive effects. Because of the confusion and lack of force cohesion it was decided to create a joint special operations command that would oversee training and integration of special forces units, including the US Air Force's. This effort would take time to complete, and only very basic contacts had been set up by the time the US decided to invade Grenada in 1983. 

Tensions between the US and the Grenadan government had increased and reached a peak when the current Prime Minister was killed in a coup. There were over 1,000 Americans on the island, many of them medical students studying on the island and the decision was made to go in and provide protection for their extraction. Part of the plan involved the securing of the airport at Point Salines. Before that happened the US commanders needed to know the state of the airport, whether it was defended and what obstructions might be in place. A USAF Combat Controller was tasked for this mission, but instead of sneaking him in on a civilian airliner it was decided that he would insert with two boatloads of SEALS from ST6 as escorts. The insertion scheduled as a daytime drop into calm seas was delayed and turned into a night-time drop into stormy weather, something the newly-formed ST6 had never practiced. Consequently four members of SEAL Team 6 drowned in the insertion and the surviving force was further delayed. The small force never reached land, but they were close enough for the Combat Controller to see obstructions and hear local radio stations broadcasting citizens to rise up and defend the airport from invaders. He radioed that the airport would have to be cleared before anything could land, but by this time the USAF MC-130 cargo aircraft carrying members of the Army's 75th Rangers were already in transit. Instead of stepping off the planes on the ground as had been planned, the Rangers would have to jump. Although the drop was ultimately successful, several events happened that almost turned it into a disaster and brought to light the weak points in the new joint commands. While the Rangers had been told to expect heavy resistance, the Combat Talon pilots had been told that the airfield would be lightly defended if at all. The heavier than expected defences wound up hitting the second MC-130 and driving it off until a circling AC-130H could suppress the fire.

Based on their intelligence the Rangers had requested a drop from 500 feet; a very low altitude that leaves no room for error. The first aircraft had suffered an INS (Internal Navigation System) failure and dropped out of position to let a fully functional aircraft lead the way in. Consequently the Rangers arrived out of order, and badly fragmented by the large time gap created by the heavy air defences. Eventually all players were on the ground (remarkably no Rangers were killed, the only casualty was one that had broken his leg) and the airport secured for the arrival of more C-130s. The AC-130 tasked with supporting the airport assault was responsible for taking out 6 gun pits, one BMP armoured personnel carrier, and numerous structures that Cuban and Grenadan troops were using for cover. It expended all of its ammunition and was in the air for an astonishing 31 hours straight. Another AC-130 was responsible for protecting half of a SEAL Team 6 force that had been tasked with rescuing the governor of Grenada so that he could authorize US forces to officially come to the island. An initial landing at the mansion had been cut short when one of the Blackhawk helicopters was hit by antiaircraft fire and driven off before all of the SEALS were on the ground. Outnumbered and outgunned by the Armoured personnel carriers that appeared, the SEALs were protected all night long by the circling AC-130. The Grenadan assault was successful in many aspects, but a disaster in others. While the US had sent a force to assault the island quickly, interservice fighting and extremely poor communication caused deaths and delays of the US forces. As a result of the problems with Grenada the US Military created the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) an 1987. Air Force Special Operations units were given higher status and were consolidated into the new 23rd Air Force. However, this was still a tenuous organization: the Air Force had signed an agreement earlier in 1985 to turn all rotary-win aircraft over to the Army and anti-special ops feelings still ran high in the Air Force brass (Special Note, I hear rumblings that the Air Force brass is trying this again. The MH-60 Pavehawk is being transferred to Search and Rescue Units with no replacement for the SOW's).

AFSOC was created from the 23rd Air Force in May of 1990. AFSOC has control over three wings, three groups, as well as the USAF Special Operations School and Special Missions Operational Test & Evaluation Centre. Some of the changes that occurred after the creation of the new command was the creation of the Special Tactics Groups, an organization that blended the USAF Combat Controllers and Pararescue Jumpers into an integrated force capable of supporting all the different US Special Forces units in their unique capabilities. This new integration and force structure was put to the test during the Panama invasion in 1989 and for the most part worked with flying colours. All of the Air Force's special operations aircraft types took place in the invasion and members of the Special Tactics Groups were assigned to help out the other service's soldiers. MC-130 Combat Talons dropped Army Rangers on an airfields while HC-130 Combat Shadows (now MC-130 Combat Shadows) stayed in the air the entire first night refuelling American aircraft. Nine AC-130's provided cover during the many actions (including the Navy SEALs disastrous assault on Patilla Airfield). MH-60 Pavehawks shuttled conventional and special operations forces around the cities and countryside while MH-53J's provided transport as well as fire support for American troops. Combat Controllers were along with the SEALs during the Patilla assault, providing their capabilities to the force, and combined Special Tactics Teams helped the Army Rangers assault two separate airfields simultaneously. In the end several aircraft had been damaged but none shot down and no USAF Special Operations airmen were killed. While there was one friendly fire incident (no US Soldiers were killed) another gunship crew was recognized and given medals for refusing a direct order to fire on what turned out to be American soldiers who were in the process of capturing a Panamanian APC. There were problems and errors made, but they were readily noticeable and ones that the Air Commandos could learn from and improve on in time for their next conflict--The Gulf War.

In 1990 The Forces of Iraq invaded and conquered the country of Kuwait. Fearful of a continued drive through Saudi Arabia, American forces were immediately dispatched and plans made for the defence of the US's oil-rich ally. From the beginning USAF special operations personnel were present. USAF Combat controllers handled all of the air traffic at King Fahd airport during the build-up of Allied forces. During that time, they handled the busiest airport in the history of the world, some days handling as many as 1,800 operations per day (that equates out to 75 operations an hour, or an aircraft taking off or landing at intervals of less than a second between each operation). After the build-up they moved to Al Jouf Airfield, just south of the Iraqi/Saudi border preparing to handle battle-damaged aircraft returning from the first night of the air war. Although the supreme allied commander General Schwartzkopf had a dislike of special forces, he allowed them some missions early in the war. The Iraqi border was ringed by an array of high-tech long-range radars that could warn the Iraqi command of incoming bombers and attack aircraft. In order to minimize the Iraqi response the element of surprise was needed and that meant destroying the radars before the Iraqis knew aircraft were on the way. In an excellent example of inter-service coordination, 4 USAF MH-53J's lead eight US Army AH-64 Apaches through the Iraqi front lines and near to two long range radar complexes in an operation named "Eager Anvil". The Pave lows marked a precise spot with bundles of chem-sticks and then moved off to a close orbit. Using the chemsticks to precisely update their internal navigation systems, the Apaches were able to destroy both radar stations completely within ten seconds of each other. The combined team of Pave Low and Apache were the first American and Allied aircraft across the border during the air war.

Pave Low's provided also CSAR for downed pilots, rescuing the first a Navy F-14 pilot four days after the war started. During that mission the abilities of the Pilots were shown as they hid their aircraft in the desert from an Iraqi fighter searching for them and crossed the border twice while searching for the Navy Pilot. More recently USAF Special Operations Squadrons have aided US counter-narcotic efforts in Latin America. MC-130, MH-53J, and MH-60G Aircraft operated in theatre supporting US and other indigenous troops in the fight against drugs and Narco-terrorists. The MH-60G Was retired from AFSOC and transferred to the Air Combat Command for use in the CSAR role, although they continue to work very closely with AFSOC assets such as Pararescue groups and often deploy in support of special operations missions.

Department of Defence Intelligence and Related Organizations

Office of the Secretary of Defence

Assistant Secretary for Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence

Deputy Assistant Secretary (Intelligence and Security) (DASD)

Intelligence Systems Support Office (ISSO)

Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence Oversight

Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

J-2 Directorate of Intelligence

US Joint Forces Command

Atlantic Intelligence Centre


Blue Light /Delta Force

Cruise Missile Support Activity (CMSA)

First Special Operations Wing

Information Analysis Centre (IAC)

Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) East (JTF-4)

Joint Task Force 6 /Nightstalkers

SEAL Team 6 (Special counterterrorist)

US Army Ranger Battalions /Black Berets

US Army Special Forces /Green Berets

US Marine Force Reconnaissance Company

US Navy, Sea, Air and Land Platoons /SEAL

USMC Battalion Landing Team

USMC Marine Amphibious Unit


US European Command

Intelligence Directorate (ECJ2)

Joint Analysis Centre - JAC


US Southern Command

Joint Intelligence Centre - JICSOUTH

Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) - South


US Central Command

Joint Intelligence Centre - JICCENT


US Pacific Command

Joint Intelligence Centre Pacific [JICPAC]

Joint Intelligence Training Activity Pacific


Special Intelligence Communications Centre

Cruise Missile Support Activity - CMSA Camp Smith, HI

Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) West [JTF-5]


US Special Operations Command

Joint Intelligence Centre - JICSOC


US Strategic Command

Joint Intelligence Centre - JICSTRAT


US Space Command

Joint Intelligence Centre - JICSPACE


US Transportation Command

CJ-2 Intelligence Directorate

Joint Intelligence Centre - JICTRANS


Defence Support Program Office

Defence Dissemination Program Office (DDPO)


Intelligence Agencies Australia & New Zealand Canada Chile China
Cuba Czechoslovakia Egypt France Germany
Greece India Indonesia Iran Iraq
Ireland Israel Italy Japan Nigeria
North Korea Pakistan Romania Russia Serbia
South Africa South Korea Spain Sweden Taiwan
Turkey United Kingdom United States of America