|Military Intelligence Department|
long-term goal is to become one of the world’s great powers. Its
leaders envision that, at some point during the first half of the
twenty-first century, China will be securely established as the leading
economic and political power in East Asia. Chinese statements and
actions support the theory that China will continue to emphasize
economic growth and economic modernization, rather than military might,
as a foundation for national greatness. As an emerging great power,
China will probably build its military power to the point where it can
engage and defeat any potential enemy within the region with its
conventional forces and can deter any global strategic threat to
China’s national security. Evidence suggests, however, that China will
develop her military strength at a measured pace. A more rapid or
large-scale military build-up is seen by the Chinese leadership as
unnecessary and detrimental to continued economic growth. China’s
future military strategy is likely to concentrate on improving the
defensive posture of its armed forces while developing a capability to
fight short duration, high intensity wars in the region. Military
modernization probably will focus on three components: small high-tech
forces for flexible use in regional contingencies, large low-tech and
medium-tech forces for internal security and reinforcement in defence of
the homeland, and modest levels of strategic nuclear forces to maintain
a viable deterrent against other nuclear powers.
To carry out this strategy, China is engaged in developing and acquiring new fighter aircraft, submarines, improved naval air defences, and short-range ballistic missiles. In the ground forces, it is giving attention to the creation of rapid reaction units and airborne forces. In accordance with this developing strategy, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has indicated that it will decrease in size in the near future to conserve funds for military modernization.
China’s nuclear strategy probably will continue to emphasize the development of a nuclear retaliatory capability as a deterrent against the potential use of nuclear weapons by existing nuclear weapons states. Ongoing ballistic missile modernization encompasses a shift from liquid to solid fuel missiles.
China’s ability to achieve its military modernization objectives for the coming decade and beyond will depend to a large extent on the rate at which it can assimilate the foreign technology it is acquiring, on its ability to use and integrate the new weapon systems it is purchasing from abroad, and on its industrial capacity to produce advanced weapons domestically without foreign technical assistance. Beijing is likely to experience mixed results in all three areas. The problems China faces in these areas could constrain progress in achieving overall modernization objectives as rapidly as the Chinese would hope.
|Communist Party Central Committee / Ministry of State Security (MSS)|
The central institution of the Chinese intelligence community was the Communist Party of China (CPC) prior to 1949 was Central Department of Social Affairs, which subsequently became the Central Investigation Department (replaced by the Ministry of State Security in 1983). During the Yanan period, the Central Department of Social Affairs provided CPC leaders with reports on the world situation and on the major events and issues taking place abroad. These efforts were based on news reports of foreign press agencies, and a limited number of foreign newspapers and books. During the 1946-1949 warfare between Kuomintang and Communist troops, the intelligence provided by the Central Department of Social Affairs proved instrumental in the Communist's battlefield victories. After the Party consolidated state power in China, the intelligence system played an increasingly important role. Li Kenong, head of the department, also held several other leadership positions, including head of the Central Investigation Department, deputy chief of General Staff, and vice minister of foreign affairs, and attended meetings of the Political Bureau as an observer. During the 1950's every Chinese embassy had an Investigation and Research Office for intelligence collection by staff from the Central Investigation Department. Analytical tasks were the responsibility of the Central Investigation Department Eighth Bureau, publicly known since 1978 as the Institute of Contemporary International Relations.
Shortly before the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Li Kenong died and was succeeded by Luo Qingchang. Kang Sheng [who had once headed the Central Department of Social Affairs] was by that time a member of the CPC Political Bureau, and he assumed responsibility for the work of the Central Investigation Department. During the Cultural Revolution the Central Investigation Department was abolished, most of its senior leadership was sent down to the countryside for re-education, and most of its activities and assets were absorbed by the PLA General Staff Second Department. The Central Group for the Examination of Cases, composed of Central Investigation Department cadres acting on orders of Kang Sheng, were instrumental in the removal from power of individuals such as Deng Xiaoping. With the death of Lin Biao in the early 1970's the Department was re-established. When Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing assumed power in 1977 they sought to enlarge the Central Investigation Department and expand the CPC's intelligence work as part of their more general efforts to consolidate their leadership positions. This initiative was resisted by Deng Xiaoping, who had returned to power. Deng Xiaoping argued that the intelligence system should not use Chinese embassies to provide cover, and that intelligence personnel should be sent abroad under the cover of reporters and businessmen. Consequently, the Central Investigation Department withdraw its men from Chinese embassies abroad, apart from a small number of secret intelligence agents. Zhou Shaozheng, a veteran of the Central Investigation system, became head of the General Office of the Central Investigation Department in 1976. During the CPC's 12th National Congress in 1982 Zhou Shaozheng was informed against by a bureau chief under the Central Taiwan Affairs Office, and was accused of moves against Premier Zhou Enlai during the latter's mourning period. Investigation results later showed that Zhou Shaozheng was innocent, though he had lost the chance to be considered for the post of Minister of State Security.
In 1983 Liu Fuzhi, secretary general of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and minister of Public Security, proposed the establishment of a Ministry of State Security that would merge the whole Central Investigation Department with the counter-intelligence elements of the Public Security Ministry. This proposal was approved by the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. In June 1983 the National People's Congress, perceiving a growing threat of subversion and sabotage, established the Ministry of State Security under the State Council. The new ministry was charged with ensuring the security of the state through effective measures against enemy agents, spies, and counterrevolutionary activities designed to sabotage or overthrow China's socialist system. At its inception, the ministry pledged to abide by the state constitution and the law and called upon the citizenry for their cooperation, reminding them of their constitutional obligations to "keep state secrets" and "safeguard the security" of the country. Lin Yun, deputy minister of Public Security, was appointed the first minister of the Ministry of State Security Ministry. However in 1985 a department head of the Anti-Espionage Bureau (a cadre from the Ministry of Public Security) defected to the United States. After the incident, Lin Yun and the chief of the Anti-Espionage Bureau were both removed from their posts. Jia Chunwang was appointed Minister of State Security in 1985, following the dismissal of Lin Yun. Both the public security and central investigation elements of the Ministry insisted that Lin Yun be replaced by one of their own cadres. To settle this conflict, the CPC leadership appointed Jia Chunwang, as he was an outsider with ties to neither element.
Chinese intelligence agents are generally assigned to overseas postings for terms of six years, 10 years, or long-term residence depending on the nature of the job or on performance. In mid-September 1996, the Central Military Commission and the State Council approved the report of the plan drawn up by the General Staff Department and Ministry of State Security on the consolidation, readjustment, and reinforcement of intelligence in Hong Kong, Macao, and abroad. Nearly 120 intelligence agents who had been operating in the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Northern Europe, and Japan as industrialists, businessmen, bankers, scholars, and journalists, were recalled. China's leadership was so impressed with the favourable international reaction that it received for its revisions of the Criminal Procedure Law in March 1996 corresponding set of revisions to the country's Criminal Law were enacted in March 1997. These included the long-awaited repeal of the historic counterrevolution statutes (Articles 90 to 104) and their replacement with systematic provisions for the punishment of crimes endangering state security. China's MSS and other intelligence services aggressively target the US, placing particular emphasis on the high tech sector heavily concentrated in Southern California, and in the Silicon Valley. Cover for Beijing's espionage in the United States includes the 1,500 Chinese diplomats operating out of 70 offices, 15,000 Chinese students who arrive in the US each year, and 10,000 Chinese who travel in some 2,700 visiting delegations each year.
Most of the research personnel in Communist China are locked up in the compound of their research institutes, and very few of them have ever had the chance to see things in foreign countries. The shortcomings of the CPC's intelligence research institutes has affected the judgment of the CPC top leadership when making foreign- related policies. Thus it is not surprising that the CPC's foreign policies have been at times confused or too aggressive. In 1987, Vietnam invaded Cambodia. Prior to Vietnam's 1987 invasion of Cambodia, the CPC's intelligence community assured the Chinese leadership of the Khmer Rouge's ability to resist the Vietnamese invasion. Based on this assurance, the CPC continued suppling the Khmer Rouge with arms, which were seized by the Vietnamese. CPC intelligence also claimed that Vietnam could not capture Phnom Penh, but only a few days after this assessment, Phnom Penh fell into Vietnamese. In 1979, Hua Guofeng planned to pay a visit to Iran on his way to Western Europe. The assessment of CPC intelligence was that the Shah of Iran would not step down in the near future, though shortly after Hua Guofeng's visit the Shah was forced to leave the country. The CPC was thoroughly discredited by this event and later fell afoul of the new regime in Iran. On the eve of the collapse of Romania's Ceausescu, Qiao Shi visited Romania to attend the national congress of the Romanian Communist Party. In their reports Qiao Shi before he left for Romania, Chinese analysts stated that the situation in Romania was fairly good. As it turned out, Ceausescu was executed shortly after Qiao Shi returned home. As early as 1991, the FBI knew about Chinese government contributions to U.S. campaigns. There is evidence that China sought favourable American treatment on trade policy by contributing millions of dollars to the re-election of Bill Clinton and members of Congress. The US National Security Agency intercepted communications indicating that China was targeting 30 Congressional candidates (mostly Democrats) for influence buying campaign contributions. Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich was one of those candidates. According to James F. Lilley, U.S. ambassador to China in the Bush administration and a former CIA officer:
"U.S. counterintelligence agents and the FBI discovered Chinese efforts to interfere in American campaigns as early as 1991, when FBI agents warned a number of Democratic members of Congress to watch for Chinese donations passed through intermediaries.... It's the way they operate in Asian countries. They do it by bribing government officials; they bribe them to change policy.... Beijing is trying to influence the U.S. position on a host of issues related to ongoing negotiations about China's and Taiwan's entry into the World Trade Organization, market access for American products in China, intellectual-property piracy, technology transfers and weapons proliferation. Sen. Fred D. Thompson (R-Tenn), who chaired the 1997 campaign finance hearings, said the committee believed: that high-level Chinese government officials crafted a plan to increase China's influence over the U.S. political process, and took specific steps to do so, including the allocation of substantial sums of money to influence federal and state elections. US security agencies and the Justice Department's Criminal Division believe, based on counterintelligence surveillance, that Beijing's diplomatic community and espionage network helped Democratic fundraiser John Huang and other political operatives get millions of dollars in campaign donations and "walking-around" cash for the 1996 election. The plan was launched in 1995 as a relatively benign congressional lobbying activity, but became an effort whose goal was to illegally funnel money into political campaigns. Approved at the highest levels of the Beijing government, the plan was placed under the control of the Chinese Ministry of State Security. U.S. intelligence has established that about $2 million was allocated by the Chinese government, of which at least $1 million was transferred to U.S. banks or to the Chinese Embassy in Washington."
First Bureau - Domestic
Second Bureau - Foreign
Third Bureau - Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan
Fourth Bureau - Technology
Fifth Bureau - Local Intelligence
Sixth Bureau - Counterintelligence
Seventh Bureau - Circulation
Eighth Bureau - Research (Institute of Contemporary International Relations)
Ninth Bureau - Anti-Defection and Counter-Surveillance
Tenth Bureau - Scientific and Technological Information
Eleventh Bureau - Electronic Computers
Foreign Affairs Bureau
Institute of International Relations
|Institute of Cadre Management|
|The Ministry of State Security, the General Staff Department, and the United Front Work Department have established intelligence agencies in 170-plus cities in nearly 50 countries and regions all over the world. These agencies are classified as general branches, branches, and sub-branches. In his report entitled Salute to Comrades on the Special Duties Front delivered at the Conference on Strengthening Intelligence Work, Zou Jiahua said: Tens of thousands of nameless heroes who cherish and loyally serve their motherland are quietly fighting in their special posts abroad in complicated environments. From the figure disclosed by Zou Jiahua in his report, one can conclude that there are tens of thousands of Chinese Communist spies in various parts of the world.|
|Guojia Anquan Bu (Guoanbu) / Ministry of Public Security|
|The Ministry of Public Security is headquartered in a large compound of on Eastern Changan Avenue next to the Tiananmen Square. The Ministry of State Security only has a reception office at this facility, although the signs of both the Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of State Security hang side by side at the front gate.|
|People's Armed Police|
People's Armed Police Force was set up in April 1983 and is made up of
PLA forces on domestic defence duty and the armed, frontier defence and
fire-fighting police, which carry out a military service system. It is
an armed defence force for social security, which undertakes police
duties. The armed police force follows the rules and regulations of the
PLA and enjoys equal treatment with PLA troops. The armed police force headquarters
falls under the direct jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Security.
It also has headquarters in various provinces, autonomous regions and
municipalities, under which there are detachments, groups and squadrons.
The People's Armed Police, one of the
PRC's three Armed Forces, numbering 1.1 million plus, has military and
security missions. The Armed Police is divided into the following in
accordance with the nature of missions and T/O: security guards, defence
for borders, fire teams, traffic, public utility, gold, woods and mobile
division. In a peaceful time, it is responsible for the interior
security in coordination with the public security units, the
national-level construction works, and guards. At wartime, it is under
military command to carry out missions such as battlefield security,
anti-infiltration, and coast guards. The armed police force undertakes the
tasks of avoiding and curbing through the use of arms acts of sabotage,
defending social security and protecting national security, life and
property according to the needs of public security work and in
compliance with the law, government rules and regulations and other
administrative laws and regulations. Since the Democratic Movement
June, 4 1989 in Tianmen Square, the status and importance of the
People's Armed Police have seen rapidly elevated. The CCP's Central
Military Committee has made public that in case there is any domestic
upheaval, the People's Armed Police will be first mobilized. In other
words, the Armed Police is PRC's main force in charge of the domestic
security and social stability. There are two chains of Command for
People's Armed Police. The Armed Police is simultaneously under the
command of the CCP's Central Military Committee and the State Council.
Since the issuance of "the SOP of the PRC's Armed Police GHOs"
in June 1996, the People's Armed Police GHOs has been upgraded to a
great military-region level. And over the last two years, it was time
and again found that 14 PLA field divisions were restructured into the
People's Armed Police. Furthermore, there is a tendency that the command
system of the People's Armed Police is going to be transferred from
under the Ministry of Interior to the military system, and its military
function is beefed up.
The PRC's Armed Police with a mixed function between the military police and the police of the democratic countries is equipped with the light weapons. In recent years, its forces have been beefed up with the wheel armoured vehicles, command vehicles, and patrol cars, etc. Besides, the air patrol units like the fly boat and helicopter units have been activated with the capabilities in the field of the mobile and long-range disposition. Its contingencies have capabilities better than those of the public security police in general. Some of the GHO-level units of the Armed Police are given the PLA's military training and exercise, functioning as the main force of the domestic public security. In April 1984 the State Council issued the Tentative Regulations Governing People's Republic of China Resident Identity. The regulations, to be implemented over a period of years, required all residents over sixteen years of age, except active-duty members of the PLA and the People's Armed Police Force and inmates serving sentences, to be issued resident identity cards by the Ministry of Public Security. The picture cards indicated the name, sex, nationality, date of birth, and address of the bearer. Cards for persons sixteen to twenty-five years of age were valid for ten years; those for persons between twenty-five and forty-five were valid for twenty years; and persons over forty-five were issued permanent cards. As of early 1987, only 70 million people had been issued identity cards, well below the national goal. Also, even those with resident identity cards preferred to use other forms of identification. Public security officials also made extensive use of the authority granted them to impose administrative sanctions by two sets of documents. These were the 1957 Regulations on Reeducation Through Labour, which were reissued in 1979 with amendments, and the 1957 Regulations Governing Offences Against Public Order, which were rescinded and replaced in 1986 by regulations of the same name. Offenders might include vagabonds, people who have no proper occupation, and people who repeatedly breach public order. The police could apprehend such individuals and sentence them to reeducation through labour with the approval of local labour-training administration committees. The 1957 regulations placed no limit on the length of sentences, but beginning in the early 1960s three or four years was the norm. The 1979 amended regulations, however, limited the length of reeducation through labour to three years with possible extension for extraordinary cases. The Regulations Governing Offences Against Public Order empowered the police to admonish, fine, or detain people for up to fifteen days. Goods illegally in the possession of an offender were to be confiscated, and payment was imposed for damages or hospital fees in the event injury had been caused.
The criminal laws in force after January 1, 1980, restricted police powers regarding arrests, investigations, and searches. A public security official or a citizen could apprehend a suspect under emergency conditions, but a court or procuratorate was required to approve the arrest. The accused had to be questioned within twenty-four hours and his or her family or work unit notified of the detention "except in circumstances where notification would hinder the investigation or there was no way to notify them." Any premeditated arrest required a court or procuratorate warrant. The time that an accused could be held pending investigation was limited to three to seven days, and incarceration without due process was illegal. Two officials were needed to conduct a criminal investigation. They were required to show identification and, apparently, to inform the accused of the crime allegedly committed before he or she was questioned. The suspect could refuse to answer only those questions irrelevant to the case. Torture was illegal. The 1980 laws also provided that in conjunction with an arrest the police could conduct an emergency search; otherwise, a warrant was required. They had the right to search the person, property, and residence of an accused and the person of any injured party. They could intercept mail belonging to the accused and order an autopsy whenever cause of death was unclear. In July 1980 the government approved new regulations governing police use of weapons and force. Police personnel could use their batons only in self-defence or when necessary to subdue or prevent the escape of violent criminals or rioters. Lethal weapons, such as pistols, could be used if necessary to stop violent riots, to lessen the overall loss of life, or to subdue surrounded but still resisting criminals. The regulations even governed use of sirens, police lights, and whistles.
In January 1996 authorities issued regulations requiring Internet users to register and sign a vaguely worded pledge not to use the Internet to endanger security. In September 1996 the Government blocked access to more than 100 news sites on the World Wide Web, including many Chinese language sites in Hong Kong and Taiwan and the sites of major Western news organizations. Sites hosted by dissidents were also blocked. During the year, China's Ministry of State Security was tasked with controlling material on line. Regulations allegedly adopted to preserve public security were used to implement Internet censorship. Reportedly Chinese internet users will be required to register with Ministry of Public Security departments at the county and prefecture level within 30 days of being summoned. New users and users who change their hook-up or disconnect must also notify public security departments within 30 days. Those failing to comply will be dealt with in accordance with the country's Regulations on Protection of Computer Information System Security, administered by the Ministry's Computer Management and Monitoring Department. The Administrative Measures for Ensuring the Security of Computer Information Network, the Internet, which the State Council approved on 11 December, was promulgated for implementation on 30 December. This administrative law for ensuring the security of the Internet is China's code of conduct for collective and individual subscribers of the Internet service. China's criminal justice system consists of police, procurates, courts and correctional institutions. At the central level, the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Justice administer China's police and correctional institutions, respectively. The public security station generally had considerably broader responsibilities than a police station in the West, involving itself in every aspect of the district people's lives. In a rural area it had a chief, a deputy chief, a small administrative staff, and a small police force. In an urban area it had a greater number of administrative staff members and seven to eighteen patrolmen. Its criminal law activities included investigation, apprehension, interrogation, and temporary detention. The station's household section maintained a registry of all persons living in the area. Births, deaths, marriages, and divorces were recorded and confirmed through random household checks. The station regulated all hotels and required visitors who remained beyond a certain number of days to register. All theatres, cinemas, radio equipment, and printing presses also were registered with the local public security station, permitting it to regulate gatherings and censor information effectively. It also regulated the possession, transportation, and use of all explosives, guns, ammunition, and poisons.
Another important police function was controlling change of residence. Without such controls, large numbers of rural residents undoubtedly would move to the overcrowded cities in search of better living standards, work, or education. In the 1980s secret police operations employed agents, informers, and roving spies. Police surveillance apparently was restricted to probation and parole. Plainclothes agents were posted at bus and railroad stations and other public places. Police informers denounced "bad elements" and assisted in surveillance of suspected political criminals. Roving spies were a special category of informant in the factories and work units and were ever watchful for dissidence or sabotage. Youths aspiring to be Communist Youth League members, or league members aspiring to be party members, sometimes cooperated as informants and agents for the police. The relationship between the police officers assigned to neighbourhood patrols and the people was close. Police officers lived in a neighbourhood on a long-term assignment and were expected to know all the residents personally. Their task was not only to prevent and punish crime but to promote desirable behaviour by counselling and acting as role models. This positive side of the police officer's duties was a constant responsibility, but the bond between the public security units and the people was strengthened annually by means of "cherish-the-people" months, during which the police officer made a special effort to be of help, especially to the aged and the infirm.
Foreign visitors are subject to Chinese laws and regulations and their frequently arbitrary application. Plainclothes police officers with cellular phones openly and covertly tail foreigners. Public security has deteriorated in several provinces, including Sechuan, Hunan, Jiangxi, Shanxi and Anhui, which were listed as somewhat unstable in a 1991 top secret State Council report. The Ministry of Public Security reported that in 1992 there were 540 illegal demonstrations, 480 strikes and 75 incidents in which government and Party offices were attacked. Between 1986 and 1992, the Ministry of Public Security dismantled 1,370 illegal organizations, including 62 considered to be hostile forces opposed to the socialist régime. The Chinese government censors all forms of expression, including speech, media reports, and the publication, distribution, dissemination and possession of printed matter. The aim is to ensure that no materials considered counterrevolutionary are available to the general public. Actions that have been considered counterrevolutionary include: communications with foreign journalists, analysing policy decisions, unauthorized use of a fax machine, distribution of printed T-shirts, documenting human rights abuses, supporting minority cultures, religious proselytizing, and petitioning for a tax cut. In 1989 the Ministry began monitoring fax machines and fax communications. A person can be jailed for having a fax machine in his home or if a pro-democracy message is sent or received on his fax.
|People's Liberation Army / 8341 Unit - Central Security Regiment|
|The Beijing-based Central Security Regiment, also known as the 8341 Unit, was an important PLA law enforcement element. It was responsible over the years for the personal security of Mao Zedong and other party and state leaders. More than a bodyguard force, it also operated a nationwide intelligence network to uncover plots against Mao or any incipient threat to the leadership. The unit reportedly was deeply involved in undercover activities, discovering electronic listening devices in Mao's office and performing surveillance of his rivals. The 8341 Unit participated in the late 1976 arrest of the Gang of Four, but it reportedly was deactivated soon after that event.|
|General Staff Department|
Staff Department carries out staff and operational functions for the PLA
and had major responsibility for implementing military modernization
plans. Headed by the chief of general staff, the department served as
the headquarters for the ground forces and contained directorates for
the three other armed services: Air Force, Navy, and Strategic Missile
Force. The General Staff Department included functionally organized
subdepartments for artillery, armoured units, engineering, operations,
training, intelligence, mobilization, surveying, communications,
quartermaster services, and politics. Navy Headquarters controlled the North
Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet. Air Force Headquarters
generally exercised control through the commanders of the seven military
regions. Nuclear forces were directly subordinate to the General Staff
Department. Conventional main, regional, and militia units were
controlled administratively by the military region commanders, but the
General Staff Department in Beijing could assume direct operational
control of any main-force unit at will. Thus, broadly speaking, the
General Staff Department exercises operational control of the main
forces, and the military region commanders controlled the regional
forces and, indirectly, the militia. The post of principal intelligence
official in the top leadership of the Chinese military has been taken up
by a number of people of several generations, from Li Kenong in the
1950's to Xiong Guangkai today; and their public capacity has always
been assistant to the deputy chief of staff or assistant to the chief of
staff. Ever since the CPC officially
established the system of major military regions for its
army in the 1950's, the intelligence agencies inside the Army have,
after going through several major evolutions, developed into the present
three major military intelligence setups.
The central level is composed of the Second and Third Departments under the PLA General Staff Headquarters and the Liaison Department under the PLA General Political Department. At the major military regions intelligence activities consist of the Second Bureau established at the same level as the Operation Department under the Headquarters, and the Liaison Department established under the Political Department. The third system includes a number of communications stations directly established in the garrison areas of all the major military regions by the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters. The Second Bureau under the Headquarters and the Liaison Department under the Political Department of major military regions are only subjected to the professional leadership of their counterpart units under the Central Military Commission and are still considered the direct subordinate units of the major military region organizationally. Those entities whose names include the word institute, all research institutes under the charge of the Second and the Third Departments of the PLA General Staff Headquarters, including other research organs inside the Army, are at least of the establishment size of the full regimental level. Among the deputy commanders or deputy chiefs of staff of a major military region in China, there is always one who is assigned to take charge of intelligence work, and the intelligence agencies under his charge are directly affiliated to the headquarters and the political department of the military region. The Conference on Strengthening Intelligence Work held from 3-18 September 1996 at the Xishan Command Centre of the Ministry of State Security and the General Staff Department. Chi Haotian delivered a report entitled Strengthen Intelligence Work in a New International Environment To Serve the Cause of Socialist Construction. The report emphasized the need to strengthen the following four aspects of intelligence work:
"Efforts must be made to strengthen understanding of the special nature and role of intelligence work, as well as understanding of the close relationship between strengthening intelligence work on the one hand, and of the four modernizations of the motherland, the reunification of the motherland, and opposition to hegemony and power politics on the other. The United States and the West have all along been engaged in infiltration, intervention, sabotage, and intelligence gathering against China on the political, economic, military, and ideological fronts. The response must strengthen the struggle against their infiltration, intervention, sabotage, and intelligence gathering. Consolidating intelligence departments and training a new generation of intelligence personnel who are politically reliable, honest and upright in their ways, and capable of mastering professional skills, the art of struggle, and advanced technologies. Strengthening the work of organizing intelligence in two international industrial, commercial, and financial ports Hong Kong and Macao."
|Second Department (Intelligence)|
|The Second (Intelligence) Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters is
responsible for collecting military information. Activities include
military attaches at Chinese embassies abroad, clandestine special
agents sent to foreign countries to collect military information, and
the analysis of information publicly published in foreign countries. The Second Department oversees
military human intelligence (HUMINT) collection, widely exploits open
source materials, fuses HUMINT, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and
imagery intelligence data, and disseminates finished intelligence
products to the CMC and other consumers. Preliminary fusion is carried
out by the Second Department’s Analysis Bureau which mans the National
Watch Centre, the focal point for national-level indications and
warning. In-depth analysis is carried out by regional bureaus. Although traditionally the Second
Department of the General Staff Department was responsible for military
intelligence, it is beginning to increasingly focus on scientific and
technological intelligence in the military field, following the example
of Russian agencies in stepping up the work of collecting scientific and
technological information from the West. The research institute under the
Second Department of the General Staff Headquarters is publicly known as
the Institute for International Strategic Studies; its internal
classified publication MOVEMENTS OF FOREIGN ARMIES [WAI JUN DONGTAI] is
published every 10 days and transmitted to units at the division level. The PLA Institute of International
Relations at Nanjing comes under the Second Department of the
General Staff Department and is responsible for training military
attaches, assistant military attaches and associate military attaches as
well as secret agents to be posted abroad. It also supplies officers to
the military intelligence sections of various military regions and group
armies. The Institute was formed from the PLA "793" Foreign
Language Institute, which moved from Zhangjiakou after the Cultural
Revolution and split into two institutions at Luoyang and Nanjing.
The Institute of International Relations was known in the 1950s as the School for Foreign Language Cadres of the Central Military Commission, with the current name being used since 1964. The training of intelligence personnel is one of several activities at the Institute. While all graduates of the Moscow Institute of International Relations were employed by the KGB, only some graduates of the Beijing Institute of International Relations are employed by the Ministry State Security. The former Institute of International Relations, since been renamed the Foreign Affairs College, is under the administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is not involved in secret service work. The former Central Military Commission foreign language school had foreign faculty members who were either Communist Party sympathizers or were members of foreign communist parties. But the present Institute of International Relations does not hire foreign teachers, to avoid the danger that its students might be recognized when are sent abroad as clandestine agents. Those engaged in professional work in military academies under the Second Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters usually have a chance to go abroad, either for advanced studies or as military officers working in the military attache's office of Chinese embassies in foreign countries. People working in the military attache's office of embassies are usually engaged in collecting military information under the cover of military diplomacy. As long as they refrain from directly subversive activities, they are considered as well-behaved military diplomats. Some bureaus under the Second Department which are responsible for espionage in different regions, of which the First Bureau is responsible for collecting information on Taiwan and Hong Kong. Agents are dispatched by the Second Department to companies in Hong Kong like the China Resources Group. In addition, the military also dispatches agents to the Everbright Group, Bank of China Group, and other local corporations to gain cover.
The Autumn Orchid intelligence group assigned to Hong Kong and Macao in the mid-1980s mostly operates in the mass media, political, industrial, commercial, and religious circles, as well as in universities and colleges. The Autumn Orchid intelligence group is mainly responsible for the following three tasks:
Finding out and keeping abreast of the political leanings of officials of the Hong Kong and Macao governments, as well as their views on major issues, through social contact with them and through information provided by them. Keeping abreast of the developments of foreign governments' political organs in Hong Kong, as well as of foreign financial, industrial, and commercial organizations. Finding out and having a good grasp of the local media's sources of information on political, military, economic, and other developments on the mainland, and deliberately releasing false political or military information to the media to test the outside response. It is understood that news of the so-called "fourth-wave military exercise" last spring was spread by the Japanese media on tips supplied by a correspondent assigned by the Chinese Communists to Hong Kong. The correspondent was recalled in early May.
The Autumn Orchid intelligence group was awarded a Citation for Merit, Second Class, in December 1994. It was further awarded another Citation for Merit, Second Class, not long ago.
Department of the General Staff Headquarters is responsible for
monitoring the telecommunications of foreign armies and producing
finished intelligence based on the military information collected. The communications stations
established by the Third Department of the PLA General Staff
Headquarters are not subject to the jurisdiction of the provincial
military district and the major military region of where they are based.
The communications stations are entirely the agencies of the Third
Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters which have no
affiliations to the provincial military district and the military region
of where they are based. The personnel composition, budgets, and
establishment of these communications stations are entirely under the
jurisdiction of the Third Department of the General PLA General Staff
Headquarters, and are not related at all with local troops. China maintains the most extensive
SIGINT network of all the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. SIGINT
systems include several dozen ground stations, half a dozen ships,
truck-mounted systems, and airborne systems. Third Department
headquarters is located in the vicinity of the GSD First Department
(Operations Department), AMS, and NDU complex in the hills northwest of
the Summer Palace. The Third Department (zongcan sanbu) is allegedly
manned by approximately 20,000 personnel, with most of their linguists
trained at the Luoyang Institute of Foreign Languages. Ever since the 1950's, the Second and
Third Departments of the PLA General Staff Headquarters have established
a number of institutions of secondary and higher learning for bringing
up special talents.
The PLA Foreign Language Institute at Luoyang comes under the Third Department of the General Staff Department and is responsible for training foreign language cadres for the monitoring of foreign military intelligence. The Institute was formed from the PLA "793" Foreign Language Institute, which moved from Zhangjiakou after the Cultural Revolution and split into two institutions at Luoyang and Nanjing. Though the distribution order they received upon graduation indicated the PLA General Staff Headquarters, many of the graduates of these schools found themselves being sent to all parts of the country, even to remote and uninhabited backward mountain areas. The reason is that the monitoring and control stations under the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters are scattered in every corner of the country. The communications stations located in the Shenzhen base of the PLA Hong Kong Garrison started their work long ago. In normal times, these two communications stations report directly to the Central Military Commission and the PLA General Staff Headquarters. Units responsible for coordination are the communications stations established in the garrison provinces of the military regions by the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters. By taking direct command of military communications stations based in all parts of the country, the CPC Central Military Commission and the PLA General Staff Headquarters can not only ensure a successful interception of enemy radio communications, but can also make sure that none of the wire or wireless communications and contacts among major military regions can escape the ears of these communications stations, thus effectively attaining the goal of imposing a direct supervision and control over all major military regions, all provincial military districts, and all group armies.
|The Fourth Department [ECM and Radar] of the General Staff Headquarters Department has the electronic intelligence (ELINT) portfolio within the PLA’s SIGINT apparatus. This department is responsible for electronic countermeasures, requiring them to collect and maintain data bases on electronic signals. 25 ELINT receivers are the responsibility of the Southwest Institute of Electronic Equipment (SWIEE). Among the wide range of SWIEE ELINT products is a new KZ900 airborne ELINT pod. The GSD 54th Research Institute supports the ECM Department in development of digital ELINT signal processors to analyse parameters of radar pulses.|
|General Political Department, International Liaison Department / (China Association for International Friendly Contacts)|
|The PLA General Political Department (GPD) maintains the Communist Party of China structure that exists at every level of the PLA. It is responsible for overseeing the political education, indoctrination and discipline that is a prerequisite for advancement within the PLA. The GPD controls the internal prison system of the PLA. Ye Xuanning, son of the CPC's Marshal Ye Jianying, is director of the Liaison Department of the PLA General Political Department with the rank of major general. The International Liaison Department of the General Political Department is publicly known as the China Association for International Friendly Contacts. The department prepares political and economic information for the reference of the Political Bureau. The department conducts ideological and political work on foreign armies, explaining China's policies, and disintegrate enemy armies by dampening their morale. It is also tasked with instigating rebellions within the Taiwan army and other foreign armies. The Liaison Office has dispatched agents to infiltrate Chinese-funded companies and private institutions in Hong Kong. Their mission is counter-espionage, keeping watch on their own agents, and preventing foreign agents buying off Chinese personnel.|
|PLA Naval Intelligence|
|The Third Department and the Navy cooperate on shipborne intelligence collection platforms.|
|PLA Air Force Sixth Research Institute|
|Air Force SIGINT collection is managed by the PLAAF Sixth Research Institute (kongliusuo) in Beijing.|
|New China News Agency (Xinhua)|
|Xinhua reports the news to readers in China and to the world. It also functions as part of a broader information apparatus for China's leaders. The agency "receives, translates, condenses, and provides analysis of news gathered from all over the world and presents it daily to China's readers. Xinhua also acts as a cover for agents of China's Ministry of State Security, the intelligence gathering arm of the PRC. The XINHUA News Agency issues a daily publication named REFERENCE MATERIALS [CANKAO ZILIAO]. This publication originally had morning and the afternoon editions which have been reduced to a single daily edition in recent years. XINHUA's International Affairs Department issues a twice-weekly publication named INTERNAL REFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [GUOJI NEICAN] which is devoted to contributed articles written by reporters based around the world. Some of the agents of the State Security Ministry dispatched to Hong Kong work in a covert section within XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (there is no such section in the official establishment). People inside the agency call it the "security section" and the director of the section is the "chief" of agents dispatched by the State Security Ministry. The security section is located on a special floor in the XINHUA NEWS AGENCY at the racecourse [in the Happy Valley district].|
|HUMINT - Human Intelligence|
|The MSS is the primary Chinese HUMINT collection organization, although the MID is also involved in HUMINT collection. The MID is primarily involved in the overt collection of technical information through visits to trade shows, military exchange programs, and through the military attache program. The MSS is responsible for both overt and clandestine collection. It uses students, diplomats, businessmen, and scientists in its attempts to gain information. China has been extremely aggressive in its HUMINT collection activities in the United States. The PRC has more than 2,600 diplomatic and commercial officials in the United States. A substantial percentage of these personnel are actively involved in collecting intelligence. More than 40,000 students from the PRC also attend schools in the United States, and many of these students have been tasked to collect information by the Chinese government. In addition to these personnel, over 25,000 Chinese visit the United States each year as members of official delegations, and an additional 20,000 Chinese emigrate to the United States annually. The MSS has been able to obtain high- and mid-level technologies not cleared for export to the PRC through its activities. It has used three principal means to obtain such technology: first, recruiting agents in China and sending them abroad to acquire technology; second, acquiring American firms that produce a desired technology; and third, the use of MSS operated front companies in Hong Kong. The Chinese have used a number of different methods to gather HUMINT. They have used pressure to gain information from the Chinese immigrant community, especially on those Chinese that have access to high technology or military data. The MSS has also encouraged Chinese students to remain in the United States as long-term penetration agents. MSS personnel have acted as intelligence collectors using cover as NCNA reporters, trade office representatives, and accredited diplomats. Scientific exchange programs have proven to be extremely useful means for the Chinese to gather information. The FBI has stated that virtually all Chinese allowed to leave the PRC for the United States are given some type of collection requirement to fulfil. Although the bulk of Chinese operations are not sophisticated operations, the large number of ongoing Chinese operations greatly increases the difficulty of countering their espionage activities. In recent years, the Chinese have been the subject of approximately half of all cases initiated by U.S. law enforcement agencies concerning the illegal diversion of technology from the United States.|
|IMINT - Imagery Intelligence|
|The Chinese currently have a limited spaceborne photoreconnaissance capability that focuses on collecting imagery over the Russian border. The Chinese also use a variety of fixed wing aircraft to collect photographic imagery. None of these systems present a substantial intelligence collection threat to U.S. forces in the region. U.S. intelligence agencies believe that China will likely develop a mid-resolution electro-optic imaging system in the future that will provide the Chinese with improved capabilities. The PRC has been conducting space-based imaging of the Earth since 1975, when it became the third country in the world to retrieve high resolution photographs of the planet shot from space. Although some of these FSW (Fanhui Shi Weixing - Recoverable Satellite) missions may have been in whole or in part related to civil requirements, Western assessments have long held that some, if not all, were also concerned with photographic reconnaissance of a national security nature. By mid-1999 a total of 17 FSW-class spacecraft had been orbited with 15 successful recoveries, and there have been no subsequent flights.|
|FSW-3 Imagery Intelligence|
reference was made in a 1989 scientific paper about the development of a
second generation of recoverable satellites which would be much
larger, heavier, and more advanced than FSW-2. The new spacecraft
would also incorporate more sophisticated reentry lift techniques to
improve landing precision and to lessen deceleration forces, which are
currently as high as 20 g's for FSW capsules. No subsequent discussion
of this proposed satellite has ensued. China’s third generation of imaging
satellite, the FSW-3, is expected to be a recoverable system with a one
meter resolution. China’s Academy of Space Technology (CAST) engineers
have also conducted design work on a tactical imagery system and
associated mobile ground receiving stations. The system is based on
small satellite technology, uses a charged coupled device (CCD) array,
and, when operating in a 700-kilometer sun synchronous orbit, is
designed to have a five meter resolution. Some Western sources claim that China
may be seeking European and Russian technology to facilitate
construction of high-resolution radar satellites for all-weather
targetting applications, particularly the location of naval forces in
the Taiwan Straits. The source of this speculation remains unclear, and
there are no concrete indicators of such Chinese programs. The high
absentee ratio of space-based systems would provide a poor match with
Chinese regional force projection capabilities.
China has also taken an interest in the potential civil applications of such a system in the aftermath of the flooding, landslides, and typhoon damage in 1994. While China has used optical and infrared imaging space-based civil remote-sensing systems, there is particular interest in active microwave imagery that can penetrate southern China's constant cloud cover. The PLA and other parts of the state apparatus view radar satellite imagery as critical in China’s ability to achieve information dominance. Unlike electro-optical systems, radar satellites, according to GSD Second Department advocates, can see through clouds, rain, and fog in order to detect targets on the ground or underground, and in or under the ocean. In addition, SAR satellites are extremely useful in tracking moving targets, and can be useful in satisfying military mapping requirements. Chinese engineers have been examining SAR satellites as a means to track enemy submarines in shallow waters. China has already fielded a real-time airborne synthetic aperture radar (SAR) system, and is working toward deployment of an indigenous space based SAR satellite. Preliminary R&D on a space-based SAR satellite was reportedly initiated in the late 1980s, and model R&D began in 1991. In May 1995, SSTC and COSTIND approved the finalized design and work on associated high speed data transmission. While the first generation SAR satellite is in the prototype development phase, preliminary research has probably already begun on the second generation SAR satellite system. Key institutes involved in the indigenous development of synthetic aperture radar satellites include CAS’ Institute of Electronics, CAST’s 501st and 504th Research Institutes (Xian Institute of Space Radio Technology), Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering, and MEI’s 14th Research Institute and the Southwest Institute of Electronic Equipment (SWIEE).
|SIGINT - Signals Intelligence|
|The Technical Department provides the PRC with a wide range of SIGINT capabilities. The Chinese maintain, by far, the most extensive SIGINT capability of any nation in the Asia/Pacific region. The Chinese operate several dozen SIGINT ground stations deployed throughout China. They monitor signals from Russia, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, India, and Southeast Asia. Signals from U.S. military units located in the region are of significant interest to these monitoring stations. A large SIGINT facility at Hainan Island is principally concerned with monitoring U.S. naval activities in the South China Sea. The Chinese appear to be developing a spaceborne ELINT system that is mounted on their photoreconnaissance and communications satellites. There is no indication at this point that this capability presents a significant threat to U.S. forces in the region. The Chinese actively monitor international communications satellites from SATCOM intercept facilities on Hainan Island, and outside Beijing. Additionally, the Chinese have developed a series of SIGINT collection vessels that monitor U.S. military operations and exercises in the Asia/Pacific region.|
|Satellite Imaging Systems|
|The Chinese currently have the capability to launch military photo-reconnaissance satellites however the technology they employ is outdated by Western standards and they lack real-time satellite reconnaissance capabilities. The Chinese also currently use commercial SPOT and LANDSAT imagery, which can have some military uses. Use of other commercial satellite imagery can also be anticipated as these data sources become available in the next few years. China launches meteorological satellites and there is a high probability that its first geosynchronous satellite will be launched in 1997. It is expected that China eventually will deploy advanced imagery reconnaissance and earth resources systems with military applications. Airborne Early Warning Systems: China has been trying to acquire an airborne early warning system since the late 1980s. In the near future, Beijing is expected to award a contract to a foreign radar manufacturer to provide China with this capability. It could take an estimated four to six years from the date of a contract, however, before China is likely to have an operational airborne early warning platform. The development of more advanced satellite surveillance systems and sensors will continue to improve China’s strategic view of the Pacific theatre. The acquisition of airborne early warning and maritime patrol systems and their introduction into the armed forces, if successful, will greatly improve China’s battlefield command and control capabilities. However China will continue to lack a truly integrated Airborne Warning and Control (AWACS) capability.|
|Intelligence Agencies||Australia & New Zealand||Canada||Chile||China|
|South Africa||South Korea||Spain||Sweden||Taiwan|
|Turkey||United Kingdom||United States of America|