South Korean Agencies
|National Security Council|
|The National Security Council and the Ministry of National Defence are the primary executive bodies responsible for military affairs. The former, comprising the prime minister, the director of the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP), and the ministers of national defence, foreign affairs, home affairs, and finance, is responsible for advising the president on security issues and was convened at the pleasure of the president.|
|Ministry of National Defence|
Korean armed forces modified their command system on October 1, 1990, from a trilateral system of three services to the joint force system, and reformed the organizations and functions of the Ministry of National Defence, the JCS and the headquarters of three services in April 1995 to enhance the capabilities of crisis management and to complete the self-reliant systems of the joint planning and integrated operations. Meanwhile, unit structure is under improvement towards qualified unit structure focused on efficiency of operations and on a balance of three services so that integrated combat capabilities are maximized. The Ministry of National Defence is organized into bureaus responsible for force development, budget, personnel, reserve forces, logistics, military installations, medical affairs, the defence industry, and the military education system. Annual defence budgets are proposed by the Ministry of National Defence and approved by the president following consultations with the National Assembly. Beginning in fiscal year 1979, the Ministry of National Defence adopted a budget management system based on the United States Department of Defence project planning budget system. The South Korean system focused on force modernization and the maintenance of military organizations in peacetime at 70 percent of their wartime strength. The government's mobilization and resource management plans for support of the military were designed to bring the armed forces up to full strength quickly and to maintain the country's capability to supply the military during wartime. Under the 1987 Constitution, the National Assembly was accorded more responsibility to review the defence budget and to recommend appropriate levels of spending. In 1990, however, the president continued to have the final say on budget matters.
Seoul's defence budget increased in proportion to the growth of the national economy throughout the 1970s and 1980, demonstrating how strongly national leaders felt about improving the armed forces (see fig. 16). Between 1971 and 1975, defence spending increased from US$411 million to US$719 million. Defence expenditures averaged about 4.5 percent of the country's gross national product (GNP--see Glossary). In 1976, the first year that the government included proceeds from the defence tax in published figures for military expenditures, the budget for the armed forces and defence industries increased 100 percent over the 1975 figure to US$1.5 billion. The costs involved in initiating weapons production and the loss of military grant aid from the United States were the major reasons for the gradual increase of defence spending from 5.2 percent of GNP in 1979 to 6.2 percent of GNP in 1982. By 1990 defence spending had increased to almost US$10 billion a year, but because of the dramatic growth in the country's economy, this figure was below 30 percent of the government's budget and less than 5 percent of GNP for the first time since 1975. The rank and grade structure of the three services correspond, with minor exceptions, to that of the United States forces, as did the correlation between rank and responsibility. In peacetime, the army and air force were each commanded by a four-star general; a lieutenant general commanded the marines, and an admiral commanded the navy. Service uniforms also resembled those of the United States forces in colour and style. Service personnel wore a summer uniform of denim and a winter uniform of wool. Troops in forward areas wore a more expensive padded winter uniform. Noncommissioned officers of the army and air force wore a tunic buttoned to the top; navy noncommissioned officers wore the United States-type seaman's blouse. Officers' uniforms were similar to those worn by officers Until mid 1960's the procurement of military materiel for the Republic of Korea largely relied upon military aid from the United States. However, with the goal of modernizing and developing domestic weapon production capability, the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) was established in Jan 1, 1971 by integrating the Defence Construction Agency, procurement organizations of each service, and the Laboratory of Army Research and Development Command under the 5402nd order of the president. DPA has continued to carry out its functions, undergoing ten reorganization processes in its history. In 1990 South Korean industries provided about 70 percent of the weapons, ammunition, communications and other types of equipment, vehicles, clothing, and other supplies needed by the military of the United States.
Defence Security Command
Defence Security Command (DSC) was originally founded as "Army Counter-Intelligence Corps" on October 21, 1950, and it worked as the forerunning anti-Communist force on shattering the attempts by the North Korean regime to disintegrate the Korean Military, as well as strengthening the military power and establishing an independent national defence. Ever since it changed its official title to Defence Security Command on 01 January 1991, in order to comply with the era of change and reform, it has been enforcing necessary changes for the command while maintaining its main objective of upkeeping military confidentiality and counterintelligence activities as a pure "military intelligence and investigation organization". The DSC (and its predecessors) was created to deal with the real question of loyalty within a military on a divided peninsula. It was inspired by the Guomindang model, in which political officers monitored the military services for subversion or disloyalty. The DSC was responsible for monitoring the military for loyalty; safeguarding military information; monitoring domestic political, economic, and social activities that might jeopardize military capabilities and national unity; maintaining defence industrial security--both physically and in terms of counterespionage; countering North Korean infiltration; detecting espionage and anticommunist law violations; and conducting special investigations at the direction of the president. It was Syngman Rhee, not the military, who initiated the political involvement of the military in intelligence activities. The turning point came in 1952 when Rhee proclaimed martial law and the presence of military police in the chamber of the National Assembly guaranteed passage of the constitutional amendment he sought over the objections of a recalcitrant legislative branch and still-independent judicial branch. Throughout Rhee's administration, two military units--the Joint Military Provost Marshal and the army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC)--engaged in extralegal and violent political tactics, apparently not excluding the outright murder of politically undesirable people. Although the details never were disclosed fully, more than a few minor political figures' disappearances were connected to the two units.
Under Park, the provost marshal's political role declined, while the CIC and its successor, the Army Security Command (ASC), concentrated on internal military security. The CIC/ASC, which was under Park's direct control, maintained strict surveillance over all high-ranking officers. It acted as a deterrent to would-be coup leaders. It tried, less successfully, to prevent the rise of disruptive factions within the military. The Defence Security Command was formally activated in October 1977. This merger of the Army Security Command, the Navy Security Unit, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations produced a single, integrated unit under the direct command and operational control of the minister of national defence. Although technically subordinate to the minister, the DSC commander operated semi autonomously and typically had personal, direct access to the president. Given the disparity in service size, the old ASC predominated within the DSC. The strength of the DSC varied over time within a probable range of 5,000 to 7,000 people during the 1980s. The DSC assigned small elements to all major military units to monitor security and loyalty. These elements operated outside the unit's chain of command and performed a highly effective independent audit function. The DSC representatives never rivalled unit commanders as political officers occasionally had in communist military units. Their input into officer evaluations, however, often played a decisive role in career progression, giving DSC members influence far beyond their rank and producing friction between them and the "regular" military. Corruption within the DSC was difficult to verify, but political manipulations, misappropriation of operating funds, and undue influencing of promotions certainly occurred and were particularly rampant in the mid- to late 1970s. For most of the Park regime, the ASC/DSC remained concerned primarily with internal military matters and was involved in the Yun P'il-yong incident in 1972 and removing the army chief of staff, General Yi Se-ho, in 1979 for corruption. Yun P'il-yong, head of the Capital Garrison Command, was court martialled, along with several close followers, on charges of bribery and corruption. His "real" offence, however, was creating a faction among the classes of the four-year graduates of the Korea Military Academy. Yun's faction did not disappear when he was purged. The group of young officers, who called themselves the "Hanahoe," (One Mind Society), had its origins in an alumni group, the Taegu Seven Stars, of seven young officers, including Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, from the first graduating class of the Academy (Class 11). The Hanahoe evolved into a group of some 200 members through ten graduating classes. In 1979 and 1980, Chun drew on the Hanahoe in his ascent to power. The irony of Park's death at the hands of his KCIA chief in 1979, however, was compounded by the rise to power of the commander of the DSC, then Major General Chun Doo Hwan, who used the military's anticoup apparatus to ensure the success of his own coup .
During and following Chun's rise to power, the DSC greatly expanded its charter into domestic politics and during the early 1980s was, perhaps, the dominant domestic intelligence service. The DSC was "credited" with masterminding the media reorganization of 1980 and with being the midwife for the first political parties of the Fifth Republic. Many former DSC members played prominent roles in Chun's administration and in the ruling Democratic Justice Party. The end of the Fifth Republic brought the DSC under even more pressure than the ANSP to cut back on its domestic political activities. Both the DSC and the ANSP withdrew from the National Assembly at the same time in 1988. In October 1988, Minister of National Defence O Cha-bok reported to the National Assembly that the DSC would concentrate on counterespionage activities, preventing the spread of communism, conducting "relevant research," major restructuring, and would discontinue the investigation of civilians. Subsequently, the DSC eliminated the Office of Information that had been charged with collecting information on civilians, whose members had been active in local government offices. As a result of this move, 116 small detachments were disbanded, and the DSC announced plans to cut 860 personnel, or 14 percent of its 1990 strength. Additionally, the DSC curtailed its involvement in security screening of non-military government personnel. An official of the DSC claimed that surveillance of politicians was turned over to "another agency." Given the historically broad interpretation of national security threats espoused by DSC personnel, however, many analysts doubted that the DSC had totally disengaged from domestic political surveillance. Despite the democratic trends of the late 1980s, intelligence and security agencies still were populated by individuals who were both institutionally and personally loyal to the president and ready to use any means at their disposal to support him. DSC welcomes all reports and inquiries in order to search out North Korean spies who are threatening the national security and peace by engaging in secret manoeuvres within our society, as well as pro-North leftists who, following the directions of the North Korean regime, infiltrate into the Korean military and try to obstruct operations. People to be reported include those: Keeping in touch with someone who voluntarily has been to North Korea in the past. Unintentionally using peculiar North Korean words in speech, or secretly burying objects at well-marked places such as near cemeteries and around big trees. Hiding walkie-talkies or firearms, wearing a Korean military uniform while bearing an M-16 rifle, or taking photographs of military facilities and airports. Propagandising the ideology of the North Korean regime such as "juche" and instigating servicemen to form factions inside military.
Each case is promptly handled on the scene by DSC's branches all around the nation. Swift arrests are possible since the troops are quickly put into operation upon the outbreak of each situation As a special agency against spies and pro-North leftists, DSC makes sure to thoroughly verify the substance in order to reach a satisfying conclusion for each report, and the knowledgeable experts are available for helpful advice.
Additional areas of responsibility include: Matters related to improving or impeding morale of soldiers and battle capability. Matters related to soldiers and troops who give good or bad impression to people. Matters related to reports about persons who have or let out military secrets. Matters related to reports for environmental preservation, such as discharging polluted water or illegally burying wastes from constructions and hospitals. Matters related to construction and placement of military facilities, such as reports about unlawfulness and unreasonableness of the overseeing managers in military construction work or illegal infringement of lands for military use. Matters related to munition supply, such as reports about bribery in connection with certain munition companies or illegal carry-out of goods for military use. Other kinds of matters related to military.
The Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was created in 1961, and in 1981 the agency changed its name to the Agency for National Security Planning (NSP). In 1994, the NSP had its law revised following the agreement between Korea's ruling and opposition parties and established an "Information Committee" in the Assembly to lay a foundation for political neutrality. The NSP also launched operations against international crime and terrorism to protect the Korean people from international organized crime. The Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was originally established on June 19, 1961 as the directly under the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction in the immediate aftermath of the May 16, 1961, military coup. Its duties were to "supervise and coordinate both international and domestic intelligence activities and criminal investigation by all government intelligence agencies, including that of the military." Its mission was akin to that of a combined United States Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The first head of the KCIA was Kim Chong-p'il. Kim, utilizing the existing Army Counterintelligence Corps, built a 3,000-member organization--the most powerful intelligence and investigatory agency in the republic. The KCIA maintained a complex set of interlocking institutional links with almost all of the government's key decision-making bodies. The KCIA had a near monopoly over crucial information concerning national security under the charter of the Act Concerning Protection of Military Secrets and, more importantly, possessed considerable veto power over other agencies through its supervisory and coordination functions.
The KCIA's practically unlimited power to investigate and to detain any person accused of antistate behaviour severely restricted the right to dissent or to criticize the regime. The frequent questioning, detention, or even prosecution of dissidents, opposition figures, and reporters seriously jeopardized basic freedoms and created an atmosphere of political repression. Under Park, the lack of advancement in civil liberties continued to be justified by referring to the threat from North Korea. The political influence of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the police declined in the face of the KCIA's power. The relationship between the police and general public, however, was not significantly altered. As Se-Jin Kim wrote in 1971: "The former still act with arbitrary arrogance; the latter respond with fear but not respect." The government often used martial law or garrison decree in response to political unrest. From 1961 to 1979, martial law or a variant was evoked eight times. The October 15, 1971, garrison decree, for example, was triggered by student protests and resulted in the arrest of almost 2,000 students. A year later, on October 17, 1972, Park proclaimed martial law, disbanded the National Assembly, and placed many opposition leaders under arrest. In November the yusin constitution (yusin means revitalization), which greatly increased presidential power, was ratified by referendum under martial law. The government grew even more authoritarian, governing by presidential emergency decrees in the immediate aftermath of the establishment of the yusin constitution; nine emergency decrees were declared between January 1974 and May 1975. The Park regime strengthened the originally draconian National Security Act of 1960 and added an even more prohibitive Anticommunism Law. Under those two laws and Emergency Measure Number Nine, any kind of antigovernment activity, including critical speeches and writings, was open to interpretation as a criminal act of "sympathizing with communism or communists" or "aiding antigovernment organizations." Political intimidation, arbitrary arrests, preventive detention, and brutal treatment of prisoners were not uncommon.
Opposition to the government and its harsh measures increased as the economy worsened in 1979. Scattered labour unrest and the government's repressive reactions sparked widespread public dissent: mass resignation of the opposition membership in the National Assembly and student and labour riots in Pusan, Masan, and Ch'angwon. The government declared martial law in the cities. In this charged atmosphere, under circumstances that appeared related to dissatisfaction with Park's handling of the unrest, on October 26, 1979, KCIA chief Kim Chae-gyu killed Park and the chief of the Presidential Security Force, Ch'a Chi-ch'ol, and then was himself arrested. Emergency martial law was immediately declared to deal with the crisis, placing the head of the Defence Security Command, Major General Chun Doo Hwan, in a position of considerable military and political power. After the 1979 assassination of President Park Chung Hee by the KCIA director, the KCIA was purged and temporarily lost much of its power. Chun Doo Hwan used his tenure as acting director of the KCIA from April to July 1980 to expand his power base beyond the military. The slow pace of reform led to growing popular unrest. In early May 1980, student demonstrators protested a variety of political and social issues, including the government's failure to lift emergency martial law imposed following Park's assassination. The student protests spilled into the streets, reaching their peak during May 13 to 16, at which time the student leaders obtained a promise that the government would attempt to speed up reform. The military's response, however, was political intervention led by Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan, then KCIA chief and army chief of staff. Chun, who had forced the resignation of Ch'oe's cabinet, banned political activities, assemblies, and rallies, and arrested many ruling and opposition politicians. In Kwangju, demonstrations to protest the extension of martial law and the arrest of Kim Dae Jung turned into rebellion as demonstrators reacted to the brutal tactics of the Special Forces sent to the city. The government did not regain control of the city for nine days, after some 200 deaths.
The KCIA was renamed the Agency for National Security Planning, and its powers were redefined in presidential orders and legislation. The ANSP, like its predecessor, was a cabinet-level agency directly accountable to the president. The director of the ANSP continued to have direct presidential access. In March 1981, the ANSP was redesignated as the principal agency for collecting and processing all intelligence. The requirement for all other agencies with intelligence-gathering and analysis functions in their charters to coordinate their activities with the ANSP was reaffirmed. Legislation passed at the end of 1981 further redefined the ANSP's legally mandated functions to include the collection, compilation, and distribution of foreign and domestic information regarding public safety against communists and plots to overthrow the government. The maintenance of public safety with regard to documents, materials, facilities, and districts designated as secrets of the state was the purview of the ANSP as was the investigation of crimes of insurrection and foreign aggression, crimes of rebellion, aiding and abetting the enemy, disclosure of military secrets, and crimes provided for in the Act Concerning Protection of Military Secrets and the National Security Act. The investigation of crimes related to duties of intelligence personnel, the supervision of information collection, and the compilation and distribution of information on other agencies' activities designed to maintain public safety also were undertaken by the ANSP. By 1983 the ANSP had rebounded and again was the pre-eminent foreign and domestic intelligence organization. Discontent was kept under control until 1987 by the regime's extensive security services--particularly the Agency for National Security Planning, the Defence Security Command (DSC), and the Combat Police of the Korean National Police (KNP). Both the civilian ANSP and the military DSC not only collected domestic intelligence but also continued "intelligence politics."
The Act Concerning Assembly and Demonstration was used to limit the expression of political opposition by prohibiting assemblies likely to "undermine" public order. Advanced police notification of all demonstrations was required. Violation carried a maximum sentence of seven years' imprisonment or a. fine. Most peaceful nonpolitical assemblies took place without government interference. However, the act was the most frequently used tool to control political activity in the Fifth Republic, and the Chun regime was responsible for over 84 percent of the 6,701 investigations pursued under the act. The security presence in city centres, near university campuses, government and party offices, and media centres was heavy. Citizens, particularly students and young people, were subject to being stopped, questioned, and searched without due process. The typical response to demonstrations was disruption by large numbers of Combat Police, short-term mass detention of demonstrators, and selective prosecution of the organizers. Arrest warrants required by law were not always produced at the time of arrest in political cases. The National Security Act increasingly was used after 1985 to suppress domestic dissent. Intended to restrict "antistate activities endangering the safety of the state and the lives and freedom of the citizenry," the act also was used to control and punish nonviolent domestic dissent. Its broad definition of offences allowed enforcement over the widest range, wider than that of any other politically relevant law in South Korea. Along with other politically relevant laws such as the Social Safety Act and the Act Concerning Crimes Against the State, it weakened or removed procedural protection available to defendants in nonpolitical cases.
Questioning by the security services often involved not only psychological or physical abuse, but outright torture. The 1987 torture and death of Pak Chong-ch'ol, a student at Seoul National University being questioned as to the whereabouts of a classmate, played a decisive role in galvanizing public opposition to the government's repressive tactics. The security services not only detained those accused of violating laws governing political dissent, but also put under various lesser forms of detention including house arrest those people, including opposition politicians, who they thought intended to violate the laws. Many political, religious, and other dissidents were subjected to surveillance by government agents. Opposition assembly members later charged in the National Assembly that telephone tapping and the interception of correspondence were prevalent. Ruling party assembly members, government officials, and senior military officials probably also were subjected to this interference though they did not openly complain. Listening to North Korean radio stations remained illegal in 1990 if it were judged to be for the purpose of "benefiting the antistate organization" (North Korea). Similarly, books or other literature considered subversive, procommunist, or pro-North Korean were illegal; authors, publishers, printers, and distributors of such material were subject to arrest.
Use of tear gas by the police (over 260,000 tear gas shells were used in 1987 to quell demonstrations) increasingly was criticized; the criticism eventually resulted in legal restrictions on tear gas use in 1989. The government continued, however, to block many "illegal" gatherings organized by dissidents that were judged to incite "social unrest." In 1988 government statistics noted 6,552 rallies involving 1.7 million people. There were 2.2 million people who had participated in 6,791 demonstrations in 1989. As of 1990, the organizational structure of the ANSP, was considered classified by Seoul, although earlier organizational information was public knowledge. Despite the social and political changes that came with the Sixth Republic, the ANSP apparently still considered the support and maintenance of the president in power to be one of its most important roles. In April 1990, for example, ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) coleader Kim Young Sam complained that he and members of his faction within the DLP had been subjected to "intelligence manoeuvring in politics" that included wiretapping, surveillance, and financial investigations. Nevertheless, the ANSP's domestic powers were indeed curtailed under the Sixth Republic. Prior to the change, the ANSP had free access to all government offices and files. The ANSP, Defence Security Command, Office of the Prosecutor General, Korean National Police, and the Ministry of Justice had stationed their agents in the National Assembly to collect information on the activities of politicians. In May 1988, however, overt ANSP agents, along with agents of other intelligence agencies, were withdrawn from the National Assembly building. The ANSP's budget was not made public, nor apparently was it made available in any useful manner to the National Assembly in closed sessions. In July 1989, pressured by opposition parties and public opinion, the ANSP was subjected to inspection and audit by the National Assembly for the first time in eighteen years. The ANSP removed its agents from the chambers of the Seoul Criminal Court and the Supreme Court in 1988.
As of 1990, however, the ANSP remained deeply involved in domestic politics and was not prepared to relinquish the power to prevent radical South Korean ideas--much less North Korean ideas- -from circulating in South Korean society. Despite an agreement in September 1989 by the chief policymakers of the ruling and opposition parties to strip the ANSP of its power to investigate pro-North Korean activity (a crime under the National Security Act), the ANSP continued enforcing this aspect of the law rather than limiting itself to countering internal and external attempts to overthrow the government. The ANSP continued to pick up radical student and dissident leaders for questioning without explanation. In another move to limit the potential for the ANSP to engage in "intelligence politics," the ANSP Information Coordination Committee was disbanded because of its history of unduly influencing other investigating authorities, such as the Office of the Prosecutor General. Additionally, the ANSP, responding to widespread criticism of its alleged human rights violations, set up a "watchdog" office to supervise its domestic investigations and to prevent agents from abusing their powers while interrogating suspects. Aside from its controversial internal security mission, the ANSP also was known for its foreign intelligence gathering and analysis and for its investigation of offences involving external subversion and military secrets. The National Unification Board and the ANSP (and the KCIA before it) were the primary sources of government analysis and policy direction for South Korea's reunification strategy and contacts with North Korea. The intelligence service's reputation in pursuing counterespionage cases also was excellent. The ANSP monitored visitors, particularly from communist and East European countries, to prevent industrial and military espionage. Following the diplomatic successes of the late 1980s-- the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, and the increased informal contacts with China, Mongolia, and Vietnam--this mission grew in importance. The security watch list contained 162 out of 3,808 visitors from communist nations in 1988 and 226 out of 6,444 visitors in 1989.
National Intelligence Service missions and functions include: Collection, coordination, and distribution of information on the nation's strategy and security. Investigation of crimes affecting national security, including crimes that violate the Military Secrecy Protection Law, the National Security Law, which prohibit the incitement of civil war, foreign troubles, and insurrection. Investigation of crimes related to the missions of NIS staff. Maintenance of documents, materials, and facilities related to the nation's classified information. Planning and coordination of information and classified information.
|National Police Agency|
The Korean National Police Agency system consists of, from the top: one National Police Headquarters located in Seoul; 5 special task police agencies, including Marine Police; 13 provincial police headquarters; 220 police stations; and 3,389 police branch offices across the country. The Korean Police has its own chain of command independent of the Army. There are no local municipal police systems or state police departments like those in many western nations. During the Japanese Occupation Period. (1910 - 1945) Japan established the Police Administration Bureau (1910) under the Governor-general in Choson. This had forced discontinuation of the Korean police system and caused the people's hatred and mistrust about the police. With the end of World War II, Korea restored its independence on August 15, 1945. However, Korea was suffering from disorder and chaos without any countermeasure or systematic organization to ensure public peace and order. On 17 August 1945 an autonomy organization was established by the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Republic of Korea (Chairman: Yeo Woonyoung) This contributed to the public peace and order until the US Army was stationed in Korea on September 9. Various organizations formed, such as the Public Peace Corps., Student Organizations, Youth Organizations, Guards Corps., Self-Defence Organization, and Choson Student Group. The Police Administration Office was established under the U.S. Military Government on October 21, 1945, with Police Administration Departments in each province. On 01 January 1946 the Police Administration Bureau was elevated to the Police Administration Department by Military Government Order No.23104 [Subject of Police Administration Bureau and Police Administration Department] . Subsequently the Provincial Police Departments were reorganized to District Police Bureaus (9 districts nationwide).
The new government that had declared the establishment of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948, took over administrative power from U.S. Military Government on September 13. However, the policy system did not remain as a department but was downgraded as an office within the Ministry of Home Affairs. The July 17, 1948 Law of Government Organizations Article 15 (Korean Law No. 1) stated that the Minister of Home Affairs shall govern the affairs on local administration, election, security, fire fighting, road, bridge, rivers, water service, construction and statistics and supervise the local organization for public peace and order to provide the basis of subordination to the Ministry of Home Affairs. On 03 September 1948 the Police Administration Department became subordinate to the Security Bureau in the Ministry of Home Affairs; local the police headquarters became subordinate to provincial Governors. As the National Assembly was dismissed by emergency martial law, on 17 October 1972 the government suddenly decided upon the so called "October Revitalization" style of Korean democracy. In 1974, the government started to study the police system to revive the proper functionality of the police. The Security Bureau was upgraded to the Security Headquarters and the Head of the Security Bureau was promoted to chief of Security Headquarter at the vice-minister level. The Security Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs was reorganized on 24 December 1974 into the Security Headquarters with three departments. The Personnel Education Department was established within the Department NO.1 and the Computer Centre was established within Department NO.3. In the 1990s the Police searched for the political neutralization of the police. The efforts for this neutralization, such as the introduction of a bill based on the committee type that organized the national police committee belonging to the Prime Minister on March, 1989, and enlisted the police agency under the banner of the committee, has been continued. On May 31, 1991, the Police Law was established and promulgated. On July 31, 1991, the Police Committee of the Ministry of Home Affairs was inaugurated. The matter for the main policy about personnel management, budget, equipment, communications etc. and the development of police affairs, the matter for the management and improvement of police related to safeguard the human rights, the matter for the cooperation of affairs from the other national organization except police affairs, and the matter that is presented to a committee by recognition of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and NPA Commissioner General are deliberated and decided.
On 01 August 1991 the NPA was inaugurated as an independent government organization which is not a subordinate organization of the Ministry of Home Affairs. It was reorganized to one Deputy Commissioner General, nine major staffs, and 41 sections, with reinforced management through the planning, readjustment and control. The NPA was reorganized into large departments and large sections by considering specialization and efficiency. The police box is a first-line organization of the police and served as a base for anti-crime activities for maintaining the security of an area in consideration of the population, area, administrative district, frequency of crime. The total number of nationwide police boxes is 3,422, manned by 38,000 policeman; 43% of the entire police force work day and night in protecting the population from crime. The NPA performs various surveillance activities to guard against the appearance of anarchistic ideology struggle; reappearance of anti-democratic and anti-government violence. It also monitors increased labour circle meetings and demonstrations due to the IMF impact. Activities include watching various events such as ceremonial meetings, athletic events, and guarding the people visiting hometowns or parent's graves. The NPA utilizes its own order keeping guardians as well as guardians from security guard service company, allocating a minimum number of policemen when keeping order is required. It is also responsible for checking the protection status of important facilities and paying guidance visits to protect them from various dangerous activities. The chief of the facility takes primary responsibility for protection; the police takes responsibility for guidance and supervision. Protection of candidate activities include pre-investigate and present disrupting activities to the election speech sites, voting place and ballot counting locations. The Presidential Security Service (PSS) is charged with providing security for the President, his immediate family and the Blue House, the presidential residence. The PSS is also authorized to protect former Presidents, their spouses and minor children for seven years after leaving office. PSS is also charged with protecting security for visiting heads of foreign states, their accompanying spouse and family, and other visiting dignitaries when deemed necessary for national interest.
The Kyong Mu Dae Presidential Security Police (predecessor to the present Presidential Security Service) was established in 1949, and was renamed Blue House Presidential Police in 1960. In 1961 the Security Force to protect Park Chung Hee, National Revolution Leader, was established. The PSS was established in 1963 after PSS Law 157 was enacted, with Hong Jong Chul as its first Chief. After the 1968attack against the Blue House by North Korean guerrillas, PSS responsibilities are increased. After the First Lady was fatally shot in a 1974 failed attempt to assassinate President Park Chung Hee by Moon Sei Kwang, acting under orders from the North Korean government, PSS was given significantly greater authority over presidential security operations including mobilization of military, police, etc. A reduction of PSS responsibilities came after the assassination of President Park Jung Hee in 1979. This included abolishment of Security Committee for presidential protection (Executive Order 9692) and abolishment of Security Control Unit for presidential protection (Executive Order 9692). The 1981 revision of Presidential Security Law (PSL) included enactment of the Protection Law for former presidents and their families. The PSS began protecting the President-elect and his family, along with a revision of Security Committee for presidential protection. After North Korean agents commit a terrorist bombing attack in Myanmar in 1983, PSS responsibilities were broadened and intensified for the presidential entourage.
|707th Special Missions Battalion|
|The 707th Special Missions
Battalion, part of the Republic of Korea's Army Special Warfare Command
(ROKA SOCOM), is South Korea's primary counter terrorist and quick
reaction force. The unit's soldiers – distinguished by their black
berets – are tasked with conducting urban counter terrorist missions,
and constitute the Army's quick-reaction force for emergencies. During
wartime they perform clandestine special-warfare assignments. This elite
force of operators was formed after the Munich Olympic disaster in 1972.
The South Korean government realized the need to raise a specially
trained unit to handle the many threats facing it. These threats ranged
from North Korean special operations forces conducting operations to
destabilize the government to foreign terrorist organizations operating
on Korean soil. In 1982 the South Korean government tasked the
battalion with providing a counter terrorist response to any potential
terrorist incident occurring during the upcoming 1988 Seoul Summer
Olympics. The unit immediately began a program to rapidly expand it
strength and operational capabilities, almost tripling in size. The 707th provided security for VIPs and for
key facilities during the 1986 Asian Games and during the 1988 Olympics.
At both events terrorist attacks were considered to be a real danger. In
addition, the unit has reportedly seen extensive action against North
Korean infiltrators, and according to several unconfirmed reports, they
have also conducted multiple operations on the North Korean mainland.
Prospective candidates for the battalion are only drawn from the ranks of qualified special forces personnel. Special Forces operator training and selection lasts for a full year, and includes six months of basic infantry combat training, with an additional six months of special warfare training and parachute training. During the special warfare portion of their training are provided instruction in basic parachute techniques, rappelling and mountain warfare, martial arts, fire arms instruction, and demolitions. Korean special forces personnel are well known for their toughness, and 707th SMB personnel are reportedly even tougher. Throughout their training physical fitness is stressed and students are driven hard by their instructors. Various reports have stated that members frequently perform daily callisthenics in the snow and subzero temperatures, and swim in freezing lakes without any thermal protection. Those special forces personnel wishing to volunteer for service in the unit must first pass an extensive background check and endure a ten day selection process that eliminates approximately 90% of the applicants. Counter-terrorist training for the 707th is intensive, and once an operator is accepted into the unit he will receive additional instruction in combat shooting, breaching, assault tactics, SCUBA diving, and various other skills. The battalion's training facility, which is reportedly one of the finest in the world, has an extensive network of range facilities allowing for the development of CQB skills in the unit's operators. It also reportedly contains a complete mockup of a 747 airliner, allowing operators the opportunity to conduct live fire training exercises, and hone their aircraft takedown skills. In addition to working with other Korean special operations forces and special Korean counter terrorist police units, such as the Korean National Police Agency's SWAT team, the 707th maintains close ties with similar units from around the globe, including Singapore's STAR team, the Australian SASR's Tactical Assault Group (TAG), and Hong Kong's SDU, although the unit's closets ties are with the US Army's 1st Special Forces Group, and the 1st SFOD-D.
The South Korean government lavishly funds the battalion, and as a result they use a wide variety of foreign and domestically produced weapons. Pistols include modified versions of the US produced Colt .45 and the Daewoo 9mm. The HK MP-5 is now used as the primary submachine gun for assaults. Both the Daewoo K1 and K2 assault rifles are used, albeit modified for assaults with the addition of forward pistol grips and in some cases low-light vision devices. For rearguards a Benelli Super-90 shotgun with pistol grips is used. For light sniping the HK PSG-1 and M-24 7.62mm rifles have been used, heavier sniping needs are cause for the RAI .50 calibre weapon to be broken out. When heavier firepower is needed the unit has M-203 40mm grenade launchers, M-60E3 and K3 Beltfed 7.62mm machine guns at its disposal. The unit has also deployed Short Brothers Javelin man-portable SAMs as a defence against low level aircraft.
|National Police 868 Unit|
|Due to the possibility of terrorist actions during the then future 1988 Olympic games, the S. Korean National Police formed a special counter-terrorist unit sometime in 1982 known as KNP 868 or 868 HRT. The Korean phonetic word for 868 HRT is "kyungchal (Police) teuk-kong-dae (Special Response Team). Unit 868 is an approximately 90 man force tasked with hostage rescue and light anti-terrorism duties. They are formed into 12 7-operator assault teams with associative support elements. In the event of a large scale terrorist incident they would defer to the S. Korean Army's 707th Special Missions Battalion.|
|Intelligence Agencies||Australia & New Zealand||Canada||Chile||China|
|South Africa||South Korea||Spain||Sweden||Taiwan|
|Turkey||United Kingdom||United States of America|