The National Intelligence Council (NIC) is best known as the organization that produces National Intelligence Estimates, which are intelligence community-wide forecasts of issues and challenges facing the security of the United States. The NIC reports to the Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity as head of the intelligence community. In an attempt to engage creative thinking from outside the intelligence community's classified bunker the NIC has increasingly participated in joint sponsorship of conferences with non-governmental institutions and has produced a number of unclassified publications.

The United States has carried on foreign intelligence activities since the days of George Washington, but only since World War II have they been coordinated on a government wide basis. Even before Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was concerned about American intelligence deficiencies. He asked New York lawyer William J. Donovan to draft a plan for an intelligence service. The Office of Strategic Services was established in June 1942 with a mandate to collect and analyze strategic information required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to conduct special operations not assigned to other agencies. During the War, the OSS supplied policy makers with essential facts and intelligence estimates and often played an important role in directly aiding military campaigns. But the OSS never received complete jurisdiction over all foreign intelligence activities. Since the early 1930s the FBI had been responsible for intelligence work in Latin America, and the military services protected their areas of responsibility.

In October 1945, the OSS was abolished and its functions transferred to the State and War Departments. But the need for a postwar centralized intelligence system was clearly recognized. Eleven months earlier, Donovan, by then a major general, had submitted to President Roosevelt a proposal calling for the separation of OSS from the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the new organization having direct Presidential supervision. Donovan proposed an "organization which will procure intelligence both by overt and covert methods and will at the same time provide intelligence guidance, determine national intelligence objectives, and correlate the intelligence material collected by all government agencies." Under his plan, a powerful, centralized civilian agency would have coordinated all the intelligence services. He also proposed that this agency have authority to conduct "subversive operations abroad," but "no police or law enforcement functions, either at home or abroad."

NSA is the nation's crypto logic organization, tasked with making and breaking codes and ciphers. In addition, NSA is one of the most important centres of foreign language analysis and research and development within the government. NSA is a high-technology organization, working on the very frontiers of communications and data processing. The expertise and knowledge it develops provide the government with systems that deny foreign powers knowledge of US capabilities and intentions.

The National Security Agency (NSA) is charged with two of the most important and sensitive activities in the US intelligence community. The information systems security or INFOSEC mission provides leadership, products, and services to protect classified and unclassified national security systems against exploitation through interception, unauthorized access, or related technical intelligence threats. This mission also supports the Director, NSA, in fulfilling responsibilities as Executive Agent for interagency operations security training.

The foreign signals intelligence or SIGINT mission allows for an effective, unified organization and consists of all the foreign signals collection and processing activities of the United States. NSA is authorized to produce SIGINT in accordance with objectives, requirements and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.

1960-1989 - Initial Organization
Since its formation on 25 August 1960, the Navy, Air Force and CIA had each managed their own stable of satellites, with both Air Force and CIA managing both SIGINT and IMINT assets, although CIA usually handled IMINT and Air Force had primary responsibility for SIGINT. Program D included aerial assets. Initially the NRO was organized into four programs, each of which was responsible for system design and development, coordination with contractors, and operations.
Program A included all Air Force satellite intelligence programs, which were managed by the Special Projects Office located at the Air Force Space and Missiles System Centre at Los Angeles AFB, El Segundo, CA.
Program B encompassed Central Intelligence Agency satellite programs, which were the responsibility of the Agency's Deputy Director for Science and Technology, discharged the Assistant Deputy Director for Research and Engineering.
Program C embraced the Naval component of NRO, responsible for ocean surveillance satellites. Development activities were conducted by the Naval Space and Warfare Systems Command (NAVSPAWAR) in Crystal City, VA, and the Navy Space Project Office at Los Angeles AFB, El Segundo, CA. Operational control of Naval systems is the responsibility of the Naval Security Group Command, headquartered in Washington, DC.
Program D covered aerial surveillance programs, such as the U-2 and A-11, prior to 1969. These aircraft were subsequently operated by the Air Force Strategic Air Command, until the establishment of Air Combat Command, whereupon control of the remaining U-2s reverted briefly with NRO. Responsibility for these activities was subsequently removed from the NRO and ultimately lodged in the Defence Airborne Reconnaissance Office in late 1993.
This use of service executive agents mirrored the pattern initially established by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, and later by the Strategic Defence Initiative Organization, and its successor, the Ballistic Missile Defence Organization. A small central agency staff directed and supervised work conducted by much larger service organizations, which in turn managed relations with the even larger contractor base.
Although the NRO is a national organization, since its formation the NRO has operated under the cover of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, and the Office of Space Systems [SAF/SS], which serves as the organization's staff director. However, during the Carter and Bush Administrations, the NRO was headed by an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force -- on both occasions the Under Secretary was a woman, who was presumably not qualified to discharge this responsibility. Exceptionally, Reagan Administration Air Force Under Secretary Edward Aldridge retained responsibility for the NRO when he became Secretary of the Air Force. For over a decade the NRO Deputy Director has been an Air Force civilian, Jimmie Hill, and the current identity of the NRO Director can be readily tracked by observing who Jimmie Hill works for.
The Under Secretary of the Navy is also specifically tasked to operate the Department of the Navy's programs which are part of the NRO.
The Director of Central Intelligence chairs the National Reconnaissance Executive Committee, which directly supervises the NRO.

1989-1990 Consolidation
In mid-1989, David Boren, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence requested a jointly approved plan for the reorganization of the National Reconnaissance Office. In 1989 the Senate Intelligence Committee stated that:
"the best approach to ensuring a robust national reconnaissance program is to reorganize the NRO in a way which facilitates greater communication, cross-system and cross program fertilization, and common security, support, and administrative practices. Thus, the Committee directs that, unless an Alternative plan approved by the Secretary of Defence and the DCI is submitted prior to November 1, 1989, the NRO begin, no later than November 1, 1989, a reorganization according to the plan outlined in a letter to the Intelligence Committee dated November 21, 1988 by then Secretary of the Air Force Edward C. Aldridge, Jr....
" ... (2) collocation of remaining activities in a central facility in the Washington, D.C. area; ... [under] ... the Aldridge Plan...Ultimately, circa 1991-1992, the plan called for the collocation of the CIA Air Force, and Navy Program offices in a new facility in Northern Virginia. The Committee believes these goals and the timetable are realistic. Moreover, additional realignment of program office functions are made feasible by the collocation and should be pursued....
"Accordingly, the Committee directs that all activities of the various program offices be collocated according to the 1991-1992 timetable unless the Director, NRO decides, based on compelling reasons, that certain sub-elements of the three program offices should not collocate. In such a case, the Director should notify the Intelligence Committees of his decision and describe his rationale for it.
In a 3 July 1989 letter to Boren regarding the NRO restructure, Defence Secretary Richard Cheney and Director of Central Intelligence William Webster stated their intent to:
Form a Joint Senior Advisory Board (now referred to as the National Reconnaissance Review Board) of senior Intelligence Community managers to advise us and the DSRO regarding NRO issues; Establish a strong Planning, Analysis, and Evaluation capability within the NRO to support the architectural development and programmatic decision processes; Designate the CIA's Director of Development and Engineering as the Director of Program B to provide a full-time manager for Program B; and Establish, within the NRO, a Deputy Director for Command Support position (now referred to as the Deputy Director for Military Support) to improve NRO support to the military.
In addition to these initial steps, the DNRO Restructure Study recommended:
Realignment of the NRO and Defence Support Project Office (DSPO) staffs to improve management effectiveness and facilitate a more integrated and effective organizational response to military requirements. The DSPO continued as a distinct organizational entity providing the principal focus for the DSPO/NRO interface with the military. However, common support functions, such as budget administration and planning and analysis support, were combined into single organizational entities that provided support to both the NRO and DSPO. Establish, within the NRO, National Security Agency responsible for ensuring that consistent and adequate implementation standards are applied across government and contractor organizations in order to minimize wasteful resource expenditures and maximize the effectiveness of security protection. Continued use of a small, centralized, Inspection and Audit (IG) function, supported by the IG activities of the NRO Program Offices' parent organizations, to accomplish the necessary NRO IG functions. With the recent agreement between the NRO and CIA, the final issue preventing successful implementation of this concept has been removed and all NRO Program Offices and their parent organizations support the charter of the NRO Inspector General.
Defence Secretary Richard Cheney and Director of Central Intelligence William Webster endorsed the DNRO's decision not to pursue further collocation. They shared his belief that the combination of restructure initiatives being implemented had the potential to achieve the same benefit as a total collocation without the downside risk of disrupting the NRO's program execution ability and support infrastructure. However, they did express the belief, as did DNRO, that it was important to continue to protect the option to implement additional collocation initiatives if required. The DNRO's facility acquisition strategy supported this objective.
The Defence Secretary and the Director of Central Intelligence reaffirmed their previous conviction, supported by the DNRO's 1989-90 reassessment, that a business-line structure, that would attempt to give each Program Office the responsibility for a unique mission area, was neither a viable or effective restructure alternative. They wanted to preserve a beneficial degree of competition between the Program Offices and the ability to apply the resources of all three Program Offices, as appropriate, to a problem. Competition was also viewed as vital to sustaining the motivation of the Program Offices and the ability to develop creative solutions to intelligence requirements.
The Defence Secretary and the Director of Central Intelligence shared the DNRO's concern regarding the House Appropriations Committee guidance to shift program management responsibility for the Defence Reconnaissance Support Program (DRSP) and Airborne Reconnaissance Support Program (ARSP) from the DNRO to the Assistant Secretary of Defence for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (AND (C3I)). In their view, no matter what external lines of authority existed, or are established, to the NRO, the fundamental principle must remain that NRO Program Offices must work for one program manager, the DNRO, regardless of the source of the funding for the programs they are executing. Subsequent to the preparation of the Restructuring Report on 8 January 1990, the ASD(C3I) and the DNRO developed a recommendation which maintained this principle while providing for appropriate direction from the ASD(C3I). Under this plan, the NRO's Deputy Director for Military Support would also serve as the Director of the DSPO under the day-to-day operational control of the DNRO. In this capacity, he will receive programmatic oversight, requirements, guidance, and funding through the ASD(C3I). The DSPO would be a DoD staff element (not a NRO Program Office) with budgeting, coordination, and architectural responsibilities. Specific relationships among the ASD(C3I), DSPO, DNRO, and the DCI were to be formulated and provided at a later date.
The DNRO recommended implementation of an NRO headquarters collocation that included the DNRO, his deputies, their staff support, management elements from the three Program Offices, and appropriate centralized support functions in order to facilitate a more integrated organizational approach to the accomplishment of the NRO mission, built upon the unique capabilities of the individual Program Offices.
Throughout most of its history, the small NRO staff consisted of personnel seconded from other agencies. The January 1990 NRO Restructure Report noted the problems this created, and considered the possibility of creating:
" ... a more integrated organizational structure. Multiple civilian personnel systems may result in individuals doing similar jobs for different levels of pay and benefits. Additionally, our ability to make the personnel changes necessary to accommodate programmatic changes in our programs might be improved if the NRP budgeted, and perhaps directly controlled, its personnel resources. "This area is very important to the long term success of our restructure efforts. However, I am not prepared to recommend a definitive solution for our personnel requirements beyond the approach for the additional requirements described above. I intend to work with the Administration and the Congress to develop a solution as quickly as possible."
The restructure activities required additional personnel to support the centralized security function.
To support the additional personnel requirements associated with the new facilities and the centralized security function, 111 additional personnel were authorized to be paid with funds available to the National Reconnaissance Program, which would require funding increasing gradually from $5.6 million in 1991 to $7.9 million in 1995.
1992 Functional Reorganization
As early as mid-1989 it was reported that the Defence Department (Air Force) was in charge of the photographic intelligence bureau of the NRO. And by late 1989 it was reported that the NRO had initiated a major restructuring, with each CIA assigned responsibility for all satellites under the Imagery Branch, and Air Force assigned responsibility for all satellites under the SIGINT Branch. Least affected was the Navy, which retained responsibility for the satellites of the Ocean Surveillance Branch. Although these reports were in error at the time, they reflected the options under consideration in 1989, and ultimately implemented in 1992.
The Woolsey panel recommended reorganization of NRO into several directorates and collocation of major NRO elements as expeditiously as possible. These recommendations were approved by the DCI, the Secretary of Defence, and the President. The Restructure Plan approved by the SECDEF and DCI collocated most of the NRO to a single location as soon as possible. Full collocation would be supported with the occupancy of the NRO Westfields facility in 1996. According to the NRO, the Westfields consolidation would: strengthen the technical capability of the organization; improve decision making; promote closer, more active, interfaces with customers; improve ability to develop more integrated architecture; allow merging of similar functions to minimize redundancy; and facilitate functional organization structure.
The process of reorganization along product rather than service lines began in late 1992. In mid- November, DCI Robert Gates announced:
"... we have implemented a far-reaching internal restructuring of the National Reconnaissance Office (including declassification of its existence). These changes, from an organizational to a functional structure, are the most comprehensive in the NRO's history."
Under the new structure, the designation of CIA as IMINT Branch manager and Air Force as SIGINT Branch-manager was replaced by IMINT and SIGINT Branches staffed by workers from CIA and the military services. According to NRO Director Martin Faga, under the new structure:
"We will have the CIA and the [Defence Department] people intertwined to carry out the particular functions we need."
Faga suggested that the NRO organization prior to 1989, with each service working competitively and independently, had contributed to excessive proliferation of competing satellite designs and a lack of technical coordination.
The leading public authority on NRO, Jeff Richelson, suggested that:
"The advances have been so great that maybe they don't need the degree of competition they have had in the past. You're not going to have the Air Force and the CIA competing for the design of the next signals intelligence spacecraft in the way you have in the past."
As of early 1994, NRO reported that "significant progress has been made in our efforts to reorganize into an integrated functional organization."
As part of the continuing baseline review of NRO support functions, it was determined that the support function needed to be consolidated and expanded in the NRO. Consequently a Management Services and Operations (MSO) organization was established in FY 1992. MSO provides consolidated support in the areas of communications, human resources management, administrative services, facility acquisition, logistics support,, and facility security. Additionally, the Centralized Security Function has expanded its original support function in the areas of communications security training and personnel security.
The Miscellaneous Support and Operations element of the Mission Support expenditure centre includes the facilities required in the NRO reorganization, airlift support, personnel costs, security operations, NRO communications and non-program specific logistics and support. The FY 1992 increase in Miscellaneous Support and Operations includes a functional transfer from the Air Force for the operational costs of the NRO communications.
As a result of the restructure actions the NRO became responsible for new or increased infrastructure and administrative support which it had previously received from other organizations. These functions necessitated an increase in NRO personnel. In addition to the personnel requirements to support the NRO restructure initiated in 1990, the recent organizational changes and the declassification of the existence of the NRO increased the requirement for additional personnel to support FOIA facility activities and an expanded NRO Inspector General function.

The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) is a combat support agency of the Department of Defence (DoD), supporting the Secretary of Defence, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and other national-level policymakers in the areas of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. NIMA is a member of the national Intelligence Community and the single entity upon which the U.S. Government relies to coherently manage the disciplines of imagery and mapping. NNIMA was established on 1 October 1996 to address these expanding requirements. It was created from the former Defence Mapping Agency (DMA), Central Imagery Office (CIO), and the Defence Dissemination Program Office (DDPO) in their entirety; the missions and functions of the National Photographic Interpretation Centre (NPIC); and the imagery exploitation, dissemination and processing capabilities of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Defence Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO). The National Imagery and Mapping Agency's (NIMA's) role is to support the war fighter through priorities established by the commanders in chief (CINCs). This support comes in the form of imagery, imagery intelligence, and GI (including standard maps and data sets) in support of national security objectives. The agency's vision is to guarantee ready access to the world's imagery, imagery intelligence, and GI. NIMA has technical and liaison representatives at the CINC level who work with the staff and the GI&S officer to establish requirements and priorities and to identify the best products and services that NIMA can provide. These representatives prioritise, validate, and consolidate requirements identified by major subordinate commands (MSCs).

NIMA has a global mission, as established by the NIMA Act of 1996. It has the unique responsibilities of managing and providing imagery and GI to national policy makers and military forces. NIMA is also an established part of the US intelligence community in recognition of its unique responsibilities and global mission. NIMA brings together in a single organization the imagery tasking, production, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) responsibilities and the mapping, charting, and geodetic functions of eight separate organizations of the defence and intelligence communities. NIMA continues to improve support to national and military customers through comprehensive management of US imaging and geospatial capabilities. The NIMA mission is to provide timely, relevant, and accurate imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information in support of national security objectives. NIMA is responsible for providing support to military operations, defence agencies, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), and other Federal Government Agencies on matters concerning imagery and geospatial information relating to national security. NIMA was created by consolidating several agencies into a single entity which requires consolidating several distinct missions into the NIMA mission. Under this mission NIMA is assigned the responsibility to prescribe and mandate standards and end-to-end technical architectures related to imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information for the DoD Components and for non-DoD elements of the Intelligence Community. NIMA is chartered to provide management and operation (collection tasking, imagery analysis and geospatial information production) of the imagery and geospatial services for National customers and for support to military operations, planning, training, and weapons systems. It is to ensure access and dissemination of primary and secondary imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. NIMA is responsible for the acquisition, design, development, implementation, installation, transition, and sustainment of systems, standards, and technology pertaining to the United States Imagery and Geospatial Information Systems (USIGS) for the imagery, imagery analysis, and geospatial information community. NIMA ensures that imagery intelligence, geospatial information, and other needs for imagery are managed effectively and efficiently in a manner conducive to national security and consistent with the authorities and duties of the Secretary of Defence and the DCI.

United States Imagery and Geospatial Information Systems (USIGS)

The United States Imagery and Geospatial Information System (USIGS) is an umbrella term for the suites of systems formerly called the United States Imagery System (USIS) and the Global Geospatial Information and Services (GGIS). USIGS will be defined by the migration of the former USIS and GGIS architectures, with the goal of common graphical interfaces, and seamless information exchanges. In addition to the former USIS and GGIS framework, USIGS will include new capabilities, and leverage the pre-existing architecture work. USIGS will use the DII/COE C4ISR Architecture Framework, and the Joint Technical Architecture as its baseline.

Since the 1930's, the FBI has had the primary responsibility for investigating most federal crimes. Espionage and treason are such crimes, and so the FBI has been responsible for most of America's counterintelligence work. Although the Bureau has close to 100,000 agents, only about a thousand are involved in counterintelligence work. These agents are occasionally assisted by other FBI  agents or officers of local or state police agencies. The FBI also has Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams.

Delta Force

The TO (Table of Order) for Delta consists of three operational squadrons, a support squadron, a signal squadron, an aviation platoon, and what is termed the "Funny Platoon". This funny platoon is reported to be the only JSOC unit including female operators. Selection for all of these units is rigorous with more focus on mental abilities and toughness than physical

Training involves runs through CQB (Close Quarters Battle) killing houses designed to teach teams and individuals how to assault buildings that have been captured by terrorists. Selective firing (whether or not to shoot a target) as well as the double tap (shooting the target twice to make sure that the target does not get up again) are instilled in the Counter-terrorism specialists.

Their facility at Bragg is reported to be considered the best special operation training facility in the world. The CQB indoor training range has earned the ominous nick-name, "The House of Horrors". The Facility comes equipped with mock-up of trains and buses for practice in tubular assaults, and there is reported to be a section of a wide-body jet in the units "aircraft room".

As a counter-terrorist group, Delta's main function is in hostage rescue. During Operation Just Cause Delta got their chance to do just that. Kurt Muse, an American businessman operating an underground radio station, had been jailed in the city of Modelo. A 160th SOAR MH-6 transported a team of troopers to the rooftop of the jail. The team fought its way down to the second floor and blew the door to Muse' cell, freeing him without injury. As the team and Muse made their way to the roof and the waiting MH-6, Kurt Muse counted at least five bodies. Not all had been killed; one terrified guard had been handcuffed to a staircase railing. Lifting off, the small helicopter was hit by small arms fire and fell to the street below. The pilot slid the aircraft along the ground to a parking lot and attempted to take off again. The aircraft was hit by ground fire again and hit the ground, this time permanently. A passing UH-60 spotted the infrared spotlight held up by a Delta trooper, and soldiers from the 6th Infantry Regiment came to their rescue. Four Delta operators were wounded, but Delta had "officially" validated their existence and saved Kurt Muse' life.

Delta also saw action in Desert Storm, although the full extent of what they did there has not been revealed. Delta Troopers provided security for General Norman Schwartzkopf and also took part in some missions into Iraq to locate Scud missile launchers for destruction. Delta received some unwanted publicity in the disastrous UN Campaign to stabilize the country of Somolia. During their mission in Mogadishu, Somolia, they assaulted different safe houses containing high-ranking members of warring clans and took them prisoner. Unfortunately, during their last mission two of the support helicopters from the 160th SOAR were shot down. Two Delta operators were killed defending the survivours of the second crash, and at least one was killed in an on-foot extraction through a city populated with locals riled up against the Americans.

Hostage situations

Counter terrorist operations

Barricaded criminals

Sniper incidents

VIP protection duties

High risk searches

Threatened suicide

Barricaded mentally disturbed persons

In the event that a SRT is deployed, the teams primary focus would be to insure the safety of all parties involved. Teams would also try to apprehend any offenders, and secure the area for investigators. Potential SRT members are selected from the ranks of experienced MPs. After passing an initial selection which includes a physical fitness test, a psychological screening, and a records review; candidates then attend a two week long SRT 1 course at the US Army Military Police School. During the 160 hr. course of instruction students receive instruction in selective firing, physical training, rappelling, breaching techniques, and tactics. Students must successfully complete eight scenarios, including some conducted at night, to graduate. SRT marksman-observers (snipers) attend a separate one week long SRT 2 course. Team members receive additional training at US Army, civilian, and military training courses. A standard SRT consists of a least 9 men led by a team leader, who holds the rank of E-6, or above. 5-6 men compromise the entry team, with the remaining four men making up two-2 man marksman-observer teams. The entry team is broken down into:

1 Team leader- E-6 or above

1 Pointman- E-4 or above

2 Defensemen - E-4 or above

1 Rear Security E-4 or above

The teams are outfitted with standard Army BDUs, black kevlar helmets, tactical thigh holsters, and various tactical vests with built in radios. Weapons available for employment by team members include: M-9 Barretta pistols, M-16 and M-4 rifles, HK MP-5 SMGs, Remington 870 shotguns, and M-24 sniper rifles (modified Remington 700s).

JSOC units have reportedly been involved in a number of covert military operations over the last two decades. Some of the operations that have come to light include providing assistance to Italian authorities during their search for kidnapped US Army Gen. James Dozier, participating in Operation Urgent Fury; the US invasion of Grenada, planning a rescue attempt of US hostages being held in Lebanon, rescuing hostages being held aboard the cruise liner Achille Lauro, participating in Operation Just Cause; the US intervention in Panama, directing US Scud hunting efforts during Operation Desert Storm, conducting operations in support of UN mandates in Somalia, and searching for suspected war criminals in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. Recently the veil of secrecy surrounding JSOC has been lifted a little more. Press reports have indicates that US SMUs have been tasked with conducting counter-proliferation operations against countries producing weapons of mass destruction. Currently JSOC is believed to command the following units:

1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta " Delta" ( also known as the Combat Development Group, or Combat Applications Group)

Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) - operates under various cover names

Naval Special Warfare Development Group- DEVGRU

USAF 24 Special Tactics Squadron - (24 STS)

Joint Communications Unit- (JCU)

A joint aviation unit (operating under various cover names)

A technical intelligence unit

Other US special operations forces may operate in support of JSOC depending on their operational needs. The primary units that operate in this manner include the following:

160th SOAR, primarily the 1st Bn. with its "Little Bird" helicopters

USAF Special Operations Squadrons, especially the 55th SOS and their MC-130 squadrons.

JSOC units regularly conduct training with similar units from around the world, and provide training to nations that request US support. JSOC has also provide support to domestic law enforcement agencies during high profile, or high risk events such as the Olympic;, the World Cup; political party conventions; and Presidential inaugurations.

The early USAAC (United States Army Air Corps; the forerunner of the US Air Force) built a tradition of excellence and determination, coining the still-used motto of "Anytime, Anyplace." The motto came into being after one of the gliders crashed in a night-time training accident. The Chindit's commander, British General Wingate, was very impressed with the ability of the newly-formed air commandos and sent them a message that despite the crash, "we will go with your boys ant place, any time, any where." The 1st Air Commando Group went on to take place in Operation Thursday, a disruptive action that successfully stopped the Japanese invasion of India. On the first night, March 5 1944, they successfully delivered over 500 men and 15 tons of supplies behind Japanese lines to landing zone Broadway using gliders and C-47 cargo aircraft. Two nights later Operations reached a high tempo and no less than 92 planes loads ( roughly one every 4 minutes) arrived in the small jungle clearing in a night. Because of the Chindits (made possible by the air commando's insertion and resupply abilities) raids and sabotage, the Japanese invasion failed. The Army Air Corps also had a unit that operated in the European Theatre. Choosing the name "Carpetbaggers," the 801st/492nd Bombardment Group began to train for their mission of agent insertion and resupply behind enemy lines. Using modified ex-Navy PB they began practicing low-level flights in single ship formations, a far different way of operating than the high-level massed-formation daytime operations the pilots were used to. One of the modifications was the removal of the ball turret on the bottom of the aircraft. This allowed an easy exit from the aircraft for any agents being inserted. Another was the installation of a radio navigation device that lead a good navigator to within three miles of his target--at night in pitch black conditions. The cockpit instruments were also redesigned, putting the critical instruments front and centre so the pilot could keep his eyes on the ground as much as possible.

They began operations in January of 1944 and flew until September of that year, taking place in many important actions, including the build up to the D-day invasion of the French coast. Two days before the invasion, on June 3, 1944, they flew 17 missions in a single night. Before the invasion a need arose to pick up agents and ferry them back to England. The venerable C-47 Dakota was added to their inventory, and after two months of training the were ready for their first nighttime covert short field landing and take off. All in all, the Carpetbaggers C-47 inserted 78 agents with 104,000 pounds of supplies and extracted 213 agents from occupied territory. In part because of the Carpetbaggers actions, guerrillas were able to cut 885 rail lines and destroy 322 locomotives, 295 alone in the month following the D-Day landing, when their services were needed most. By September of 1944 the Allied army had captured the area the carpetbaggers operated, and the need for their night-time flights almost disappeared. There was still a need for their expertise, so they were simply moved forward and began operating from liberated bases in France. In one operation, a stripped-down C-47 smuggled a captured German V2 rocket out of Sweden for examination. They also inserted agents into Norway, although the weather caused many of their flights to abort due to bad conditions and inability to see the drop zone through the clouds and storms. When General Patton's drive into Germany stalled (His tank drive was so effective it ran ahead of the supply chain and they ran out of gas and had to stop) the Carpetbaggers modified their bombers-turned-cargo planes into flying fuel trucks, with the capacity to carry 2,500 gallons of non-aviation fuel each flight. All told, they airlifted almost a million gallons of fuel to Patton's gas-starved tanks and allowed them to resume their drive to Germany.

With the success of the Carpetbaggers came the need for more special operations capabilities in other areas. Fledgling units within conventional Air Forces (such as the Twelfth Air Force's 885th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) (Special) ) were created to aid in the supply of OSS agents and Eastern European Guerrillas in their fight to oust German occupation forces. The forerunner to today's Special Tactics Teams, BATS (Balkan Air Terminal Service) Teams, were created to coordinate the creation and use of covert airstrips, including guiding the aircraft in and unloading/loading cargo. The smaller units and the Carpetbaggers continued to operate until the end of the war, inserting agents behind enemy lines and resupplying covert and conventional units. New aircraft, such as the A-26 Invader (Later used in the Vietnam War) and British Mosquito were adopted to enable them to operate deeper and with greater safety to the aircrews. One innovation (which must have been quite the wild ride) was the use of the A-26's bomb bay doors as a platform for the agents to lay on. When the drop zone was reached, the pilot simply opened the bomb bay doors (with the proper warning, of course) and away the two agents went. With the close of the Second World War, all Army Air Corps Special Operations Air assets went away. Pilots were either discharged or transferred to conventional units. The planes were almost always scrapped. The United States had no unit dedicated to the resupply of forces behind enemy lines. Although the newly created United States Air Force began to look into covert operations in the late 1940's, there was nothing in place when the Korean War broke out in 1950. As ad-hoc units took on the airborne special operations role, an "official" squadron was rushed into readiness.

It was named the "Air Resupply and Communications Service," and although there was another unit that operated unofficially (det 2 of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron) earlier, the ARCS was the USAF's primary Special operations unit in the Korean War and was the only one to survive the draw down after the war (although it was also eventually dissolved). There were a total of six ARCS squadron's planned; only three became operational and served in any capacity. The ARCS were a combination of many functions, much like the different groups that make up the USAF's special operations forces today. B-29 Stratofortress bombers were used to bombard North Korean troops with Psychological leaflets designed to make them surrender or to lower moral. Helicopters were used to rescue American pilots shot down behind enemy lines, in many cases evading deadly enemy fire to do so. In addition, the Pararescue squadrons were first officially started in the ARCS. With the close of the Korean War, the immediate need for aviation special operations forces decreased. In an attempt to survive the budget cuts, the ARCS squadrons came up with new missions for themselves; such as rescuing U2 spy plane pilots. For various reasons, some missions could not make it successfully back to their bases. Two pilots were rescued by the ARCS SA-16 amphibious planes after coming down in the Caspian and Black Sea. Even with some of the new missions, there was not enough of a perceived need for special operations forces and the ARCS were shut down in the late 1950's.

There was another less known special unit that performed deep penetrations of Chinese Airspace in the late 1950's. Det 2 of the 1045th Observation, Evaluation, and Training Group was responsible for resupplying Tibetan guerrilla's resisting the Chinese Acquisition of Tibet. Flying into mountainous terrain, the group would insert Guerrilla's that had been trained in the US. One of the later missions that was performed was the a real resupply of the Dali Lama as he and his entourage escaped from Chinese forces. Det 2 was the first group in the US Air Force to use C-130 transports for special missions, the beginning of a long tradition that remains today. In 1961 the special operations capabilities of the Air Force were again established with the creation of the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (aka "Jungle Jim"). The 4400th was headquartered at Hurlburt Field located at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida and began training aircrews for counter-insurgency operations. The squadron was then changed to a group, and then changed again to become part of the new Special Air Warfare Centre. Initially, the unit operated with C-47 Dakota cargo planes, T-28 attack trainers, and B-26K's (heavily modified A-26 invaders from W.W.II). Despite the antiquated aircraft, the aircrews fought well and developed many tactics to use their slow-flying machines to good effect. For example, fares would be dropped off to the side of a fort being defended so that the airplane would not be silhouetted as it flew over the enemy's heads. Attacks would be made from different directions on different passes so that the enemy would not find a pattern and set up traps. These tactics made their missions more effective and safer, but there was still a high toll of airframes and crew.

Structural problems caused by the age of the aircraft and compounded by their heavy usage, and rough operating conditions lead to a series of accidents caused by structural failure. As a result these original aircraft were retired and A-1E Skyraiders were brought in. The Air Force would continue to use these aircraft for Search And Rescue (SAR) for the rest of the Vietnam War. The Vietnam war saw the not only the rebirth of the Air Forces Special Operations forces, but also the addition of new abilities and the aircraft to carry these missions out. U-10 Helio Courier aircraft were used to transport personnel and material into virtually any airfield or dirt road in Vietnam and Laos. The U-10's were also used in Psychological Operations, dropping propaganda leaflets or broadcasting voice messages over loudspeakers as the aircraft flew low and slow over the jungle. Also used in the Psychological Operations theatre was the MC-130 Combat Talon. Using their larger capacity, higher ceiling, and longer range, the MC-130's would haul large bundles of counterfeit money up to altitude near Hanoi and dump them so that they would land where the citizens would pick them up and hopefully read the propaganda message attached. They were so successful and the counterfeit money so effective that the North Vietnamese Government refused to negotiate in 1969 until that bombing campaign stopped. It was also about this time that the Air Force began seriously use helicopters for recovery of airmen shot down behind enemy lines (which was pretty much everywhere in Vietnam). HH-53 Jolly Greens that the Air Force acquired from the Navy were outfitted with refuelling probes, radios and extra weapons to enable them to fly into enemy controlled country to conduct SAR Operations. In addition, the Pararescue forces began developing the ability for extended operations of the ground, performing searches for friendly pilots hiding from enemy forces.

One of the more popular weapons to come out the war (at least for ground forces) was the gunship. seeking to overcome the problems caused by forward speed on accuracy, the Air Force came up with a design where the guns were mounted on the side of an aircraft and fired while the aircraft was circling around the target, able to keep the guns on target as long as there was ammunition and fuel. It should be noted that initially the USAF was HIGHLY resistant to this new concept and it was the motivated efforts of some crucial people (such as Ronald Terry, who paid for parts and fuel out of his own pocket when the Air Force cut funding) that kept the program alive. To this day the Gunship is an integral part of any USAF special opsforce and most conventional assaults. The Vietnam War saw more than the creation of new aircraft and squadrons; new units without aircraft were also created such as the Combat Controllers. The soldiers in these units were trained to jump out of aircraft and perform vital tasks on the ground, such as guiding rescue aircraft in or acting as a Forward Air Controller on the ground. Although they were trained to insert via jumping from fixed-wing aircraft, usually they were based at forward locations or were inserted via helicopter. Both the Combat Controllers and Pararescue teams, participated in many missions and saved countless lives. In particular, note should be made of the citations received. In a war dominated by medal-happy officers, enlisted ranks rarely received the commendations they deserved. Only 19 enlisted airmen received the Air Cross Medal, given for extreme bravery and heroism on the battlefield. Of those 19, ten were members of the Pararescue teams.

Ultimately, the Vietnam War saw the USAF field three Aircraft that remain in service today (AC-130, MC-130, and H-53), foster the Combat Controllers and PJ's, and raise at least three Squadrons (15th, 20th SOS). Following the Vietnam War, the Air Force once again diminished the size of their special operations capabilities, but this time they did not get rid of them. Special operations crews were present in two actions following the war. In May of 1975 (shortly after the close of the Vietnam War) an American freighter, the USS Mayaguez, was boarded and seized by the crew of a Cambodian gunboat while sailing in international waters. The order came down from Washington to immediately recapture the boat and free the crew. After a brief search the ship was located on Tang Island. Members and helicopters of the 21st SOS and US Marines were dispatched to the USS Coral Sea. The plan seemed simple, the helicopters would drop a USMC raiding force that would overpower the guards and free the captives, which would then be loaded onto the helicopters for the ride back to the carrier. Unfortunately for the aircrew and US Marines present, there was no proper intel and the planners of the mission forgot some lessons that had been learned in Vietnam. The members of the force were briefed that they could expect eleven guards, and lightly armed ones at that. A later inquiry revealed that a passing gunship had counted up to 50 campfires, but that no one had shown any interest in passing the information on. Operating on the assumption of light defence no attack aircraft were attached to provide defence for the helicopters and ground troops.

In the end it was very nearly a total disaster. The eleven "lightly armed" Khmer Rouge soldiers turned out to be in excess of 300, and some were armed with rocket-powered Grenades and heavy machine guns. Two aircraft were immediately shot down and several more limped away, one losing its last engine on the way to the carrier and another so full of holes that it had to stay connected to an MC-130 tanker the entire flight back to the carrier to keep from running out of fuel. In the end fifteen soldiers had been killed and three were missing, with another 50 wounded. The crew of the Mayaguez was found to be on the mainland and were rescued by an American destroyer after being set adrift on a fishing boat. The second action was the attempted rescue of American hostages from Tehran, Iran. This operation also ended in disaster, with at least eight American servicemen losing their lives. Although the operation ended badly, there were many positive effects. Because of the confusion and lack of force cohesion it was decided to create a joint special operations command that would oversee training and integration of special forces units, including the US Air Force's. This effort would take time to complete, and only very basic contacts had been set up by the time the US decided to invade Grenada in 1983. 

Tensions between the US and the Grenadan government had increased and reached a peak when the current Prime Minister was killed in a coup. There were over 1,000 Americans on the island, many of them medical students studying on the island and the decision was made to go in and provide protection for their extraction. Part of the plan involved the securing of the airport at Point Salines. Before that happened the US commanders needed to know the state of the airport, whether it was defended and what obstructions might be in place. A USAF Combat Controller was tasked for this mission, but instead of sneaking him in on a civilian airliner it was decided that he would insert with two boatloads of SEALS from ST6 as escorts. The insertion scheduled as a daytime drop into calm seas was delayed and turned into a night-time drop into stormy weather, something the newly-formed ST6 had never practiced. Consequently four members of SEAL Team 6 drowned in the insertion and the surviving force was further delayed. The small force never reached land, but they were close enough for the Combat Controller to see obstructions and hear local radio stations broadcasting citizens to rise up and defend the airport from invaders. He radioed that the airport would have to be cleared before anything could land, but by this time the USAF MC-130 cargo aircraft carrying members of the Army's 75th Rangers were already in transit. Instead of stepping off the planes on the ground as had been planned, the Rangers would have to jump. Although the drop was ultimately successful, several events happened that almost turned it into a disaster and brought to light the weak points in the new joint commands. While the Rangers had been told to expect heavy resistance, the Combat Talon pilots had been told that the airfield would be lightly defended if at all. The heavier than expected defences wound up hitting the second MC-130 and driving it off until a circling AC-130H could suppress the fire.

Based on their intelligence the Rangers had requested a drop from 500 feet; a very low altitude that leaves no room for error. The first aircraft had suffered an INS (Internal Navigation System) failure and dropped out of position to let a fully functional aircraft lead the way in. Consequently the Rangers arrived out of order, and badly fragmented by the large time gap created by the heavy air defences. Eventually all players were on the ground (remarkably no Rangers were killed, the only casualty was one that had broken his leg) and the airport secured for the arrival of more C-130s. The AC-130 tasked with supporting the airport assault was responsible for taking out 6 gun pits, one BMP armoured personnel carrier, and numerous structures that Cuban and Grenadan troops were using for cover. It expended all of its ammunition and was in the air for an astonishing 31 hours straight. Another AC-130 was responsible for protecting half of a SEAL Team 6 force that had been tasked with rescuing the governor of Grenada so that he could authorize US forces to officially come to the island. An initial landing at the mansion had been cut short when one of the Blackhawk helicopters was hit by antiaircraft fire and driven off before all of the SEALS were on the ground. Outnumbered and outgunned by the Armoured personnel carriers that appeared, the SEALs were protected all night long by the circling AC-130. The Grenadan assault was successful in many aspects, but a disaster in others. While the US had sent a force to assault the island quickly, interservice fighting and extremely poor communication caused deaths and delays of the US forces. As a result of the problems with Grenada the US Military created the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) an 1987. Air Force Special Operations units were given higher status and were consolidated into the new 23rd Air Force. However, this was still a tenuous organization: the Air Force had signed an agreement earlier in 1985 to turn all rotary-win aircraft over to the Army and anti-special ops feelings still ran high in the Air Force brass (Special Note, I hear rumblings that the Air Force brass is trying this again. The MH-60 Pavehawk is being transferred to Search and Rescue Units with no replacement for the SOW's).

AFSOC was created from the 23rd Air Force in May of 1990. AFSOC has control over three wings, three groups, as well as the USAF Special Operations School and Special Missions Operational Test & Evaluation Centre. Some of the changes that occurred after the creation of the new command was the creation of the Special Tactics Groups, an organization that blended the USAF Combat Controllers and Pararescue Jumpers into an integrated force capable of supporting all the different US Special Forces units in their unique capabilities. This new integration and force structure was put to the test during the Panama invasion in 1989 and for the most part worked with flying colours. All of the Air Force's special operations aircraft types took place in the invasion and members of the Special Tactics Groups were assigned to help out the other service's soldiers. MC-130 Combat Talons dropped Army Rangers on an airfields while HC-130 Combat Shadows (now MC-130 Combat Shadows) stayed in the air the entire first night refuelling American aircraft. Nine AC-130's provided cover during the many actions (including the Navy SEALs disastrous assault on Patilla Airfield). MH-60 Pavehawks shuttled conventional and special operations forces around the cities and countryside while MH-53J's provided transport as well as fire support for American troops. Combat Controllers were along with the SEALs during the Patilla assault, providing their capabilities to the force, and combined Special Tactics Teams helped the Army Rangers assault two separate airfields simultaneously. In the end several aircraft had been damaged but none shot down and no USAF Special Operations airmen were killed. While there was one friendly fire incident (no US Soldiers were killed) another gunship crew was recognized and given medals for refusing a direct order to fire on what turned out to be American soldiers who were in the process of capturing a Panamanian APC. There were problems and errors made, but they were readily noticeable and ones that the Air Commandos could learn from and improve on in time for their next conflict--The Gulf War.

In 1990 The Forces of Iraq invaded and conquered the country of Kuwait. Fearful of a continued drive through Saudi Arabia, American forces were immediately dispatched and plans made for the defence of the US's oil-rich ally. From the beginning USAF special operations personnel were present. USAF Combat controllers handled all of the air traffic at King Fahd airport during the build-up of Allied forces. During that time, they handled the busiest airport in the history of the world, some days handling as many as 1,800 operations per day (that equates out to 75 operations an hour, or an aircraft taking off or landing at intervals of less than a second between each operation). After the build-up they moved to Al Jouf Airfield, just south of the Iraqi/Saudi border preparing to handle battle-damaged aircraft returning from the first night of the air war. Although the supreme allied commander General Schwartzkopf had a dislike of special forces, he allowed them some missions early in the war. The Iraqi border was ringed by an array of high-tech long-range radars that could warn the Iraqi command of incoming bombers and attack aircraft. In order to minimize the Iraqi response the element of surprise was needed and that meant destroying the radars before the Iraqis knew aircraft were on the way. In an excellent example of inter-service coordination, 4 USAF MH-53J's lead eight US Army AH-64 Apaches through the Iraqi front lines and near to two long range radar complexes in an operation named "Eager Anvil". The Pave lows marked a precise spot with bundles of chem-sticks and then moved off to a close orbit. Using the chemsticks to precisely update their internal navigation systems, the Apaches were able to destroy both radar stations completely within ten seconds of each other. The combined team of Pave Low and Apache were the first American and Allied aircraft across the border during the air war.

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