In November 1998 the Government formed a new Council for Maintaining Security and the Legal System [Dewan Pemantapan Ketahanan Nasional - Council for the Enforcement of Security and Law] headed by the President but run by the Armed Forces Commander. President Habibie formed the Council with the duties of guiding and coordinating efforts to overcome the crisis threatening national security and the maintenance of the law in an integrated manner. The Council was raised under presidential decree No 191/1998. In order to facilitate the day-to-day operations of the Council a Daily Executive is led by Minister for Defence/Commander Armed Forces, General Wiranto, assisted by the Minister for Justice, Muladi, 10 additional ministers [the Ministers for Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Communications, Industry and Trade/Head of National Logistics Agency, Information, Employment, Education and Culture, Religion, Social Affairs, and Youth and Sport ], the Attorney General, the Head of the Intelligence Coordinating Body, and the Secretary for the Management of Development Operations. The Executive will report its activities to the president. The Council would sit in session on an as required basis, as determined by the president. Institutions similar to this in the past, such as the Council of National Defense and Security (WANHANKAMNAS), Institute of National Resistance located beside the office of the coordinating ministry for politics and security as well as agencies set up to handle security matters such as KOPKAMTIB and BAKORSTMAS, have been dominated by the military. But the new council is led by President Habibie, and its membership comprises almost all cabinet ministers. Made up of members of the Cabinet, security and intelligence officials as well as the heads of five religious councils, its stated mission was to control and coordinate efforts to resolve crises threatening national stability. It is reported to be advisory in nature, rather than operational, and does not have "technical authority" as in the case of the former KOPKAMTIB which could arrest and detain people.

Indonesia's four armed services, collectively termed the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia [ABRI - Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia], consist of the three military services--the army, navy, and air force--and the police. The effort to forge a united and coherent nation that could accommodate the natural diversity of peoples in the Indonesian archipelago has always been a central theme in the country's history. ABRI plays a role in national society that is perhaps unique in the world. The military establishment in the early 1990s was involved in many affairs of state that elsewhere were not normally associated with military forces and acknowledged as the dominant political institution in the country. The armed forces establishment, led by the dominant branch, the army, has been the country's premier institution since 1966 when, in its own view, it answered the summons of the people and moved to the centre stage of national life. Comprising the three military services and the police, the armed forces operated according to dwifungsi, or dual function, a doctrine of their own evolution, under which they undertook a double role as both defenders of the nation and as a social-political force in national development. To fully understand the role of the armed forces in contemporary Indonesian society, one must understand the absolute priority the government and the military leadership has placed, from the beginning of the New Order, on the importance of internal security to the achievement of national stability. The New Order government, whose military leaders played an important role in 1965 in crushing what was officially described as a communist coup attempt, believed that threats to internal stability were the greatest threats to national security. Having experienced two attempted coups, supposedly communist-inspired, a number of regional separatist struggles, and instability created by radical religious movements, the government had little tolerance for public disorder. Since the beginning of Suharto's rise to power in 1965, the armed forces accepted and supported the foundation of his regime, namely, the belief that economic and social development was the nation's first priority and that social and political stability was absolutely essential if that goal were to be achieved. The primary mission of the armed forces has therefore been to maintain internal stability. The maintenance of internal security was considered an integral part of national defence itself. Indonesian doctrine considers national defence within the broader context of "national resilience," a concept that stresses the importance of the ideological, political, economic, social, and military strength of the nation. Like dwifungsi, this concept has also legitimised activities of the armed forces in areas not ordinarily considered belonging to the military sphere.

The role of the separate armed services has not changed since 1969, when the heads of the army, navy, and air force were reduced to chiefs of staff. Operational control of almost all their military units was vested in the commander in chief, reducing the headquarters of each military service to the status of administrative organs. Only the police chief continued to exercise operational control over his own personnel. Communist victories in South Vietnam and Cambodia prompted national authorities to reconsider both the external threat the nation faced and how best to meet it. Consequently, the new minister of defence and security, General Mohammad Jusuf, directed a major upgrading of armed forces military capabilities. This upgrade included increased training and procurement of sufficient equipment and personnel to establish a core of some 100 fully ready combat battalions. Under Jusuf, the armed forces initiated extensive retraining and reorganization programs that culminated in a major reorganization of the armed forces in 1985. Largely retained intact when split off from HANKAM in 1985, the ABRI staff and its functions remained directly subordinate to the commander in chief, who remained, in turn, directly responsible to the president, also the supreme commander of the armed forces. Under the commander in chief, there was a provision for a deputy, a position that in 1992 was not filled. There were two ABRI chiefs of staff, one for the general staff and one for social-political affairs. The inspector general and the assistant for plans and budget, as well as a number of agencies and institutes, remained directly under the commander in chief. The ABRI chief of general staff directed assistants for communications/electronics, intelligence, logistics, operations, personnel, public security affairs, and territorial affairs, the chief of staff for social-political affairs directed the armed forces' dwifungsi operations in the civilian sector of the government through assistants for nonmilitary workers' affairs and for social-political affairs. The ABRI joint staff supported the headquarters of each of the four services. Staff personnel were drawn from all four services. Police officers served only in positions related to internal security

The 1985 reorganization also made significant changes in the armed forces chain of command. The four multiservice Regional Defense Commands (Kowilhans) and the National Strategic Command (KOSTRANAS) were eliminated from the defense structure, establishing the Military Regional Command (KODAM), or area command, as the key organization for strategic, tactical, and territorial operations for all services. The chain of command flowed directly from the ABRI commander in chief to the ten KODAM commanders, and then to subordinate army territorial commands. The commander in chief exercises control over most of the combat elements of the army, navy, and air force through the ten army KODAMs, the two air force KO-OPs, and the two navy Armadas. ABRI's military operations relied on a well-developed doctrine of national defence called Total People's Defence, based on experiences during the struggle for independence. This doctrine proclaimed that Indonesia could neither afford to maintain a large military apparatus nor would it compromise its hard-won independence by sacrificing its nonaligned status and depending on other nations to provide its defence. Instead, the nation would defend itself through a strategy of territorial guerrilla warfare in which the armed forces, deployed throughout the nation, would serve as a cadre force to rally and lead the entire population in a people's war of defence. Military planners envisioned a three-stage war, comprising a short initial period in which an invader would defeat conventional Indonesian resistance and establish its own control, a long period of unconventional, regionally based fighting, and a final phase in which the invaders would eventually be repelled. The success of this strategy, according to the doctrine, required that a close bond be maintained between citizen and soldier to encourage the support of the entire population and enable the military to manage all war-related resources. In this scenario, the people would provide logistical support, intelligence, and upkeep, and, as resources permitted, some civilians would be organized, trained, and armed to join the guerrilla struggle. In trying to attain these goals, ABRI maintained a territorial organization, run largely by the army, to support public order. This group exercised considerable influence over local decisions regarding such matters as population redistribution, the production of food and strategic materials, and the development of air and sea transportation. Armed forces personnel also continued to engage in large-scale civic action projects involving community and rural development in order to draw closer to the people, to ensure the continued support of the populace, and to develop among military personnel a detailed knowledge of the region to which they were assigned. The largest of these programs, the Armed Forces Enters the Village (AMD) began in 1983 and was to continue indefinitely. It consisted of nationwide civic action campaigns held roughly three times a year to provide assistance in planning and constructing rural and urban projects selected by local villagers.

The Total People's Defence strategy did not apply in some of the major actions Indonesia had engaged in since independence. For example, during the Confrontation with Malaysia from 1963 to 1966, ABRI engaged Malaysian forces in guerrilla warfare without the support of the border peoples of Sarawak and Sabah; in the dispute with the Dutch over West New Guinea in the mid-1960s, ABRI fought against Dutch troops. These conflicts were fought in territory outside the effective jurisdiction of the national government where the Indonesian armed forces lacked the support of the civilian population and where the concept of Total People's Defence could not be implemented. However, because the framers of the 1945 constitution had declared these areas as naturally belonging to Indonesia, national authorities declared that these conflicts were ant colonial wars and in fact represented the completion of the war of independence begun in 1945. Indonesia is unique among developing countries in the relatively low priority given to defence spending. Having fully supported the basic concept of the Suharto regime, namely, that national defence and security depended on the country's economic development, the armed forces endorsed the principle that scarce domestic resources and foreign aid could not be diverted for military use without slowing the progress of national development. Parliamentary mandate in 1978 encouraged the development of a domestic defence industry to lessen Indonesia's dependence on foreign manufacturers and to reduce the use of scarce foreign currency reserves on weaponry. In keeping with these guidelines, domestic capacity to maintain, repair, and produce military equipment was improved. Large naval vessels and fighter aircraft still had to be purchased abroad, but the Indonesian aircraft and shipbuilding industries, detached from the armed forces in the early 1980s, had been upgraded by the early 1990s. They produced helicopters, light aircraft, transport aircraft, landing craft, patrol boats, small arms, and a variety of spare parts for these systems, taking advantage of offset production and other licensing agreements with foreign firms. Defence industries attended to a greater amount of routine as well as local-level maintenance, such as installing new engines in helicopters and combat vehicles that had been retired from service because of a shortage of spare parts. Several electronics firms were established to support defence materiel production. The government continued to seek related-related technology transfer from the United States, Japan, and several European nations. For example, certification of the P.T. PAL shipyard, starting in 1992, to perform certain types of en route repairs for United States Navy warships on a commercial basis brought a new level of sophistication to that facility.

Despite these efforts, Indonesia is far from self-sufficient in the production of weapons and related-related materiel. Domestic facilities remained inadequate for the repair of certain complex weapons systems, and equipment inventories often represented considerable overstatements of what was in functioning order. Moreover, although defence guidelines favoured the standardization of weaponry and defence materiel, the armed forces still possessed and continued to procure equipment from a number of other countries, presenting serious problems in obtaining and stocking spare parts and training technical maintenance personnel. Progress on regional cooperation in defence maintenance began to show results in the mid-1980s, with cooperative agreements for aircraft and maritime repairs and maintenance established with both Singapore and Malaysia. Civilian utilization of defence industry plants has benefited the national economic base. The major defence industries were transferred from the armed forces in the 1980s and in 1992 were managed by the minister of state for research and technology. Under a new policy these plants also produced materiel for the commercial and civilian sectors. The aircraft industry produced parts and equipment for commercial aviation, for example, and the army's former munitions plants manufactured commercial explosives for the mining and petroleum industries. The P.T. PAL shipyard also manufactured commercial ships and maritime equipment. Grade and rank structure is standard throughout the three military services and the police. It corresponded to that common to most military systems, with minor deviations. No formal class of warrant officers existed between the enlisted and commissioned hierarchies. Uniforms of the four services were distinguished by colour and style, with variations in headgear and other details distinguishing some elite troops, who wear various colours of berets. Army working and ceremonial uniforms are olive drab and those of the police, dark brown. Air force and navy uniforms are medium blue and navy blue, respectively. Rank insignia are standardized among the services. In ceremonial and service dress, officers wear them on the shoulder epaulet. Field uniform insignia were moved in 1991 from the front of the fatigue shirt to the collar tip. Rank insignia were worn on the sleeves for NCOs and enlisted personnel. One title unique to Indonesia is panglima, a traditional heroic rank revived during the National Revolution. Although panglima is often translated as commander, it carries a higher connotation of honor and power. Its bearers, usually flag officers of various ranks, derive enhanced personal status from serving as panglima. In the 1980s, tradition evolved to limit the title panglima to the ABRI commander in chief and the commanders of KOSTRAD and the ten KODAMs.

POLRI, the Indonesian National Police, was incorporated into the armed forces in 1964 during the Sukarno era. Under Suharto steps were taken to militarise the Police by means of the National Defence Law of 1982 and the Police Law of 1997. As part of ABRI, the Police Force assumed all aspects of military structure, including ranks, budget, duties and even wage structure. The 1997 Law placed POLRI within the integral command structure of ABRI. On 01 April 1999, POLRI was separated from ABRI, the Indonesian armed forces. Although POLRI has been separated from ABRI, it remains under the jurisdiction of the Defence Minister, General Wiranto. By 1993 POLRI was responsible for arresting and interrogating suspects, while a special POLRI force was responsible for dealing with street demonstrations. The BRIMOB (Brigade Mobil, Mobile Brigade), the most militarised force in POLRI, was trained to deal with mass demonstrations. Since the May 1998 upheaval, PHH (Pasukan Anti Huru-Hara, Anti Riot Unit) have received special anti-riot training. Since 1945 Indonesia's National Police organization has been a national force, financed, directed, and organized by the central government. The strength of the national police force in 1992 was around 180,000. Its main duties were to maintain public order and security. Like the other armed services, the police considered themselves to be a social force active in national development, and therefore they participated in the armed services' civic missions. The commander bore the title of police chief and was the highest ranking uniformed police officer in the nation. He was assisted by a deputy police chief. Police headquarters in Jakarta included a staff and several separate administrative bodies that handled specialized police functions. The police had its own territorial organization made up of seventeen jurisdictions, each of which was known as a Police Regional Command (Polda). Each Polda was administratively subdivided at the district, subdistrict, and village level. Polda Metrojaya, which had responsibility for the metropolitan Jakarta area, was subdivided into precincts, sections, and police posts. It was commonly referred to as the Jakarta Raya Metropolitan Regional Police. Each Polda had its headquarters in a provincial capital and was assigned police units varying in strength and composition according to the needs dictated by the characteristics of the area. These forces were organized as city police forces or rural units and were under the operational command of the Polda commander, who in turn was directly responsible to national police headquarters. All police elements were charged with supporting the local government in their areas.

Functionally, the police were organized into a number of specialized elements. The largest of these was the uniformed police, which included both the general police, who performed conventional police duties relating to the control and prevention of crime and protection of property, and the traffic police, who patrolled the nation's roadways and supervised the licensing of drivers and the registration of motor vehicles. Also part of the uniformed force were the women police, who specialized in social matters and the welfare of women and children. Elite units of special police were employed to enforce order in terrorist situations beyond the capability of the regular forces. These units were better armed and more mobile than the general police and lived in separate barracks under more rigid discipline. These police wore the same uniform as other police but were distinguished by special badges. A small unit of Sea and Air Police patrolled the national waters and airspace, providing tactical aid to other elements by regulating traffic, guarding against smuggling and the theft of fish, and supplying transport. The unit was also active in disaster relief. Its equipment included a few helicopters and light airplanes and various small sea craft. Plainclothes police were assigned primary responsibility for criminal investigations, especially in complex cases or in cases involving several jurisdictions. They also handled forensics, intelligence, security, and the technical aspects of crime fighting, such as fingerprinting and identification. One of the oldest National Police units was the Mobile Brigade, formed in late 1945. It was originally assigned the tasks of disarming remnants of the Japanese Imperial Army and protecting the chief of state and the capital city. It fought in the revolution, and its troops took part in the military confrontation with Malaysia in the early 1960s and in the conflict in East Timor in the mid-1970s. In 1981 the Mobile Brigade spawned a new unit called the Explosive Ordnance Devices Unit.

In 1992 the Mobile Brigade was essentially a paramilitary organization trained and organized on military lines. It had a strength of about 12,000. The brigade was used primarily as an elite corps for emergencies, aiding in police operations that required units to take quick action. The unit was employed in domestic security and defence operations and was issued special riot-control equipment. Elements of the force were also trained for airborne operations. Police recruits were volunteers. Applicants were required to have at least a sixth-grade education and to pass a competitive examination. Other qualifications included physical fitness and good moral character. After three years' service as ordinary police, personnel with junior secondary-school diplomas could enter training to become NCOs. Those with three years' experience as NCOs were eligible for further training to enable them to become candidate officers and eventually enter the officer corps. Most higher ranking officers entered the force as graduates of the Police Division of Akabri. Advanced training in vocational and technical subjects was available for regular police, for NCOs, and for officers. Promotions were often based on performance in advanced education. The Police Command and Staff School offered advanced training to police officers assigned to command units at the subdistrict, district, and Polda level. Training there focused on administration and logistics.

A major change in the status of security and intelligence appeared to have occurred as a result of the 1985 military reorganization. Prior to that time, the foremost intelligence agency was the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB), which focused primarily on mounting internal security operations and collecting intelligence data. KOPKAMTIB was established in late 1965 in the wake of the attempted communist coup of that year. Its original function was to purge from the government and the armed forces Indonesian Communist Party [PKI] members and others suspected of complicity with the communists. By the late 1960s, that task had been largely completed. In early 1969 KOPKAMTIB was given new life by a presidential decree that provided it an organizational basis closely interwoven with the Ministry of Defence and Security [HANKAM]. KOPKAMTIB was assigned a mandate on all matters concerning internal security as defined in its widest sense and quickly began to exercise sweeping powers of supervision over the national political life, using the army's territorial forces as its main operational units. By the early 1970s, KOPKAMTIB had become a large and powerful body that concerned itself with the activities of every political and social organization in the nation; its powers of interrogation, arrest, and detention were not subject to the regular criminal justice system. Under Indonesian law, certain categories of crime were handled under special statutes outside the penal code. Political offences and acts that Indonesian authorities regarded as threats to national security were usually prosecuted under Presidential Decree Number 11 of 1963 concerning the eradication of subversive activities. Promulgated as a statute in 1969, it granted far-reaching authority in dealing with almost any act that did not conform to government policy and carried a maximum penalty of death. The special statutes also contained special procedures that differed in important respects from those in the Criminal Procedures Code. Thus, for example, while the code stated that a suspect could only be held a maximum of 120 days before being brought to trial, the subversion law allowed suspects to be held up to one year.

The most prominent use of the special procedures regarding political offences involved Kopkamtib's mass arrests and detention of some 200,000 persons in connection with the 1965 coup attempt, most of whom were never charged or tried. These prisoners were classified as group A, B, or C, according to the government's perception of how deeply they had been involved in the events of 1965 or in any of the banned organizations, including the PKI. The last 30,000 of those persons still not brought to trial were released between December 1977 and December 1979. Some PKI members were sentenced to death in the mid-1960s and remained in prison for years while their cases went through the appeals process. Several of these prisoners were executed as late as 1990. Only a handful of those convicted in connection with the coup were still in custody in 1992, although some 36,000 were still barred from voting, and 1.4 million former PKI members were closely monitored by KOPKAMTIB's successor organization, BAKORSTANAS. Between 1969 and 1979, KOPKAMTIB ran a separate penal colony on Buru Island for Group B prisoners, who were convicted on charges of indirect involvement in the 1965 attempted coup. In late 1979, following the nationwide release of Group B prisoners, the penal colony on Buru Island was closed and the island was designated a transmigration site.

The Agency for Coordination of Assistance for the Consolidation of National Security (BAKORSTANAS), the successor to KOPKAMTIB, operates outside the legal code and has wide discretion to detain and interrogate persons thought to threaten national security. In the wake of Suharto's rise to power and the birth of the New Order regime in 1965, hundreds of thousands were detained in a vast number of prisons, hastily prepared detentions centers, work camps and military units. Known by the acronym TAPOL (Tanahan Politik or political prisoner), official estimates on the numbers arrested vary between 600,000 and 750,000. The military hastily established the intelligence body, KOPKAMTIB, to administer the arrest, interrogation and trials of TAPOLs. Although officially dissolved in the late '80s, its role has been taken over by BAKORSTANAS. As part of the 1985 armed forces reorganization, KOPKAMTIB was eliminated and its widespread powers were reorganized into the Coordinating Agency for National Stability (BAKORSTANAS). Unlike KOPKAMTIB, the new agency did not have a separate staff, but instead relied upon the operational chain of command for national security matters. The elimination of KOPKAMTIB reflected both a consolidation of the national security situation and a streamlined intelligence and security apparatus able to operate within the reorganized armed forces structure. The key organizations in the revised BAKORSTANAS system were the ten army KODAMs and the two intelligence agencies, the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN) and the Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS). BAKORSTANAS relies on the regular staffs of those organizations for its manpower.

The BAKORSTANAS system reinforces the power of the ten KODAM regional commanders, forming a new coordinating body in each of the country's twenty-seven provincial-level jurisdictions. This body was called the Regional Security Council (MUSPIDA). The provincial governor served as chairman of the MUSPIDA within his geographical area, but the KODAM and KOREM commanders exerted great influence. Other MUSPIDA members were the provincial or regional chief of police, the provincial assembly chairman, and the senior air force and navy officers in the province or region (if present). The MUSPIDA system was replicated at the district (KABUPATEN) and subdistrict (KECAMATAN) levels, with the army Military Resort (Garrison) Command (KOREM) and Military District Command (KODIM) commanders serving as lower level MUSPIDA chairmen. The armed forces which include the police continue to involve themselves in labour issues, despite the 1994 revocation by the Minister of Manpower of a 1986 regulation allowing the military to intervene in strikes and other labor actions. A 1990 decree gave BAKORSTANAS authority to intervene in strikes in the interest of political and social stability. All adult citizens, except active duty members of the armed forces, convicted criminals serving prison sentences, and some 36,000 former members of the banned Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), are eligible to vote. In past elections voters chose by secret ballot between the three government-approved political organizations, which fielded candidate lists in each electoral district. Those lists were screened by BAKORSTANAS, which determines whether candidates were involved in the abortive 1965 coup or pose other broadly defined security risks.

In 1985 a major reorganization separated the Ministry of Defense and Security [HANKAM] from the ABRI headquarters and staff. HANKAM was responsible for planning, acquisition, and management tasks but had no command or control of troop units. The ABRI commander in chief retained command and control of all armed forces and continued by tradition to be the senior military officer in the country. Since the separation of the ministry from the armed forces headquarters in 1985, the HANKAM staff has been composed largely of retired military personnel. The split provided positions of responsibility for highly qualified but relatively young retired officers of the Generation of 1945 while also opening up high level billets in ABRI to younger active-duty officers who had been frustrated by slow rates of promotion. The administrative structure of HANKAM consisted of a minister, secretary general, inspector general, three directorates general and a number of functional centres and institutes. The minister, inspector general, and three directors general were retired senior military officers; the secretary general (who acted as deputy minister) and most functional centre chiefs were active-duty military officers.

The armed forces (ABRI) are organised on a 'territorial basis' in units over the entire country roughly parallel to government structures, acting as local agents for the central security system. The function of Indonesia's military, which has over three decades been closely linked with politics, is now taking on more of a defence function and less of a social function involving the military in all aspects of Indonesian life. With the commitment of the Indonesian Armed Forces to carry out the redefinition and reposition of its "dual function" [dwifungsi] in the future, the post of chief of the Sociopolitical Section has been replaced by that of the chief of staff for the Territorial Section. Under the doctrine known as Dual Function, the military assumes a significant sociopolitical as well as a security role. The unique element of dwifungsi is the military's second role as a social-political force. This very broad charter formed the basis by which military personnel were assigned throughout the government to posts traditionally filled in other countries by civil servants or politically appointed civilians. Most prevalent of these assignments for active-duty and retired military officers were as provincial governors, district heads, legislative members, numerous functionaries within civilian governmental departments, and as ambassadors abroad. The Indonesian government cannot properly be characterized as military in nature. Not all top national, provincial, regional, and district jobs are held by the military and the number of military personnel assigned to dwifungsi civilian positions at all levels of the government was probably fewer than 5,000 officers in 1992 and had declined throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In 1992, approximately half of the country's district heads (bupati) and one-third of the twenty-seven provincial or region governors were military officers. Still, under the dwifungsi doctrine, legitimizing its performance of both military and nonmilitary missions, ABRI became a dominant factor in the political life of the country and has acted as a major executive agent of government policies.

The armed forces' economic role had its beginnings early on in the National Revolution period (1945-49). That role was stepped up in 1957 when military personnel were assigned managerial or advisory positions in Dutch enterprises and agricultural estates nationalized by the government. This involvement in commercial enterprises projected the military, especially the army, into a new sphere of activity through which it acquired entrepreneurial expertise, a vast patronage, and a source of personal enrichment for many. The military's role in national economic life greatly expanded under conditions of a rapidly deteriorating economy during the Sukarno era in the 1960s. Left largely to their own devices to find support, local military units secured their needs by operating business enterprises, levying unofficial "taxes," smuggling, and other methods suggested by their own resourcefulness and available opportunities. Although not the only state institution to engage in commercial enterprise in order to generate extrabudgetary income, the armed forces certainly were the most energetic and successful. Commercial activities under the various territorial commands commonly included the use of military trucks to transport passengers and freight for hire. Military-owned companies operated in the open market, much as any private company. For example, the Dharma Putra Foundation, a holding company connected with the Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD), included a film company, an airline, and the Volkswagen assembly franchise.

The armed forces also influenced the economic policies of the Suharto regime through their ties with its most important economic technocrats. Many believe the military-technocrat alliance provided one foundation of the Suharto regime. By the early 1990s, in fact, the so-called "Berkeley Mafia," continuously augmented as successive generations of bright youths sought training in the United States, had directed Indonesia's economy for more than thirty years. In late 1982, the dwifungsi principle was placed on firm legal ground when the old 1954 defence law was replaced with a new one expressly stating that ABRI is both a military and a social force. The new law, unlike its predecessor, confers formal legitimacy on the wide-ranging powers exercised by the armed forces in the name of preserving and strengthening national resilience. The government's sanction of dwifungsi recognized the need for ABRI's continued influence in the basic national infrastructure so that national development would buttress national defence. ABRI's involvement in the national life included the assignment of both active duty and retired military personnel to civil administrative and policy positions. Gradually, as stability came to the economic sector, military personnel withdrew from the economic policy making area, and by 1980 all active duty personnel had left their positions in non defence related economic enterprises, although they remained active in military owned and managed businesses. These businesses were primarily in the sectors of plantation agriculture, timber cultivation and harvest, and transportation. Retired military officers continued to run some nationalized firms and military owned enterprises, although they frequently hired civilian managers. Members of the military are allotted 75 unelected seats in the Parliament (DPR), in partial compensation for not being permitted to vote. The military occupies numerous key positions in the administration and holds an unelected 20 percent of the seats in provincial and district parliaments. The other 85 percent of national and 80 percent of regional parliamentary seats are filled through elections held every 5 years.

The largest and most important of the recognized political parties has been GOLKAR, a government-controlled organization of diverse functional groups. During his tenure, President Soeharto strongly influenced the selection of the leaders of GOLKAR, of which he was the senior leader. GOLKAR has eliminated the Board of Patrons through which Soeharto previously had exerted control over the party. With the assistance of the armed forces, President Habibie backed the successful candidacy of the new GOLKAR General Chairman, who is also the State Minister/State Secretary, one of the most powerful positions in the Cabinet. GOLKAR traditionally has maintained close institutional links with the armed forces. Following Soeharto's May 1998 resignation, the armed forces stated publicly that they would no longer be involved directly in the affairs of GOLKAR or back the ruling party in future elections. Despite this statement, the armed forces played a prominent role in the victory of President Habibie's candidate for GOLKAR Chairman in July 1998 over a former minister of defence. In December 1998 Armed Forces Commander Wiranto publicly announced that the armed forces intended to remain neutral during the election. On 15 July 1997 it was reported that Maj. Gen. Yunus Yosfiah, commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces [ABRI] Staff and Command College, replaced Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid as chief of ABRI sociopolitical affairs. After Suharto resigned the new President, B.J. Habibie, announced his cabinet and swore them in on May 23, 1998, with Lt. Gen. Yunus Yosfiah serving as Minister of Information. The Indonesian army's most decorated soldier, Yosfiah commanded the special forces unit blamed for the deaths of five Australia-based journalists in East Timor in October 1975. In 1978 while a battalion commander in Timor he is alleged to have killed Nocolao Lobato, then leader of the East Timorese resistance movement FRETELIN. Generally heads of ABRI sociopolitical affairs are officers with territorial, socio-political, or educational experience. Rarely if ever come from the ranks of the KOPASSUS Red Berets. Of previous heads including Bambang Triantoro, Sugiarto, Harsudiono Hartas, Haryoto P.S., Ma'ruf, Hartono, and Syarwan Hamid, not one came from the Special Forces Command. With the September 1997 appointment of Yosfiah as head of the sociopolitical affairs, the three top positions at ABRI headquarters were held by KOPASSUS Special Forces officers. ABRI Commander Gen. Feisal Tanjung, who was installed in 1993, was a KOPASSUS man, as was Lieutenant General Tarub, installed in 1997. This "domination" of the upper ranks at ABRI Headquarters has never happened in preceding periods.

The Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency [BAIS] is ABRI's agency for intelligence collection relating to external defense and internal security, processing, and operational functions. After the elimination of KOPKAMTIB in 1985, BAIS received a major infusion of personnel, funds, and power. The head of BAIS for many years, Murdani, served concurrently through 1983 as head of the HANKAM intelligence staff, deputy chief of BAKIN, and armed forces commander in chief. Like Ali Murtopo and Suharto himself, Murdani had served as an officer in KOSTRAD in the 1960s. Only when the minister and commander in chief posts were separated after the 1985 reorganization, with Murdani retaining only the ministerial portfolio, did he give up his BAIS and BAKIN posts. The reorganization eliminated the chance for one man to hold so many powerful posts at the same time. After the organization the ABRI commander in chief acted as the chief of BAIS but its day-to-day operations were directed by an army major general in the post of deputy chief. 

Since the 01 April 1999 separation of POLRI, the Indonesian National Police, from ABRI, the Indonesian armed forces, the army has begun to use its former name, Tentara Nasional Indonesia or National Army of Indonesia (TNI); the term is increasingly being used instead of ABRI. The ground forces are presently termed Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat. The Army of the Republic of Indonesia (ADRI) historically has been the dominant service, with administrative control of the armed forces resting with the army chief of staff, in 1992 a four-star general. His staff included a vice chief of staff, an inspector general, and assistant chiefs of staff for logistics, operations, personnel, planning and budget, security, and territorial affairs. Total army strength, which had not changed substantially during the New Order era, as of 1992 was some 217,000, not including several thousand in nonmilitary positions throughout the government. The chief of staff was responsible for personnel, training, administration, and logistical support of the army, but he did not exercise direct authority over the ten KODAMs, the regional commands of the army that reported directly to the commander in chief. Commanders and staff of each KODAM were responsible for administration, logistics, personnel, training, and the general welfare of assigned and attached combat units. Each Kodam was divided into successively smaller administrative units. These included the Military Resort (Garrison) Command (KOREM); Military District Command (KODIM); and Military Subdistrict Command (KORAMIL). At the bottom of the structure, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were assigned to every village in the country.

The geographic extent of the army KODAM in the early 1990s was as follows: KODAM I, Special Region of Aceh and Sumatera Utara, Sumatera Barat, and Riau provinces; KODAM II, Jambi, Bengkulu, Sumatera Selatan, and Lampung provinces; KODAM III, Jawa Barat Province; KODAM IV, Jawa Tengah Province and the Special Region of Yogyakarta; KODAM V, Jawa Timur Province; KODAM VI, the four provinces of Kalimantan; KODAM VII, the four provinces of Sulawesi; KODAM VIII, Maluku and Irian Jaya provinces; KODAM IX, Bali, Nusa Tenggara Timur, Nusa Tenggara Barat, and Timor Timur provinces; and KODAM Jaya Jakarta, the Special Capital City Region of Jakarta. Approximately two-thirds of the army was engaged in the national defence aspect of the armed forces' dwifungsi mission. Operations were rarely, if ever, conducted in any formation larger than a battalion. Each Korem had control of at least one battalion and one or more battalions came under the direct control of the Kodam. Army doctrine differentiated between tactical battalions, which were found in Kostrad and at least one quick reaction force battalion for each Kodam; and territorial battalions, which made up the majority of the units assigned to the ten Kodams. Each battalion had a strength of nearly 700 men, and personnel programs within a fixed staffing size called for recruitment of sufficient numbers to bring chronically understrength units up to authorized levels. Some of these forces were occasionally assigned for temporary missions to Kostrad or Kopassus.

The army had its own small air arm that performed liaison and limited transport duties. It flew one helicopter squadron and one composite squadron composed mostly of light aircraft and small transports, such as the domestically produced CASA 235. Factionalism within the army leadership, once a severe problem, no longer disrupted operations in the early 1990s. Traditional divisional identification continued to have some significance, however, especially in regard to that developed in the former Siliwangi, Diponegoro, and Brawijaya divisions, which covered western, central, and eastern Java, respectively, during the war of independence and the years immediately thereafter. The detachment of the Jakarta area from the control of the Siliwangi division and the restructuring of the army from a divisional basis to the territorial Kodam system diffused the powers of the divisions and eliminated warlordism. Most of the army personnel not assigned to combat formations were involved in carrying out the social and developmental portions of the armed forces' dwifungsi mission. Many were attached to the Kodams as support elements, performing intelligence and internal security functions, and maintaining liaison with local officials charged with implementing the government's policies. Some military personnel filled civilian government positions from national and province levels down to the district, subdistrict, or village level. A large portion of the army's territorial forces participated in ABRI civic action projects, such as the nationally directed ABRI Masuk Desa program and locally directed programs at the Kodam level, as part of their mission to promote national development. They constructed roads, bridges, and public buildings, provided medical service in remote areas, and worked to improve rural conditions. The military's civic action mission received added attention after 1983 as part of a program designed to address the problems of a perceived growing gap between ABRI and the civilian population.

By 1992 virtually all of the army's heavy Soviet- or East European-origin equipment had been eliminated and replaced by equipment produced indigenously or purchased from Western countries. Because of funding constraints, emphasis was placed on maintenance and rehabilitation of older equipment. The mainstay of the armoured force was the French-built AMX-13 light tank and AMX-VCI reconditioned armoured personnel carriers, mostly acquired in the late 1970s. The nation's small arms industry supplied nearly all of the army's small arms requirements, although a substantial number of M-16 rifles purchased from the United States in the 1980s remained in the inventory. Domestically produced arms included FMC rifles, submachine guns, and machine guns made under Belgian-licensed production. Ammunition was in short supply. Although army recruits received their basic training in a central training facility located in each Kodam area, specialist corps training was provided at the appropriate national corps centres. NCOs were required to attend training courses and to pass examinations in their fields prior to promotion.

KOSTRAD [Army Strategic Reserve Command], which has between 25,000 and 26,000 troops, supervises operational readiness among all commands and conducts defence and security operations at the strategic level in accordance with policies of the ABRI commander. KOSTRAD came into being when Indonesia was dealing with the liberation of West Irian in 1960, and was formally constituted on 06 March 1961. Initially designated the Army General Reserve Corps, its name was changed to KOSTRAD in 1963. Major General Suharto (later Indonesian president) was the first to be entrusted with the position of PANGKOSTRAD [KOSTRAD Commander]. It was from his position as Kostrad commander, in fact, that Suharto organized resistance to the 1965 coup. Since then the powerful post has been filled by officers considered particularly loyal to Suharto. As of 01 April 1998 Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto [Suharto's son-in-law] was serving as commander of KOSTRAD. Suharto was ousted on 21 May 1999 amid mounting public pressure and large scale violent pro-reform riots. Soon thereafter Son-in-Law Prabowo was pushed out of his position as commander of KOPASSUS and reassigned to head the army's command and staff training college in Bandung. During the New Order era, the KOSTRAD force has become increasingly visible. These green-beret troops have never been absent from the various military operations, such as G-30-S/PKI [30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party], Trisula, the PGRS [Sarawak People's Guerrilla Force] in Sarawak, the PARAKU [North Kalimantan People's Force] in North Kalimantan, and Operation Seroja in East Timor. KOSTRAD troops have also been relied on at the international level, as was the case with Garuda troops in Egypt (1973-78) and Vietnam (1973-75) and with those in the combined peace force in the midst of the Iran-Iraq war of 1989 and 1990. In 1984 the PANGKOSTRAD became responsible to the ABRI commander for the conduct of combat operations, called defense and security operations. At present, KOSTRAD has a strength of some 35,000 to 40,000 army personnel with two infantry divisions: the 1st Division, headquartered at Cilodong, West Java, and the 2d Division, headquartered at Malang, East Java. Each of the divisions contains airborne and infantry brigades. KOSTRAD also includes a separate airborne brigade; one cavalry brigade; two field artillery regiments; and several combat support and service support units.

The Special Forces Command (KOPASSUS), formerly called the Sandi Yudha Forces Command and KOPASSANDHA (which also means Special Forces Command), are trained in intelligence gathering, a variety of special operations techniques, sabotage, and airborne and seaborne landings. Founded on 16 April 1952, KOPASSUS was reorganized and reduced in size in 1985, and by 1992 KOPASSUS forces numbered some 2,500 army personnel identifiable by their distinctive red berets organized into two operational groups and one training group. Since a reorganization in June 1996, KOPASSUS returned to the organization created in 1985. The stated reason for the reorganization was to permit a development rotation with one quarter on duty, one quarter in training, one quarter consolidation, and one quarter ready reserves which can be used at any time. Along with the reorganization and increase in size, its commander, the son-in-law of the Indonesian president, was promoted to two-star rank. By the late 1990s KOPASSUS numbered some 6,000-strong, an increase in the number of troops, but below that of 1985. Headquarters at Cijantung, East Jakarta, KOPASSUS had expanded to five Groups, with Group IV specifically handling intelligence operations along with the KOPASSUS Joint Intelligence Unit [SGI]. While the "elite" corps of the Indonesian Army is the KOPASSUS Red Beret Corps with its special camouflage field uniform, there are many similarities among KOPASSUS, KOSTRAD, and other corps. Because of differences in units, however, there are individual improvisations that become special features of each corps. The KOPASSUS training package called "How to Find a Fine Fighter." With its headquarters in Cijantung, East Jakarta, KOPASSUS is considered to be an elite force that has traditionally emphasized its small size and its quick-strike potential. It has been involved in numerous military actions in response to internal Indonesian unrest. KOPASSUS units were involved in 1981 in freeing the hostages from the "Woyla," the Garuda Airline plane hijacked by followers of Imran, leader of an Islamic splinter movement in West Java. Imran forced the plane to land at the Don Muang Airport in Thailand. KOPASSUS troops to Thailand and brilliantly overwhelmed the hijackers. Around 90 troops from KOPASSUS were dispatched to Irian Jaya when a rebel group took hostages there have left the province without rescuing the remaining captives in 1996. KOPASSUS members climbed Mount Everest in 1997.

KOPASSUS is associated with human rights abuses and "disappearances" which have been documented by respected human rights organizations and the Indonesian government. A number of activists were kidnapped by KOPASSUS troops in the last months of the Suharto regime, and at least 23 government critics disappeared. Nine later resurfaced and told stories of solitary confinement, interrogation, and physical abuse. One was found dead and 13 are still listed as missing. The abductions took place ahead of a general assembly which reappointed Suharto as president for his seventh consecutive term on 11 March 1998. Beginning in early 1999 a campaign of systematic liquidation of the resistance was under way in East Timor, forcing thousands of people to flee into the jungles The operations were backed by at least a section of the Indonesian armed forces and intelligence service, notably KOPASSUS. In the countryside, village chiefs in favour of independence were systematically liquidated, and even villages considered not enthusiastic enough for autonomy were destroyed. East Timor resistance leader Xanana Gusmao accused a renegade "KOPASSUS old guard" of scorning Indonesia's avowed policy of curbing the violence in East Timor. Western military sources said known KOPASSUS officers were involved in attacks on the UNAMET compound in Maliana southwest of Dili, from where the UN subsequently evacuated all its local and foreign staff. In early August 1999, less than three weeks before the poll in East Timor on the territory's future, Indonesia's military commander there has been replaced by Col Muhamad Noer Muis, formerly of KOPASSUS. Most recently, Col Muis was the commander of war training in Sumatra. Jose Ramos Horta, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and a leader of the East Timor resistance, has claimed that the so-called pro-Indonesian Timorese militiamen are in fact members of KOPASSUS special passing themselves off as militiamen. The United States Congress developed over the past several years a compromise limiting International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance to expanded-IMET, which is a human rights curriculum. However, the Department of Defense used Joint Combined Exchange and Training to train Indonesian military personnel in activities which would have been prohibited under the IMET ban, raising questions about a violation of Congressional intent.

The Air Force of the Republic of Indonesia (formerly AURI, currently TNI Angkatan Udara), like the navy, was also established as a separate service in 1946 and evolved from the aviation division of the People's Security Forces (BKR). When it became a separate service, the air force had only a few pilots. Nevertheless, it assumed responsibility for the air defence of the republic and took over all existing Dutch airfields and equipment. Initially, the air force was fairly small and flew mostly United States- and West European origin aircraft. However, between 1958 and 1964, the force expanded rapidly and switched to Soviet-bloc aircraft, purchasing more than 100 MiG-17 fighters, Il-28 bombers, and other aircraft from Soviet and East European sources. Personnel strength doubled. By the early 1960s, the Indonesian air force was the best equipped air arm in Southeast Asia. The influence and capability of the air force fell sharply after the 1965 attempted coup. The air force was heavily purged for its role in the events associated with the coup attempt, and the abrupt turn away from the Soviet bloc ended the significant flow of equipment and logistics support that had been the key to expansion during the early 1960s. The air force's large armada of Soviet aircraft subsequently fell into disuse and disrepair. At the same time, the sharp drop in defence expenditures initiated under Suharto, and the anticommunist orientation of the New Order government, prevented the purchase of needed spare parts and maintenance assistance and led to the rapid grounding of almost all East European-made equipment. Significant modernization did not get under way until the late 1970s with acquisition of the F5 and A-4 aircraft from the United States. The 1985 reorganization of the military made significant changes in the former territorial commands of the air force, which were eliminated from the structure altogether, with the service represented on the KODAM staff by a senior liaison officer. The air force territorial commands were replaced by two Operations Commands (KO-OPS). The Air Force KO-OPS split with KO-OPS I corresponding to KODAMs I through IV and VI and with KO-OPS II corresponding to KODAM V and KODAMs VII through IX. The air force's National Air Defence Command (KOHANUDNA) remained under the ABRI commander in chief. It had an essentially defensive function that included responsibility for the early warning system.

In 1992 air force strength was about 27,000. Approximately 4,000 of these personnel formed four battalions of "quick action" paratroopers. The structure of the air force consisted of a headquarters staff in Jakarta supporting the chief of staff, two subordinate commands (Air Materiel Command and Air Training Command), and three operational commands (Ko-Op I, Ko-Op II, and the National Air Defence Command). The Air Materiel Command was headquartered in Bandung, Jawa Barat Province, and the Air Training Command was in Surabaya, Jawa Timur Province. Indonesia's air operations were divided into two area commands with Jakarta being the east/west dividing point. The largest of the operational commands was Ko-Op II, headquartered in Ujungpandang, Sulawesi Selatan Province, and responsible for all air force operations east of Jakarta (including Kalimantan). KoOp I, headquartered in Jakarta, covered air force operations west of Jakarta. The National Air Defense Command, also headquartered in Jakarta, had operational control over all fighter and counterinsurgency aircraft.

SKADRON UDARA 2 : F-27 DAN CN-235

SKADRON UDARA 3 : F-16 FIGHTING FALCON

SKADRON UDARA 4 : C-212 DAN CESSNA

SKADRON UDARA 5 : BOEING 737

SKADRON UDARA 6 : TWINPAC

SKADRON UDARA 7 : BELL-47 SIOUX / SOLOY DAN HUGHES 500

SKADRON UDARA 8 : SA-330 PUMA

SKADRON UDARA 11 : A-4 SKY HAWK

SKADRON UDARA 12 : HAWK 100 / 200

SKADRON UDARA 14 : F-5 TIGER II

SKADRON UDARA 15 : HS HAWK MK-53

SKADRON UDARA 17 : BOEING 707, F-28, F-27 DAN SA-330 PUMA

SKADRON UDARA 31 : HERCULES C-130

SKADRON UDARA 32 : HERCULES C-130

Most of the major weapons systems operated by the air force were manufactured in the United States and consisted of the C-130 Hercules, OV-10F Bronco, F-5E Tiger II, and A-4E Skyhawk. The air force also operated several B-737 aircraft for maritime reconnaissance. In 1990 the air force took delivery of the twelve F-16 Fighting Falcons purchased from the United States, which were based at Iswahyudi Air Base, Jawa Timur Province. During the modernization period of the 1980s, the air force also purchased the Automated Logistics Management System (ALMS) from the United States to upgrade its ability to track and requisition spare parts and materials. In 1980 the air force enunciated a forward defence strategy that required building or upgrading air bases throughout Indonesia as well as main bases on Java. Most of those upgrades involved civilian airfields also used by the air force. A major upgrade at Ranai Air Base on Natuna Island provided a base for improved surveillance of the South China Sea. Iswahyudi Air Base was upgraded to enable it to handle modern jet fighter aircraft. In 1992, most airfield upgrade programs had been started but most combat aircraft were still based on Java. The exception was one squadron of A-4 aircraft at Pekanbaru Air Base, Riau Province, and another at Hasanuddin Air Base near Ujungpandang. Pilots generally began flight instruction in propeller-driven T-34 Turbo-Mentors. A squadron of British Aerospace T-53 Hawks was used for advanced training. However, competition with higher paying civilian airlines led to a continuing shortfall of pilots and aviation support personnel. To remedy the situation, the air force announced in 1981 that male and female senior high school graduates would be accepted for expense-free training as shortterm aviation officers. Graduates of the two-year program would serve ten years in the air force and then be released to find employment in the civilian sphere.

The Indonesian Navy was established on 22 August 1945 following the Indonesian Proclamation of Independence. It was formed as the Agency of the People’s Security Sea Service (Badan Keamanan Rakyat-Laut or BKR), with only wooden ships, a few landing craft and weapons left by Japan. The BKR was developed by the alumni of the Sekolah Pelayaran Tinggi (Maritime College) and the Dutch Naval Academy (Koninjklijk Institut de Marine). Following the establishment of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) on 5 October 1945, BKR became known as Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia (ALRI). The name ALRI was used until 1970, when it was changed to Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut (TNI-AL). During the period of the independence war of 1945–1949, ALRI, with a minimum of forces, was able to conduct sea expeditions to various areas out of Java to establish naval bases, marine forces, and naval training schools. Apart from establishing naval forces out of Java, the objective of the expeditions was to expand the spirit of the proclamation, and increase exposure among other countries by breaking through naval blockades to obtain weapons, ammunition and medical supplies. These naval operations succeeded in encouraging resistance against the Dutch and establishing armed forces in Bali, South Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi. With the recognition of Indonesian sovereignty by the Dutch under the Round Table Agreement on 2 November 1949, ALRI had the opportunity to consolidate its forces as a modern navy. This was followed by the delivery of ex-Koninklijke Marine (KM) ships, including corvettes and destroyers. On 5 December 1959, ALRI established a fleet to organise, operate and increase weapon materiel. The establishment of the fleet was a milestone for the development of ALRI.

The Navy was initially stocked primarily with craft once operated by European or the Australian navies. Beginning in 1959, the navy began to acquire a large number of craft from the Soviet Union and East European nations. In the aftermath of the abortive 1965 coup, however, the navy suffered a decline in influence within the armed forces and the nation because of suspected involvement in the coup attempt (particularly by the marine corps) and because of its small size in comparison with the army. A large portion of its vessels of Soviet or East European origin were quickly rendered non-operational owing to a lack of spare parts and maintenance expertise. During the period of confrontation, the Indonesian naval capability increased in quality and quantity. The fleet was strengthened by acquisitions from Russia including cruisers, destroyers, frigates, fast attack missile craft and submarines. The Marine Corps was also reinforced by armoured and amphibious vehicles, and naval aviation with ASW helicopters and bombers (IL28). In 1970, after the severing of diplomatic ties with Russia, which created problems maintaining the Russian ships, TNI-AL obtained an ex-US Navy destroyer escort, and an ex-RAN fast attack craft (K-16M class) to replace the ex-Russian vessels. Until the late 1970s, the only major replacements were four frigates acquired from the United States Navy in 1974. Since that time, the navy embarked on an upgrading program designed to develop a balanced fleet suited to operations in archipelagic waters. Over the 1978-92 period, it purchased submarines from the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), light frigates from the Netherlands and Britain, and fast attack craft from the Republic of Korea (South Korea). In 1992 the Indonesian government announced plans to acquire thirty-nine used ships of various types from the navy of the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany). The navy produced numerous small coastal craft in national shipyards as well. As of 1992, the fleet was composed of more than sixty ships and numerous smaller vessels.

The national and global situation at the beginning of the 1980s gave new impetus to the development of TNI-AL and the promulgation of the Indonesian EEZ (Economic Exclusive Zone) brought with it new challenges and demands. The small, effective and efficient force was required to develop into a professional, effective and modern navy. In order to conduct its primary role as a naval force, TNI-AL initiated a development and management program, including the maintenance of forces through an integrated fleet weapons system (SSAT). The elements of SSAT are ships, as a basic weapon system, aircraft, the Marine Corps and naval bases. The SSAT is a combination of strategic weapons with logistic support reflecting a strong navy. The navy's mission was to act as a territorial force responsible for the patrol of Indonesia's immense coastline. The vast majority of operational ships were stationed at the main naval base at Surabaya, Jawa Timur Province. Whereas the 1970s saw an increase in the fleet's ship inventory, the 1980s witnessed a major effort to improve the navy's armament posture through the purchase of the Harpoon weapons system and the MK-46 torpedo. The 1990s were expected to be largely a period of consolidation and training. The minimum maritime capability to ensure national security is sea denial. Based on that capability, modernisation was achieved through the procurement of modern, high technology naval ships from a variety of countries, including Holland (Fatahilah class corvettes, ‘ Van Spijk’ frigates, and Tripartite class minehunters), Yugoslavia (destroyer escort training ship KRI Kihajar Dewantara-364; Korea, ‘Patrol Ship Killer—Missiles’ (PSK) and Tacoma class landing ship tank), the United Kingdom (ex-Tribal class) and Germany (209 class submarine). The national shipyard, PT PAL, also produced FPB-57 class patrol boats for TNI-AL.

Structurally, the navy comprised the headquarters staff at Jakarta under the overall command of the navy chief of staff, two fleet commands (the Eastern Fleet in Surabaya, the Western Fleet in Jakarta), the marine corps, a small air arm, and a military sealift command. There were about 44,000 uniformed personnel serving in the navy in 1992, including about 13,000 marines. The marines were organized into two brigades, one in Jakarta and the other in Surabaya, and were equipped with light tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and antiaircraft guns. Some of the marine elements were believed occasionally to be attached to KOSTRAD in operational missions. The 1985 reorganization of the military made significant changes in the former territorial commands of the navy, which were eliminated from the structure altogether, with the service represented on the KODAM staff by a senior liaison officer. The navy territorial commands were replaced by Eastern Fleet and Western Fleet--Armadas. The Navy fleets split the Western Fleet corresponding to KODAMs I through IV and VI and with the Eastern Fleet corresponding to KODAM V and KODAMs VII through IX. The navy has maintained a small air arm since 1958. Headquartered at Surabaya, its personnel numbered some 1,000 in the early 1990s. It was equipped primarily for naval reconnaissance and coastal patrol duties, flying three squadrons of light airplanes, as well as several transports and helicopters. Naval aviation was supplemented with Nomads (N-22) from Australia, Wasp ASW helicopters from the UK, and products of IPTN such as Cassa, Super Puma and BO-105. The Marine Corps also received amphibious vehicles from France. More recently, TNI-AL obtained 39 ex-East German naval ships. In order to enhance the capability of logistic support, maintenance and administration for the unit operation, TNI-AL established five main bases with several subordinate bases, a maintenance facility, and a naval aviation base.

The military sealift command coordinated the navy's logistical support systems. In the early 1990s, naval warships generally were not deployed to a particular region but were grouped in mobile flotillas, to be dispatched where needed. Usually these included eastern, western, and central groups, but activity was most often concentrated in the west in the vicinity of the bases at Belawan in Sumatera Utara Province, Tanjungpinang in Riau Province, near Singapore; and in the east near the base at Manado in Sulawesi Utara Province. This pattern was in keeping with the major missions envisioned for the navy in the 1990s. One mission concerned patrolling the strategic straits through which foreign ships enter and exit the Indian Ocean, particularly the Strait of Malacca. The other mission centered on halting smuggling and illegal fishing, considered to be problems particularly in the areas near the Natuna Islands and in the seas between Kalimantan and Irian Jaya. In support of the second mission, the navy announced plans to construct a number of limited-role bases in isolated areas in the eastern and western sections of the national territory. Patrol activity also increased in connection with the flow of refugees from Southeast Asia, particularly in the area near the Natuna Islands. The naval shipyard P.T. PAL was turned over to the civilian government, but it, along with other facilities in Surabaya, continued to be the navy's primary training, repair, and industrial center. Since P.T. PAL's transfer to civilian control and designation as a state enterprise, it developed and implemented improvements for a management and technical upgrade of the shipyard to support the Indonesian fleet as well as to conduct commercial repairs for foreign navies. Small craft construction facilities were located at shipyards in Jakarta, Manokwari, Irian Jaya Province; Semarang, Jawa Tengah Province; and Ambon, Maluku Province.

Because of severe budgetary constraints imposed by the national government, no near-term acquisition of major new weapons systems was planned by the navy in the early 1990s. Continual overhaul of foreign-origin ships was perceived as the primary method to retain an operational fleet. Future projects included plans for an Indonesian-designed frigate and construction of a major naval base at Ratai Bay, Lampung Province. The immense costs involved, however, made achievement of these ambitious goals unlikely. When independence was proclaimed and sovereignty gained, Indonesia had to enact laws to govern the seas in accordance with the geographic structure of an archipelagic state. This, however, did not mean that the country would bar international passage. The laws were necessary instruments for the unity and national resilience of the country, with a territory that embraces all the islands, the islets and the seas in between. In view of the country's susceptibility to foreign intervention from the sea and for domestic security reasons, on December 13, 1957, the Indonesian Government issued a declaration on the territorial waters of the Republic. It stated that all the waters surrounding and between the islands in the territory came within Indonesia's sovereignty. It also determined that the country's territorial water limit was 12 miles, measured from a straight baseline drawn from the outermost points of the islands. In the past, archipelagic states like Indonesia have unilaterally determined their 200-mile-Exclusive Economic Zones. Today such economic zones are confirmed by the International Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was ratified by the Indonesian Government on October 18, 1983, by Act No. 5 of the same year. This is the legal basis of the Indonesian-Exclusive Economic Zone.

In addition to the regular armed forces, there are a variety of militia-style paramilitary formations throughout the country. As of 1992, estimates of the national strength of these forces ranged between 70,000 and 100,000. These units come under the army territorial hierarchy, which provided them with officers and training. In times of emergency, they came under the command of the army area commander.

RATIH Civilian Militia [Rakyat Terlatih]

KAMRA People's Security Force

WANRA People's Resistance

HANSIP Civil Defence Force

PAM SWAKARSA Voluntary Militia

RATIH is an old idea which was a component of the People's Defence and Security System. In this system, ABRI (the Indonesian Armed Forces) functioned as the main component, and RATIH assisted. RATIH is intended to face both invasions and internal rebellions. KAMRA (People's Security Force) is closely linked to the handling of regional security, while People's Resistance [WANRA] which is also a part of RATIH relates to facing external enemies. They are different from the Civil Defence Force (HANSIP), and should not be equated with the voluntary militia (PAM SWAKARSA).

HANSIP (Pertahanan Sipil – Civilian Defence Organization) is under government control through the village, sub-districts, counties, while RATIH is under the POLRI [Indonesian National Police]. HANSIP are under the Department of Home Affairs rather than ABRI, but ABRI provides NAHSIP's training and supplies units with their weaponry. HANSIP platoons are established in each village, the members of which come from the village community such as farmers, labourers and others. The system of Indonesia's National Defence and Security is based on "total people's defence and security" which means that the Armed Forces and the entire people are equally responsible for maintaining national security and defence. The Civil Defence Organization is responsible for matters concerning security and order and has to assist the people in emergencies, for example, when in the middle of the night an expecting woman needs help, the village HAN-SIP is to call a doctor or midwife. Organically HANSIP is under the supervision of the district head and the governor of the province.

The PAM SWAKARSA voluntary militia does not have a clear position and does not exist within the state's defence and security structure, which has caused much conflict. In November 1998 ABRI recruited some 125,000 civilians to bolster the defence of the special legislative session preparing for the 1999 elections. Many of the volunteers were recruited from groups notorious for violence, and were eventually withdrawn after numerous brawls with demonstrators. Other officially sanctioned vigilante groups in Central Java have lynched and beheaded strangers suspected of criminal activity.

In late 1998 minister of defence and security General Wiranto proposed the formation of a civilian militia (RATIH) to help maintain order in the country. Indonesian Moslem leader Abdurrahman Wahid endorsed the controversial plan, under the condition that the new militia fall under the control of General Wiranto. However, it did not materialize because it did not receive much support from some segments of the national leadership. The former Chief of Kostrad (Army's Strategic Reserves Command), Lieutenant General (ret.) Kemal Idris, for instance, regarded the establishment of RATIH as an embarrassment to ABRI, particularly the Army. Moslem leader and possible presidential candidate Amien Rais warned that the new formation could lead to abuses from members of the group. R.William Liddle, an observer of the Indonesian political scene at Ohio State University, expressed concern that the establishment of RATIH will only lead to militias "which could easily lose control."

Legal authorization is required to organize Ratih, and at present there is no law that regulates RATIH. Therefore, KAMRA was formed instead. The basis for the establishment of RATIH is the Law No. 20 of 1982 regarding Particulars for Defence and Security, which remained on the books although never implemented. If the term "RATIH" is related to Law No. 20 of 1982, there must automatically be a new authorizing law. But using the term "KAMRA" Presidential Decision No. 55 of 1978 may be used to provide authorization for the force.

Members of the Indonesian military-recruited civilian auxiliary force, the so-called KAMRA security forces, are civilian paramilitaries recruited and trained by the Indonesian army to serve in its, and the police's, auxiliary units. The KAMRA is organized to assist police personnel, which are rather small in number. At present Indonesia has only 200,000 police personnel. Starting in February 1999 the Indonesian Army began training 40,000 unemployed youths as members of a civilian security force (KAMRA). Recruitment began in January 1999, and each member of Kamra trained for at least trained for two weeks at an educational institution of the Indonesian Army in camps at military area base regiments, with a subsequent three to four months of training "on the job." The training was originally to involve 29,000 persons, but the number was later increased to 40,000. The civilians selected to assist the security measures are initially to be armed only with shields, batons, and handcuffs, but are authorized to make arrests and to take information from suspects.

According to General Wiranto, the militia forces are "to be assigned in security disturbance-prone areas."

Militias in East Timor

The recruitment members of the community to serve the interests of the armed forces is an integral part of the Indonesian army's "people's defence" doctrine. The para-military forces in East Timor are under the direct command of ABRI, and are not an independent force of vigilantes outside the command structure as is usually claimed. Pro-autonomy militias had a history dating back to 1975 of supporting the Indonesian invaders against FRETILIN. Violence between pro-Indonesia and pro-independence factions mounted since Jakarta's announcement in January 1999 that it could consider independence for the former Portuguese colony if the people rejected an autonomy package. In early 1999 Major-General Adam Damiri, the commander of the Udayana military command, publicly held a meeting with para-militaries, at which he gave the signal for Operasi Sapu Jagad to start, resulting in many casualties among the population in many parts of East Timor, including the capital Dili. With this act Damiri was in open defiance of Habibie’s decision to give the East Timorese the chance to determine their own political future. Upwards of 1,200 official civilian militia (PAM SWAKARSA) members were installed at a ceremony in the courtyard of the East Timor governor's office on 20 April 1999. East Timor's police chief defended the recruitment of pro-Indonesia militias into a civil security system, although the recruited militias are widely regarded as being responsible for massacres in Liquisa and Dili. Militia commanders Eurica Guetteras and Manuel de Souza of Aitarak and Besi Merah Putih have been recruited along with their militias into Indonesia's civilian security force PAM SWARKASA.

The United Front for East Timor Autonomy is a coalition that includes the pro-Indonesia Forum for Unity, Democracy and Justice (FPDK) and militias. Members of the FPDK [Forum for Unity, Democracy and Justice], a pro-integration political organization, has used the militias as its armed wing, although the militias have a different chain of command and receive orders from "other people." FPDK members have participated in the militias' swearing of allegiance ceremonies throughout the territory. The FPDK president, Domingos Soares, is a Dili council administrator. Other pro-integration leaders include Basilio Dias Araujo, and Hermenio da Silva, the Pro-integration Forces (PPI) Chief of Staff. Eurico Guterres, the commander of the Aitarak [Thorn] militia who wear distinctive black headbands with the word Aitarak inscribed on them, waged a campaign of terror over the summer of 1999 with the avowed aim of partititioning East Timor. Ilidio Dos Santos leads a 3,000-member strong pro-integration civilian militia group in the Maubara district that includes Liquisa, 60 kilometers west of the East Timor capital Dili. He calls his group "Besi Merah Putih" (Red and White Iron), named after the colour of the Indonesian flag. Besi Merah Putih militia accompanied by and directed by TNI (Indonesian army) soldiers carried out a variety of operations. The Besi Merah Putih have been blamed by witnesses for the bloody attack on a Liquisa church in which up to 52 people may have been killed. Joao da Silva Tavares, commander of the 9,000-member Integration Fighters Force, concentrated his force and personnel in Bobonaro District, which borders on Atambua District of East Nusa Tenggara Province. United Front for East Timor [UNIF] forces are mainly scattered at the western sector which stretches from Maliana, Ermera, Suai, and Ambeno to Dili. East Timor Integration Fighters Force [PPI] members from Baucau-based Sector A have four areas of control, namely the Saka and Sera Force in Baucau, Alfa Force in Lospalos, Makikit Force in Viqueque, and Red and White Force in Manatuto. The Dili-based Sector B consists of Aitarak Force in Dili, Red and White Iron Force in Liquica, and the Integration Blood Force in Ermera.

Jose Ramos Horta [vice-president of the National Council of the Timorese Resistance and Nobel Peace laureate in 1996] believes that at least half of the [pro-integration] militias are from West Timor, the side of the island which has always been Indonesian. Indonesian armed forces are reported to have supplied thousands of shotguns to the various civilian militia in all 13 regencies of East Timor. Armed forces commander Gen. Wiranto, however, denied the military supplied ammunition to the territory to help militia groups intimidate pro-independence East Timorese. Weapons surrender events over the summer of 1999 were based on the resolutions reached at the tripartite agreement on 5 May 1999. The weapons surrenders served as the implementation of several agreements reached by pro- and anti-autonomy groups from April to June 1999. The surrender of weapons by the East Timor Integration Fighters Force [PPI] ended on 19 August 1999 with a ceremony witnessed by Col. Neville Rilei, an UNAMET [United Nations Assessment Mission on East Timor] military liaison officer

Although the 1945 Constitution and the 1982 Press Law provide for freedom of the press, the Government maintains some serious restrictions and monitoring continues. Following the May 1998 departure of President Suharto, freedom of speech improved significantly, as sensitive issues were discussed and dissenting opinions were expressed at public demonstrations, seminars, and in statements to the press. Following Suharto's resignation, press freedom improved significantly, and there were few signs of the self-censorship that had pervaded reporting in the past, even on subjects known to be sensitive to the Government. Although the English-language press was more forward in the move toward openness, the Indonesian-language press was not far behind. Attempts by authorities to direct local journalists and editors on what they should print apparently have diminished significantly. The Government in June 1998 revoked the 1984 decree allowing the Minister of Information to cancel press publication licenses. The Government had used this decree to control the press in practice. The Government also simplified the licensing procedure for starting a publication. However, the Government issued a new decree in which it retained the right to suspend publishing licenses for an unspecified period of time. The process of preparing, formulating, reviewing, and finalizing of draft proposals until the dissemination of law and policies on telecommunications is carried out by the Ministry of Tourism, Posts and Telecommunications. Sometime the process of launching new laws and policies on telecommunications requires the involvement of various related Ministries such as the Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Information, ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc.

The Ministry of Information is involved in activities such as granting TV broadcast station licenses. The Government operates a nationwide television network with 12 regional stations. Private commercial television companies, most with ownership by, or management ties to, the former president's family, are required to broadcast government-produced news, but they all also produce news and public affairs programming independently. Over 600 private radio-broadcasting companies exist in addition to the Government's national radio network. They all were required to belong to the government-sponsored Association of Private Radio Stations to receive a broadcasting license. The government radio station produces the program "National News." The new regulations issued by the Government in June reduced the number of these government broadcasts that a private station must run per day from 14 to 4. These broadcasts are relayed throughout the country by private stations and 53 regional affiliates of the government network. The Government regulates access to Indonesia, particularly to certain areas of the country, by visiting and resident foreign correspondents. It occasionally reminds the latter of its prerogative to deny requests for visa extensions. Special permission is necessary for foreign journalists to travel to East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya.