The current head of the Serbian State Security Service, Jovica Stanisic, is the most powerful man in Serbia apart from Slobodan Milosevic. The full extent of Milosevic's confidence in Stanisic became apparent when he was appointed as the Presidential Advisor for National Security. In the announcement of his appointment, it was stated that Jovica Stanisic will "perform only the duty of the Chairman of the Council for Security." The 1997 draft Law on the FRY Security-Operative Service envisages the marginalization of the republican security services, so that all information and evaluations provided by all secret services (the Army service, the Serbian service, the Montenegrin service, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' service) go directly to a single, more-powerful, and better-organized service accountable only to the President. Altogether, Stanisic has about 4,000 men under his direction. Under Stanisic's leadership, the Serbian secret police has grown into a 300-employee service. He is also in charge of the military counterintelligence and intelligence services and the newly established diplomatic secret service, and he also covers the Montenegrin SDB. An additional ,000 people work for him in these services, plus the same number of contractors, many of whom are members of political parties or work in media or at universities. The rich Tanjug news service network also represents an exceptionally extensive intelligence and agent network.

During the 1991 reorganization of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Stanisic renamed the State Security Service (SDB) secret service as the State Security Division (RDB). He wanted to remove the connotations the term "SDB" which had functioned exclusively as a political police force, and to establish the RDB's reputation as a service for fighting terrorists and armed Serbian enemies. In 1993, when the Serbian secret service took over the building of the Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs on Knez Milos Street in Belgrade, he finally dissociated the Serbian RDB from Yugoslavia. Stanisic's office is still in the SDB part of the building of the former Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs. Before the beginning of the war the Serbian secret political police provoked violence and interethnic fighting in Croatia and Bosnia. Through criminal types such as Seselj and Arkan it carried out executions, expulsions and looting. Stanisic undertook a number of measures to hide the crimes from the domestic and world public, representing the events as the consequence of the civil war between the three sides in the conflict. Stanisic played a key role in organizing raids by Serb paramilitary formations against Knin and Vukovar. During the conflict int Bosnia-Herzegovina, the MUP of the Republika Srpska was subordinate to the Belgrade MUP to the same extent that Karadzic's military depended on the General Staff in Belgrade. Karadzic personally asked Milosevic to send Stanisic to him to help him organize para-state and para-police forces. And in May 1995, Stanisic visited Pale to secure the release of the captured UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] soldiers whom Karadzic's people were holding hostage. In May 1991 his police provided security for Seselj's visit to Romanija, even though at the time there was an arrest warrant out on Seselj from the Croatian MUP. Stanisic is credited with the disclosure of para-army units and paramilitaries among the Albanian nationalists in Kosovo. It was he who revealed the existence of the Kosovo Liberation Army. 

The Information and Documentation Service [Sluzba Informaitvna u Dokumenti - SID] is the organization within the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs responsible for gathering intelligence overseas. The principal role of SID is the production of secret intelligence in support of Serbian security, defence, foreign and economic policies . It meets these requirements for intelligence gathering and other tasks through a variety of sources, human and technical, and by liaison with a wide range of foreign intelligence and security services. From 1988 through SID was headed by Zoran Janackovic, who was formerly head of the domestic security State Security Service (Sluzba drzavne bezbednosti--SDB). In January 1995 Janackovic, then undersecretary in the ministry of foreign affairs, was appointed ambassador to Athens. Janackovic was appointed the FRY's [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] first ambassador in Macedonia in mid-1996, a post he retained as of mid-1998.

In 1990 the Yugoslav People's Army [YPA] consisted of the ground forces, air force, and navy. They were organized into four military regions including the Split Naval Region. The regions were further divided into districts that were responsible for administrative tasks such as draft registration, mobilization, and construction and maintenance of military facilities. Of the YPA's 180,000 soldiers, airmen, and sailors, more than 100,000 were conscripts.In mid-1990 the army numbered 140,000 active-duty personnel (of which 90,000 conscripts); air force, 32,000 (4,000 conscripts); and navy, 10,000 (4,400 conscripts, 900 marines). An estimated 450,000 reservists were available in wartime. The paramilitary Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) numbered 1 million to 3 million in 1990; 860,000 in regular training. TDF was largely funded by and under peacetime control of republic governments, and designated to fight either independently or under YPA command during an invasion. Following a major force structure change in army in 1990, thirty brigades were formed, including tank, mechanized, mountain infantry, and one airborne brigade. Naval submarines, corvettes, and frigates were cantered in Adriatic Fleet, administered from Split; smaller craft in both river and Adriatic commands; main mission Adriatic coastal defence. The Air Force operated over 400 combat aircraft (in twelve combat squadrons) and 200 helicopters. The main missions of air force were to maintain air superiority over Yugoslavia and to support ground and naval operations. All services had a substantial reliance on imported heavy military equipment; most aircraft and naval vessels manufactured domestically, following a strong effort to expand domestic arms industry in the 1980s. In 1990, a dispute arose between Serbia and three of the other five republics. The disagreement concerned the structure of the federal government. The Republics of Slovenia, Croatia and BiH preferred a loose confederation in order to exercise greater autonomy. Serbia, on the other hand, wanted a more highly centralized federation in order to maintain its dominant role. This dispute resulted in the secession of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina from Yugoslavia. The role performed by the military in the breakup of the former Yugoslavia was critical to the evolution of the conflict in Bosnia. When the three Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina [BH] declared their independence, they did not have separate armies. Before 1991, the JNA was a single army for all members of the former Yugoslavia, though its military centrality changed since 1974. Upon the successive declarations of independence of these three republics, some of the military personnel, who had been located in each of these Republics, left the JNA and reconstituted themselves as part of the newly created national armies of Slovenia, Croatia, and BH.

The JNA's overwhelming military superiority was not fully used against Slovenian forces which it could have easily crushed. Despite its control of approximately 30 per cent of Croatian territory, JNA forces experienced several problems. An estimated 25,000 draftees deserted, and the entire 32nd Corps, with its equipment, surrendered to Croatian forces in October 1991. According to Croatian sources, the JNA lost 618 tanks, 395 other armoured vehicles, and 100 aircraft during the fighting. In November 1991, the warring forces agreed to a JNA withdrawal from Croatia. On 1 March 1992, BH became the fourth Yugoslav Republic to declare its independence from the former Federal Government. The first three were Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia. The BH declaration of independence caused a split in that former Republic along ethnic lines. The large Serbian minority, approximately 33 per cent of the population, had passed their own referendum opting to remain a part of Yugoslavia in November 1991. Bosnian Serbs boycotted the March, BH-wide referendum on independence. The Bosnian Muslims, 44 per cent of the population, and ethnic Croats, 17 per cent of the population, voted overwhelmingly in favour of secession. This sparked a rebellion among the Serb population and led to the bloodiest fighting to date in the former Yugoslavia. The defeats in Krajina and later in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the role of the Yugoslav People's Army during the destruction of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia reduced the Army of Yugoslavia representing the remnants of the remnants of the onetime Yugoslav People's Army to a third-class role in Serbia and Yugoslavia. The Army has in many ways been eclipsed by the more politically dependable and better-equipped Serbian Special Force Police.

At the beginning of 1993, the JA troop strength was estimated to be 150,000 with 400,000 reserves. An additional 110,000 troops was nominally subordinated to the Defence Ministries of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SRBiH) and the Serbian Republic of Krajina. These forces received instructions, arms and ammunition and other support from the JA and from the FRY. JNA units were typically kept below full strength in peace time, to be supplemented by reservists as needed. With the collapse of the Yugoslavia, the remaining Serbian military forces have most recently focused on the Model-21 plan for transformation of its organization and structure to conform to new security requirements. Current sanctions prohibit other countries from selling or delivering any weapons to the Serbian armed forces. From 1996 to 1997 the defence budget dropped from US$5 billion US$1 billion. In 1997 the VJ had 114,000 members, 40 percent of which were conscripted soldiers. Given the shortage of financial resources and the halt in programs for technical modernization, the emphasis has been on creating improved organization and the maintenance of existing stocks of equipment. As of 1997 according to one estimate at least a half of the Army have anti-regime attitudes and supports radical reforms and a quick professionalization of the Army and that they. They include special forces, the whole air force, military institutes, and many officers. Commanders of military regions, generals, and various services dependent on commands are generally still loyal to the regime.

The Yugoslav Army (JA / VJ) and its predecessor, the Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA), also referred to as the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), led the armed services in personnel. In 1990 the army had 140,000 active-duty soldiers (including 90,000 conscripts) and could mobilize nearly 450,000 trained reservists in wartime. The army comprised several major service branches, including infantry, armour, artillery, and air defence, and smaller support branches such as the signal, engineering, and chemical defence corps. The Yugoslav army was organized into three military regions and ten army corps headquarters. The military regions and corps headquarters were responsible for forces and operations in three strategic areas: Slovenia and northern Croatia; eastern Croatia, Vojvodina, and Serbia; and Kosovo and Macedonia. In 1990 the army had nearly completed a major overhaul of its basic force structure. It eliminated its old divisional infantry organization and established the brigade as the largest operational unit. The army converted ten of twelve infantry divisions into twenty-nine tank, mechanized, and mountain infantry brigades with integral artillery, air defence, and antitank regiments. One airborne brigade was organized before 1990. The shift to brigade-level organization provided greater operational flexibility, manoeuvrability, and tactical initiative, and it reduced the possibility that large army units would be destroyed in set piece engagements with an aggressor. The change created many senior field command positions that would develop relatively young and talented officers. The brigade structure also was more appropriate at a time of declining manpower. Yugoslav tank brigades comprised two or three battalions. They operated about 750 Soviet T-54 and T-55, 290 Yugoslav M-84, and some United States-made M-47 tanks. The LCY held about 550 Soviet T-34 and United States-produced M-4 tanks in storage as reserves. The army's tanks were in many respects its most obsolete forces. The T-54/-55 was a frontline model during the 1960s. The M-47, T34, and M-4 were tanks of World War II and the early postwar era. Domestic production of the M-84 (basically a version of the Soviet T-72 built under license in Yugoslavia) was slowly providing the army with a late 1970s and 1980s model.

Yugoslav mechanized infantry brigades lacked sufficient mechanization. In 1990 fewer than 1,000 armoured combat vehicles and personnel carriers served almost 50,000 troops in frontline infantry units. Far fewer than one-half of all brigades were substantially mechanized. The majority of mechanized units were concentrated in eastern Croatia, Vojvodina, and Serbia along what would be the main axis of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav army had over 400 M-980 armoured combat vehicles and 300 M-60P armoured personnel carriers produced domestically. The infantry also operated more than 200 Soviet-made BTR-152, BTR40, and BTR-50 armoured personnel carriers, which had been purchased in the 1960s and 1970s. It had 100 M-3A1 half-tracked personnel carriers produced by the United States and a small number of new Romanian TAB-72 armoured personnel carriers. Armoured reconnaissance vehicles included a few older Soviet BTR-40s, newer BRDM-2 models, and domestic BOV and M-8 vehicles. Yugoslav Artillery regiments were well equipped with Soviet, United States, and domestic systems. Soviet artillery in these units consisted of approximately 1,000 towed 122mm howitzers, 130mm guns, 152mm gun/howitzers, and 155mm howitzers. There were about 700 older United States 105mm and 155mm towed guns and domestically produced models such as the M-65 in the artillery regiments. Towed pieces were very important for operations in the country's mountainous terrain. Artillery units operated Soviet 100mm and 122mm and Yugoslav-produced 105mm M-7 self-propelled guns. Those units had over 6,000 82mm and 120mm mortars, including a self-propelled 82mm mortar mounted on an M-60PB variant of the standard armoured personnel carrier. Yugoslav Artillery units operated several battlefield missile systems including 160 128mm YMRL-32 and M-63 multiple-rocket launchers. The arsenal included four launchers for Soviet FROG-7 surface-to-surface missiles. First fielded in 1967, the unguided FROG-7 had a range of 100 kilometres.

Yugoslav Antitank regiments had towed antitank guns, recoilless rifles, and Soviet antitank guided missiles. Antitank guns included 75-mm, 90-mm, and 100-mm models. They were Soviet produced with the exception of the 90mm M-63B2, which was manufactured domestically. The recoilless rifles were manufactured domestically and included 57mm, 82mm, and 105mm models. Two self-propelled 82mm recoilless rifles could be mounted on an M-60PB armoured personnel carrier. Antitank guided missiles were the Soviet AT-1 and AT-3. They were used in both antitank and infantry units, but because of their early vintage, effectiveness against advanced armour was uncertain. The four wheeled BOV-1 armoured reconnaissance vehicle could be equipped with six AT-3 launchers to serve as a highly mobile antitank platform. Larger Yugoslav army units had considerable tactical air defence assets, designed to defend major troop concentrations against enemy air strikes. The ground forces had four surface-to-air missile regiments and eleven antiaircraft artillery regiments. The former operated Soviet SA-6 mobile medium-range surface-to-air missiles as well as large numbers of shorter-range portable SA-7 and vehicle-mounted SA-9 missiles. Short-range systems also were employed in infantry units. Yugoslav antiaircraft artillery regiments operated over 5,000 guns. Self-propelled gun systems included the Soviet-made 57-mm dual ZSU-57-2 gun systems and the domestically produced triple 20mm BOV-3 and dual 30mm BOV-30. Large numbers of towed antiaircraft guns of many calibres were in the inventory. Of both domestic and foreign origin, they included pieces purchased from the United States, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, and Sweden. In general, the Yugoslav army's major deficiencies were its lack of adequate firepower and mobility. Infantry units were insufficiently mechanized to manoeuvre on a modern battlefield, and tank forces were largely outdated. Using equipment from the Soviet Union, the United States, and other countries, the ground forces had serious logistical problems, including irregular ammunition supply and maintenance of many nonstandard weapons systems. The Yugoslav army lacked sufficient fire support from the air force, although by 1990 the latter was acquiring additional ground attack aircraft and helicopters to perform this mission. The army emphasized developing or obtaining more effective vehicle-mounted and portable antitank guided missiles and antiaircraft missiles. A shortage was evident in advanced target designation systems including infrared sights and laser rangefinders.

The YPA became involved in internal security when unrest in Kosovo escalated in 1981. Under a declaration of national emergency, the army intervened to stop demonstrations by ethnic Albanians beyond the control of the People's Militia, and local militia. Hundreds of citizens were injured and some were killed during the YPA's suppression of the demonstrations. Some reports indicated that one-fourth of the YPA's total manpower remained in Kosovo to maintain order throughout the 1980s. The YPA presence added to local resentment; demonstrations resumed in 1987 and continued through the end of the decade. Use of military force against the domestic population to maintain order aroused controversy. Top government and party leaders, rank and file military, and government critics expressed varying opinions. Political leaders expected the military to ensure the unity of Yugoslavia and preserve its constitutional order against internal threats. Yet the internal security mission put the YPA under great stress because it was not structured or equipped for such activity. In Kosovo the YPA suffered intense hostility from the entire ethnic Albanian population, including armed attacks by local militants

The JNA's structure was changed several times since the Slovenian War of Independence. Three major military re-organizations took place in 1991, 1992 and 1993. But, until the summer of 1991, the JNA was organized into three Military Districts (MD) and a Naval Military District. The Air and Air Defence Force had a separate headquarters at the same level of command as the MD. The MD, designated the 1st, 3rd, and 5th, represented an intermediate level of command between the General Staff and actual combat units. Each MD was responsible for exercising Federal control of forces within its geographic region. The 1st MD, headquartered in Belgrade, was responsible for coordinating the defence of central and north-eastern Yugoslavia. Its estimated strength was 40,000 troops organized into six corps formations, plus units directly subordinate to the MD. Corps headquarters subordinate to the 1st MD were the following:

4th Corps, headquartered at Sarajevo;

5th Corps, headquartered at Banja Luka;

12th Corps, headquartered at Novi Sad;

17th Corps, headquartered at Tuzla;

24th Corps, headquartered at Kragujevac; and

37th Corps, headquartered at U ice.

In addition to these forces, the 1st MD had a mechanized infantry division (headquartered in Belgrade), three mixed artillery and anti-tank brigades, and a rocket artillery brigade directly subordinate to the MD headquarters. The 1st MD was thought to have 968 tanks, 633 armoured combat vehicles and 1,392 artillery pieces, including 92 multiple rocket launchers. 

The 3rd MD, headquartered in Skopje, was responsible for the defence of Yugoslavia's southern flank. Its estimated troop strength was 41,000, again organized into Corps and direct reporting units. The five Corps headquarters subordinate to the 3rd MD were:

2nd Corps, headquartered at Titograd;

21st Corps, headquartered at Niš;41st Corps, headquartered at Bitola;

42nd Corps, headquartered at Kumanovo; and

52nd Corps, headquartered at Priština.Two brigades of armour and two brigades of mixed artillery and anti-tank weapons were directly subordinate to the MD. The 3rd MD had 729 tanks, 472 armoured combat vehicles, and 1,190 artillery pieces, including 60 multiple rocket launchers.

The 5th MD, headquartered at Zagreb, was responsible for the defence of northern Yugoslavia and had an estimated troop strength of 35,000. The 5th MD had five Corps headquarters:

10th Corps, headquartered at Zagreb;

13th Corps, headquartered at Rijeka;

14th Corps, headquartered at Ljubljana;

31st Corps, headquartered at Maribor; and

32nd Corps, headquartered at Vara din.

The 5th MD had 711 tanks, 367 armoured combat vehicles, and 869 artillery pieces, of which 64 were multiple rocket launchers.

The successors of the YPA are the Army of Yugoslavia [VJ] and the Army of the Serb Republic [VRS], though in practice the distinction between these formations has declined with time. The Dayton agreement limited the number of heavy weapons of the army. At the beginning of 1998 the land forces had 90,000 members and 630 tanks (230 modern M-84's and the remaining 400 T-55's), 634 armoured personnel carriers and infantry armoured vehicles, 38 BPDM-2 armoured reconnaissance vehicles, 474 105mm and 122mm guns and howitzers, 180 130mm guns, 75 122mm self-propelled howitzers, and 132 152mm and 155mm howitzers. As of 1998 the Armed Forces were aligned into three Armies and one Corps:

The 1st Army is oriented toward the north and Croatia.

The 2nd Army is oriented toward Bosnia-Herzegovina

The 3rd Army is oriented toward the south and southwest -- Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia.

The Special Purposes Corps includes a paratroop brigade, an armoured brigade, and a mixed unit of brigade strength for diversionary and reconnaissance actions and for antiguerilla and antiterrorist combat operations.

The 3rd Army, headquartered in Nis, is under the command of Lt Col Gen Pavkovic. The 3rd Army includes; Timok Tactical Group, Nis Corps, Leskovac Corps, Pristina Corps, 15th Mechanized Brigade, 52nd Mixed Artillery Brigade, 58th Light Mechanized Brigade, 102nd Mechanized Anti armour Brigade, 243rd Armoured Brigade, 549th Motorized Brigade. Air-Defence Rocket-Artillery Brigade has anti-aircraft missiles along with associated radar stations. Units of the 2nd and 3rd Armies of the Yugoslav Army have conducted exercises in counterinsurgency and anti-landing operations in the area of the Pester plateau in Sandzak, and have continued similar exercises in the Kosovo army.

At the beginning of 1998 the Ministry of Interior [MUP police forces were primarily responsible for internal security operations against the KLA in Kosovo, while the army was primarily responsible for border security. And initially there was very little cooperation between the police and the army. Apart from occasional actions by the Military Police, Army units were not used against the KLA prior to mid-1998, in part to prevent casualties among draftee soldiers, since casualties could trigger a negative political response by the conscript soldier's parents. The situation changed in April and May 1998, when the Army became actively involved in actions using heavy artillery and equipment which the police did not have in sufficient quantities. Subsequently, according to some reports the Yugoslav Army took over command of operations from the Serb Special Police. Armed forces currently deployed in Kosovo are part of the 3rd Army. Support could also come from the 98th Air Force Brigade, the 172nd Air Force Brigade, and the 119th Helicopter Brigade from bases in Kraljevo, Podgorica, and Nis. As of mid-1998 Pristina Corps units, commanded by Gen. Nebojsa Pavkovic, the seven brigades of the Pristina Corps, which are not fully manned in peacetime, have a total strength of some 7,000 men. Including the Pristina Corps' garrison in Krusumlija, the total strength of the Corps and its associated support units is about 10,000 soldiers, who are for the most part professional contract soldiers. In case of mobilization, these forces would grow to some 25,000 soldiers. As of early-1999 total VJ strength in Kosovo was approximately 15-16,000, with some reinforcements from other VJ formations outside Kosovo.

One armoured mechanized brigade is located in Pristina, and another is located in Urosevac. One motorized brigade is located in Kosovska Mitrovica and in Pec, and another located in in Djakovica and Prizren. These units are deployed in two main directions: garrisons in Leposavic, Kosovska Mitrovica, Vucitrn, Pristina, and Urosevac garrisons in Pec, Djakovica, and Prizren, which deal with forces entering from Albania. The BOV-3, a Self-propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun (SPAAG) based on the BOV-M A wheeled reconnaissance vehicle chassis with a triple mounted 20mm cannon in a turret, has been used in the ground role to good effect. The PRAGA, an armoured truck with a twin mounted 30mm cannon, is another SPAAG that has been used to great effect against houses and the KLA. Border security facilities include the watchtowers in the Morina, Gorozup, Pastrik, Kosare, Koznjar and other sectors. The Army of Yugoslavia has extended the depth of the border control zone to five or six kilometres, significantly impeding movement between Kosovo and Albania. Soldiers have mined the area along the border with Albaniaea

The General Staff Security Directorate is variously referred to as the Army of Yugoslavia [or General Staff] Intelligence [or Security] Directorate [or Administration]. The Security Directorate of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia is responsible for overseeing the Counterintelligence Service [Kontraobavesajna Sluzba - KOS] as well as the units of the Military Police. The Directorate is headed by Colonel-General Aleksandar Dimitrijevic, known as a close Milosevic collaborator, who is also head of KOS.Milosevic's decision to rely on the police, not the army, was based on the hesitation of a considerable number of officers in the face of the "Serbo-ization" of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] which was to be turned into an instrument of Greater Serbian policy. Milosevic decided that it was necessary to clean up the KOS and the Army of Yugoslavia intelligence service, which could become the brain of an officers' plot. The decision was taken to remove the key cadre and to rely primarily on the police and the SDB of Serbia, even for purely military issues. Thus the key actions in Bosnia were not performed by the regular army but by paramilitary units fielded by the Internal Affairs Ministry. At the same time that the campaign against the army security bodies was taking place, the KOS used foreign agencies and the Internet to make counterattacks. Discoveries were made which connected the SDB of Serbia to the wiretapping of talks between Milosevic and Karadzic. Aleksandar Trifonij, a retired official of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, spoke with foreign journalists about the electronic espionage to which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is exposed.

After the end of World War II the Counterintelligence Service [Kontraobavesajna Sluzba - KOS] organized complicated networks of intelligence officers and liquidators, whose assignment was to uncover and eliminate prominent members of emigre groups and organizations. KOS, which was glorified during the war, experienced no radical changes since 1945 and remained one of the most conservative services in the world. Up to the war in former Yugoslavia, the processing and countering of foreign intelligence services was the domain of former Federal Yugoslavia services, including the military intelligence and counterintelligence service, KOS. In the fall of 1991 KOS chief Aco Vasiljevic agreed to accept in Bosnia teams of federal security officers who would perform a formal-instructional and control function at centres of security in Bosnia, while the real intention was that they engage in espionage and subversive activities. These federal (essentially Serbian) cadre were not welcome in Bosnia, except at the Banja Luka CSB [Security Service Centre]. There were similar attempts by Vasiljevic to install certain KOS agents, such as Fikret Muslimovic, in the Bosnia-Herzegovina SDB leadership in early 1992. Here too Vasiljevic was unsuccessful. In the early 1990s a major conflict emerged between the SDB and military services, with the goal of marginalizing the intelligence service of the Army of Yugoslavia, particularly the Counterintelligence Service. As early as 1992 and 1993, there was an attempt to organize a staged trial of General Aleksandar Vasiljevic, and a group of his closest assistants. That task was given a man with Milosevic's trust, retired Lieutenant Colonel Nedeljko Boskovic, who was reactivated in 1991 in the rank of colonel. The process failed when the president of the Higher Military Court in Belgrade at that time rejected the accusations as unfounded. But Vasiljevic was removed by the decision of the head of general staff Zivota Panic, and a much less capable officer, Boskovic, was appointed to his post. In the second half of 1993, Boskovic was replaced by the much more capable Colonel-General Aleksandar Dimitrijevic, known as a close Milosevic collaborator. Milosevic needed Dimitrijevic, to clean up the intentionally created chaos in the KOS and put the agency in the service of the forces on the front at a time when the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was raging. He has advanced rapidly in only three years he acquired three general ranks. As a colonel-general he holds a rather high rank for the post he holds, since previously the post was mainly held by major-generals, like Vasiljevic and Boskovic, who were previously Dimitrijevic's superiors.

The Army of Yugoslavia Military Police are one of the best qualified and most combat-prepared organizations within the Army. Military Police responsibilities include combating special forces of the enemy and counter-rebellion and counterterrorist actions. Military Police units, in comparison with other infantry elements, carry out a relatively large number of firing exercises, since the Police use weapons even in peace, not only for performing sentry duty, but also for carrying out other peacetime tasks -- stamping out crime, securing people and facilities, search actions, antiterrorist tasks, and others. Specific training is provided for members of special units of the Military Police, as well as for members of "general" and traffic Military Police. Drills for Military Police units, from squad to battalion, are based on their anticipated tactical employment, including the training in putting down civil disorder. The Security Directorate of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia is responsible for overseeing the units of the Military Police.

The war waged over recent years on the territory of the former Yugoslavia showed the importance of special units, and accordingly the Yugoslav Army [VJ] Special Forces Corps was formed in August 1992. At the time of its formation and for a long time thereafter the corps was an enigma, though over time systematic news reports and media presentations of the corps have revealed details of its organization. The Corps is represented in the Report on the Yugoslav Army prepared for the Subregional Arms Control Agreement, which includes the brigade organization of the corps. Since the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] is one of the signatories of the Dayton Agreement, and of the Subregional Arms Control Agreement, the brigades are also defined by that document as objects of inspection. The Special Force Corps, which includes one motorized and mechanized guards brigade (armoured vehicles with wheels and tracks), is the elite unit of the land forces for operations under armoured vehicle protection. The guards brigade consists of approximately 1,000 men). The 63d Paratroop Brigade, based at Nis, belongs to the airborne units in charge of transport, jumping with various parachuting techniques, usually from aircraft. The factor of surprise with this type of unit is achieved with jumps at night. The 63d Brigade tripled in size during the war in Bosnia, and it participated in a number actions, even though the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not officially participate in the war. Several units were stationed in Bosnia during 1993 and 1994 without being properly deployed in actions or in clashes with para-military troops. Although it is called a brigade and should therefore have a strength of from 2,000 to 4,000 paratroops, the number of its members in peacetime is a rather smaller number of volunteer paratroops. Transport is done by the Antonov-26 aircraft, which can take 40 paratroops each (six aircraft go together) and by the Antonov-12 of an older generation (requiring 12 aircraft) that take 100 parachutists each.

The 72d Special Brigade (commandos) is an air force transport brigade equipped with MI-8 helicopters for vertical manoeuvres. It currently has fewer members (500) than at the time of its formation in the early 1990s. The 72d Brigade, which was mobilized in 1996 for possible action against the demonstrators in Belgrade, developed from the 63d Brigade, whose members are mostly soldiers bound with a contract. The Armed Forces of Yugoslavia [VJ] possesses organized special units of the Military Police primarily employed for antiterrorist actions. Such VJ formations are the Sokolovi [Falcons or Hawks] and Kobre [Cobras]. These are the most highly trained units of the corps for antiterrorist tasks, actions, and operations. Their use is regulated by a special document from the chief of the General Staff. The Armed Forces of Yugoslavia have invested significant funds in equipping and arming these special units, including firing silencers, optic-electronic devices for observance and shooting at night, and equipment for temporarily rendering targets helpless. Mobility is provided by special combat and non-combat vehicles. The "Kobra" anti-terrorist unit within the Special Force Corps, consists of two platoons and a total of 60 members, who are trained for activities with unconventional weapons such as crossbows. All types of units of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia [VJ] can be used in certain situations against terrorists. However, from the standpoint of organization and capabilities for antiterrorist actions, existing special purpose units of the VJ for antiterrorist and antisabotage activities can be used most often. The first such unit for antiterrorist actions was formed 1978. Members of these units qualified for increased security and the protection of the highest military individuals, and, in certain cases, government officials, and especially for freeing hostages.

Other units of the Military Police for special purposes are qualified for military police missions and the execution of protective, armed (combat) missions both in peace and in war, especially for overcoming resistance and destroying discovered and surrounding sabotage-terrorist, kidnapping, and rebellious groups. These units can act in concert with MUP formations in defensive and preventive actions for controlling people and vehicles at communications facilities, as they were used during the war in 1991-92 in areas of the former Yugoslavia. Dissatisfaction in the Special Forces Corps is caused by rapidly increasing police forces, which get the best equipment while the procurement process for military equipment takes a long time. Special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia are also known as "red berets" which is especially insulting for the military "red berets."

Internal security forces were instrumental in establishing and maintaining the communist-controlled Yugoslav state after World War II. They were responsible for identifying and prosecuting Ustase leaders and others who collaborated with occupying German and Italian forces during World War II. But alleged collaboration became a pretext for reprisals against political opponents such as the Cetnici and others who did not support Tito's Partisans. Many, including Cetnik leader Draza Mihajlovic and Croatian Roman Catholic archbishop Stepinac, were executed or imprisoned after summary trials. After the break in relations with the Soviet Union in 1948, the Yugoslav government feared that the Soviet Union might find or create a group within Yugoslavia to request Soviet intervention to assist it in "preserving socialism." The Yugoslav security agency investigated more than 50,000 alleged "Cominformists" or pro-Soviet party members, who were subsequently purged from the party. Several thousand were eventually jailed, either without trials or after show trials. They were interned in political prisons at Goli Otok in the Adriatic, Sremska Mitrovica in Vojvodina, and Stara Gradiska in Bosnia. Others were subjected to administrative punishment or petty harassment. The Soviet Union formed the orthodox Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) in exile in 1948 to rally Tito's opponents and to topple him. An estimated 200 to 300 Yugoslav "Cominformists" took up residence in Moscow. The YPA was an important target of their anti-Tito propaganda. The CPY held meetings outside the Soviet Union and clandestine party congresses inside Yugoslavia. During this time, Yugoslav internal security forces exercised great power and directed much of it at the army. Security agents exposed many real or suspected Soviet operatives in high positions in the army, and some of those accused were executed. The resulting bitterness and rivalry between the internal security forces and the army survived for decades afterward.

In 1966 a major purge of the Yugoslav internal security forces benefited the military in this rivalry. The de facto chief of the Department of State Security, or secret police (Uprava drzavne bezbednosti--UDB), Aleksandar Rankovic, was involved in the behind-the scenes struggle to succeed Tito. Allegedly on orders from Rankovic, the UDB covertly monitored the telephone calls of all major party leaders, including Tito. When Rankovi was finally dismissed, however, the official announcement mentioned only his responsibility for UDB brutality and repression of Kosovo's Albanian population. The military equivalent of the UDB, the Military Counterintelligence Service (Kontraobavesajna Sluzba--KOS) was instrumental in exposing UDB activities. The UDB was purged, its name was changed to State Security Service (Sluzba drzavne bezbednosti--SDB), and a YPA colonel general became its chief. In its new form the agency retained substantial secret police powers. The army maintained some control over the civilian security service since the 1966 purge. After the Croatian nationalist unrest of 1971, a colonel general became federal secretary for internal affairs (the secretariat controlling the SDB), and another became federal public prosecutor. Using such appointments, the military controlled the internal security forces until 1984. In 1990 a former chief of the YPA general staff was federal secretary for internal affairs.

During the 1980s, the SDB actively pursued its mission of identifying and neutralizing émigré organizations in foreign countries to inhibit their efforts to establish contacts and support inside Yugoslavia. A small number of émigré groups of various political persuasions and nationalities committed violent acts against Yugoslav interests abroad. Those acts sometimes included assassinations of Yugoslav diplomats or representatives abroad. Special attention went to pro-Soviet Yugoslav exiles, whose activities against the Yugoslav government were well supported by Soviet funds. Believing that such groups threatened public order, the SDB and its clandestine foreign intelligence units used various means to counter their activities. The SDB monitored the activities of the pro-Soviet CPY in Yugoslavia and other countries. In 1974 thirty-two Montenegrins convicted of organizing a CPY congress received prison terms of up to fourteen years. A long investigation of this case ended in the arrest of a Soviet diplomat in 1976.Another major task of the Yugoslav SDB was to monitor Croatian organizations in Austria, Sweden, France, West Germany, Canada, and the United States. Surveillance of those groups provided evidence for prosecuting Yugoslavs who contacted them when abroad and then returned home. The SDB reportedly abducted and assassinated prominent émigrés. A former YPA colonel who escaped imprisonment as an alleged "Cominformist" in 1948 was seized in Romania in 1976, clandestinely returned to Yugoslavia, and jailed. As many as twenty troublesome émigrés may have been killed in Europe by the SDB, other Yugoslav operatives, or their paid agents since the early 1970s. In 1981 two West Germans and one Yugoslav were convicted for murdering an émigré in West Germany. They were allegedly paid a large sum to kill a former SDB agent who defected from the security service while abroad. However, the Yugoslav government contended that most violence against emigres was committed by rival émigré organizations, not by the SDB.The SDB was responsible for identifying and neutralizing subversive elements regarded as threats to the constitutional order and the socialist self-management system. Both violent groups and peaceful dissidents were included in this broad category. Plainclothes SDB agents investigated and monitored such groups and infiltrated their ranks. One of the SDB's most effective weapons was the concept of social self-protection. It was the equivalent of the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) in internal security matters. Article 173 of the Constitution declared the duty of all citizens to participate in social self-protection by reporting immediately to the SDB their knowledge of "hostile activities" including ordinary crime, political offenses, and terrorism.

The State Security Service functioned as a unified service on the level of Yugoslavia, and until Tito's death the service enjoyed clear autonomy on the republican level. The last Federal State Security Chief in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was Zdravko Mustac. At the beginning of the Kosovo crisis in the late 1980s republican autonomy was reduced, and the Yugoslav SDB gave preference to curtailing republican competences and strengthening control in Serbia. When the war broke out in Croatia in 1991, the SDB of the Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] severed all contacts with the Serbian SDB and the SDB of the Federal SUP [Secretariat for Internal Affairs]. The Federal State Security Service has not operationally existed since the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and that it has existed only on paper, especially since the Interior Ministry of Serbia moved into the federal service's office building. Currently the State Security Service is engaged in intelligence and counter-intelligence activities. It is divided into departments for domestic problems and for extremists, analytical services, the technical service (bugging, filming, etc.), and a personnel department. It has agents who are recruited when necessary and paid for their work, including people inclined to crime but not necessarily criminals. The SDB's budget is top secret, and money partly comes from the Interior Ministry's budget, along with secret funds and other money that comes from goods seized by customs and fines for violations of customs regulations. The SDB also has legal export companies which also cooperate with some banks.

The State Security Service is responsible for protecting Slobodan Milosevic. Senta Milenkovic, the Serbian president's bodyguard, moved from the special unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to State Security in 1992. The Serbian secret service division is also in charge of the safety of President Milosevic's family. After the experience of March 1991, when mass demonstrations nearly toppled the regime, and other smaller clashes in more recent years, the SBD decided to take preventive action, infiltrating these special agents into all the structures of the university and all the gathering places of people that are potentially politically dangerous in crisis situations. Their intent was not only gather information, but also focus the crowd in a direction that the regime can control. They are responsible for "programmed provocations" such as battering official buildings with eggs rather than rocks. These "state provocateurs" also write prescribed graffiti on facades, distribute preprinted leaflets with content concocted by the police, spread rumors, and incite violence. All important telephone lines and interesting installations dangerous to the regime are eavesdropped on, including key departments in the SBD's own ranks. Through tapping mobile-phone connections, and especially through private radio stations, the secret police monitor the activities of students' leaders and the Serbian nouveaux riches. Using secret video cameras and photographs, the children of anti-regime figures under surveillance are also monitored.

The SDB has the top English wiretapping system 2001 at its disposal, imported in the time of Ante Markovic [1990]. This system can program the recording to be triggered by a certain key word (for example "party," "state," "opposition, and so on), and its capacity is around 40,000 recorded conversations in one minute. For the needs of "direct" wiretapping, a special squad is always on hand in the building of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs in Kneza Milosa Street. Around 20 clerks, mostly middle-aged women, wearing earphones, diligently record every word of "interlocutors" in whom the police have an interest. The SBD also tries to obstruct the British monitoring installation at the Turdos base on Cyprus with devices placed in Kaludjerica near Belgrade and Ivanjica in Sumadija. Those devices are produced in Russia, and some are even from the EI Nis local electronics factory] and the institute Mihajlo Pupin. However, technologically they SBD equipment is far behind that of the Western intelligence services. This includes the Western equipment bought in 1996 and 1997 -- 3,000 sets of sophisticated electronic equipment for the wiretapping of telephone and radio signals and mobile telephones.

The Ministry of Interior conducts the State administration of the Internal Affairs. In the Republic of Serbia, Ministries conduct the State administration that is stipulated by laws and regulations. The Ministries enforce laws, regulations and general acts of the National Assembly and the Government as well as the general acts of the President. The Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was established in 1918 as the supreme authority and control power with the Department of State Security, Department of Public Security, Administration Department and the Department of Self-management. The Department of Public Security dealt with the safeguard of lives and property, crime prevention, traffic control, gendarmerie, advanced training and disciplinary control of police work. On 13 May 1944 the decision was made on establishing the Department for protection of people (ONZ), the day that is celebrated as the Serbian police holiday. Prior to the breakup of Yugoslavia, the State Security Service (an intelligence and secret police organization) monitored émigrés and domestic dissidents. The People's Militia troops (15,000) used to quell domestic disorders beyond control of regular police. And the Militia (regular police, 40,000) were used for routine law enforcement. The federal secretariat also controlled 15,000 troops in border guard units. In coastal areas, the border guards operated sixteen patrol boats in 1990.The secretariats for internal affairs in the republics and autonomous provinces controlled the militia (regular police) forces in their territory. In 1990 there were an estimated 40,000 professional law enforcement officers. They were responsible for maintaining government communications, issuing travel documents to citizens, and registering foreign residents. The average militia officer was male, twenty-two years of age, and had completed his secondary education in special schools operated by the federal secretariat for internal affairs. Select militia officers were later sent for a university education.

The militia were organized into stations and substations in larger cities. They were involved in routine law enforcement as well as more sensitive cases involving ethnic groups. Cases ranged from physical attacks and harassment to homicide. In Pristina, site of a major university and a centre of Albanian ethnic dissidence, every confrontation with authority had the potential to erupt into large disturbances between ethnic communities. In 1990 that city had seven militia stations and four substations, serving a population of 400,000. With the proclamation of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia in 1990, adjustments were made sphere of internal affairs and the new structure of today's organization of the Ministry of Interior was established. Serbia is a republic with a large number of police forces. As of 1995 the Serbian police had some 80,000 regular members and many more if the reserves are raised. In 1996 it was estimated that the heavily armed police force consisted of over 100,000 members responsible for internal security. And in 1997 it was reported that there were some 48,000 policemen in uniform, and that there were between 60,000 to 100,000 MUP members, although the latter number was regarded as probably exaggerated. According to daily newspapers, Serbia's MUP costs $6 billion, which is a large sum, since the Yugoslav Army budget is only $1 billion. The police are better supplied and paid than the Yugoslav Army, and are equipped with 150 armoured personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles and 170 mortars. The total number of police deployed to Kosovo and Metohija is guarded as a state secret. Sources say that some 12,000 uniformed police are stationed in Kosovo, and according to some claims, another 10,000 plain-clothes policemen should be added to this number, as well as state security members. This figure constantly varies as reinforcements are regularly sent to Kosovo, so that it could be estimated that the police strength in Kosovo stands at some 30,000 to 40,000. Keeping such a large number of policemen in Kosovo represents a substantial item in the MUP's budget and, according to some estimates it equals the total budget for the entire Belgrade police force.

The Federal Criminal Code of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia still remains in force. Considerable confusion and room for abuse remain in the legal system because the 1990 Constitution of Serbia has not yet been brought into conformity with the 1992 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Federal law gives republic ministries of the interior sole control over the decision to monitor potential criminal activities, a power that is routinely abused. It is widely believed that authorities monitor opposition and dissident activity, eavesdrop on conversations, read mail, and wiretap telephones. Although illegal under provisions of Federal and Serbian law, the Federal post office registers all mail from abroad, ostensibly to protect mail carriers from charges of theft.

The Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia carries out tasks of the State Administration that are related to: protection of the Republic of Serbia and detection of subversive and destructive activities against the constitutional order; protection of lives, personal and property security; prevention and detection of criminal acts and discovery and seizure of perpetrators and bringing charges against them; maintaining law and order; protection of meetings and other gatherings of citizens; protection of certain persons and objects; traffic security and security of roads; border crossing control; control of movements and stay at the border; control of movements and stay of aliens; acquisition, holding and carrying of weapons and ammunition; Production and distribution of explosive materials, inflammable liquids and gasses; Fire protection; Citizenship; Unified registration number of citizens; Identity cards; Travellers documents; Residence and stay of citizens; Training of staff as well as other tasks defined by the law.

Federal statutes permit police to detain criminal suspects without a warrant and hold them incommunicado for up to 3 days without charging them or granting them access to an attorney. Serbian law separately provides for a 24-hour detention period. Police often combine the two for a total 4-day detention period. After this period, police must turn a suspect over to an investigative judge, who may order a 30-day extension and, under certain legal procedures, subsequent extensions of investigative detention up to 6 months. In Kosovo police often beat people without ever officially charging them and routinely hold suspects well beyond the 3-day statutory period. Police also use threats and violence against family members of suspects and have held them as hostages. According to Albanian and foreign observers, the worst abuses against ethnic Albanians take place not in big towns but in rural enclaves. Ethnic Albanians continue to suffer at the hands of security forces conducting searches for weapons and explosives. Torture and other cruel forms of punishment, which are prohibited by law, continue to be a problem, particularly in Kosovo directed against ethnic Albanians. Police routinely beat people severely when holding them in detention. The police, without following proper legal procedures, frequently extract "confessions" during interrogations that routinely include the beating of suspects' feet, hands, genital areas, and sometimes heads. The police use their fists, nightsticks, and occasionally electric shocks. Apparently confident that there would be no reprisals, and, in an attempt to intimidate the wider community, police often beat persons in front of their families. In January 1997 a new citizenship law entered into force, which, when fully implemented, is expected to affect adversely the rights of many inhabitants, including those born in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, refugees, and citizens who had migrated to other countries to work or seek asylum. The new law gives the Ministry of Interior almost complete control over the granting of citizenship. The Government served notice that it plans to limit severely the granting of citizenship to refugees from the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia.

Special Force Police / Specijalnih Jedinica Policije [SJP] / Special Purpose Police Units (JPNP)

The former Yugoslav Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs controlled a federal paramilitary force, the People's Militia, which numbered more than 15,000 troops. This force operated numerous BOV-M armoured vehicles equipped with machine guns, water cannons, smoke and tear gas launchers for crowd control and riot situations, armoured personnel carriers, and helicopters. These internal security troops were well paid, heavily indoctrinated, experienced, and reliable. They could be deployed in times of political unrest or disorder when the local police were expected to side with the populace against federal authorities. The People's Militia provided security for the 1984 Winter Olympics in Sarajevo. Currently the Special Force Police are divided into battalions and brigades. Every region in Serbia has its own Special Force Police brigade, and Special police units are stationed in several barracks in Serbia [for instance in Kula]. The Belgrade Special Police Brigade stationed in the former Yugoslav People's Army barracks in Volgina Street in Zvezdara, a Belgrade suburb. Special forces are known in Belgrade as Grmija 1 (a vacation area near Pristina) and Grmija 2. These police forces have armoured-mechanized units, and artillery and rocket units with multiple rocket launchers (at the "13 Maj" Police Station). Police forces have anti-aircraft guns, too, and 14 armoured vehicles (wheeled and amphibians equipped with 14.5mm anti-aircraft guns), which were ready for action at the end of June 1997. It is estimated that there are a total of around 7,000 men in the Special Police Forces, but their numbers can quickly be expanded by recruiting new men from the regular police force. Special Police officers differ from the regular police in that their training is conducted every day and is more physically demanding and includes martial arts.

These Ministry of Internal Affairs Special forces are known as "red berets" which is especially insulting for the military "red berets" of the Special Forces Corps. The term "Red Berets" also applies [confusingly] to veterans of the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina who have ad-hoc limited-term contracts with the Ministry of Internal Affairs for special risk missions. These contract employees are also engaged as security agents for various agencies or as personal guards for important officials. It is claimed that these forces participated in the election rigging (for Martic) in Krajina, and that there are war criminals among them. As the Serbian side found itself losing more and more in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, an increasing number of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs policemen were placed on temporary duty there in order to help. First they went there discreetly, with false names, their operations were fully covered and they were paid well, but in the end, in the summer of 1995, they were leaving openly in large groups. The war waged over recent years on the territory of the former Yugoslavia showed the importance of special units. This was the impetus for the establishment of the so-called special brigade in Serbia, whose members later became known as "Red Berets." The red berets were worn only during marches, not during clashes, since the bright red colour would have given away a soldier's position. Good-quality equipment purchased in the West was characteristic of these were volunteer units, especially boots, costing over $200 per pair, which could endure long marches. State Security Officer Franko "Frenki" Simatovic is the commander of the Special Forces of State Security of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs. The "Red Berets" led by Simatovic and Raja Bozovic appeared in all stages of the war in the territory of former Yugoslavia, on various battlefields from Knin to Bihac. Vojislav Seselj's White Eagle and Arkan's SDG had operated jointly with the Red Berets from Serbia's Security Service when Zvornik was seized in 1992 and its population cleansed. Serbian police and Vojislav Seselj's forces also operated together in the Skelane area of eastern Bosnia, under the command of Obrad Stefanovic, Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs, and under that of his deputy, Simatovic.

During the campaign against Croatia in Western Slavonia, according to some claims Milosevic personally prevented the use of the Luna missiles installed on Mt. Petrova Gora, via orders to Simatovic's Red Berets formations. In March 1995 Ivica Vuletic, a Serb national, was placed on trial on charges of torturing and liquidating Croatian wounded and civilians in Aljmas, Bijelo Brdo, Sarvas, and Vukovar, killing more than 50 people, in the fall of 1991, as a member of the "Red Berets" special-purpose volunteer paramilitary units. Special Force Police are the mainstay of Serbian operations in Kosovo, and are equipped with armoured vehicles supported by helicopters and heavy weapons. The Special Force Police and other MUP formations have some 20,000 members permanently stationed in Kosovo, a number that could quickly be doubled by the deployment of officers from other locales. The Contact Group, made up of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia, has demanded the unconditional withdrawal of Serbian special police forces and Yugoslav Army forces from Kosovo. But Milosevic has not been prepared to meet these demands, since this would create conditions in which the KLA could easily take over Kosovo and proclaim independence. As of mid-1998 several hundred policemen from the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs have refused to obey orders to go to Kosovo and enter the clashes with the Kosovo Liberation Army. Of these, some have resigned, and others have been suspended and disciplinary procedures started against them.

The "special brigade" of the Bosnian Serb police is a special purpose military formation, which means it is prepared for both peace and war conditions. The unit consists of nine detachments [odred] deployed evenly throughout the state, from Prijedor to Trebinje. This Special Brigade of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republika Srpska [RS] is the "second echelon" of former Republika Srpska President Radovan Karadzic"s security, in addition to Karadzic's personal bodyguards. The brigade was founded in 1991 with special agents of the then-Bosnia-Herzegovina Police, and its first action was at Vraca. Its first commander was the current head of the Department of Public Security of the RS MUP, Milenko Karisik, but he was soon replaced by Goran Saric Sara, who remains in that position. Saric is regarded as one of the "legendary commanders" in the Republika Srpska, because his unit participated in most of the most important battles during the war. The unit was among the few units in the RS who did not bear the working title "drunk Chetniks." Unlike the majority of the detachments formed during the war, they were disciplined, and Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan said that only they could measure up to his Serb Volunteer Guard. In some of the fighting those two units acted together. As of late 1995 the majority of the units were still on the front lines in Krajina. The unit's school in the Interior Ministry and training centres instructors produce personnel for our units, except for active army service, where the training is normal and performed by interior ministry specialists and instructors. The new members of the special unit go through a short period of adjustment immediately followed by combat tasks. The brigade is equipped with state-of-the-art weapons, ranging from artillery pieces to night-vision technology.

The Special Antiterrorist Force [Specijalna Antiteroristicka Jedinica - SAJ], are elite police formations for combat in crisis situations, created in 1995. They were originally stationed at Belgrade Airport and their commander was Radovan Stojcic Badza. Later they were relocated to Batajnica Airport and their new commander was Zoran Simovic Tutinac. The entire SAJ is under the command of General Obrad Stevanovic, Commander of the Serbian Special Police Forces. There are two SAJ units, one in Vojvodina, the other in Kosovo. Originally, the SAJ numbered about 200 men, but their numbers have been steadily increasing, with the total number of these police forces approaching 500 men. Among the many training grounds, they use the Paklenik training centre in Goc, where there is a model town in which they practice fighting in an urban environment. The SAJ is equipped with helicopters of the US Jet Ranger and Long Ranger types. Unlike the special units of the Yugoslav Army, the special unit from Batajnica uses automatic guns of the Heckler-Koch MP-5 type in various 9-mm-caliber versions and Heckler-Koch G-3 SSG sniper rifles (they have already been used for 17 years), calibre 7.62-mm X51 (NATO calibre). They have the support of helicopter units whenever necessary. The SAJ uses several kinds of uniforms for operations in urban, field, and night situations. For semi-war operations they use black uniforms with black head masks with apertures for the eyes. The operation of destroying the KLA concentration in Donji Prekaz took several days. In addition to the SAJ, this operation included Special Police forces. The special police anti-terrorist units, after destroying a KLA force in the village of Donje Prekaze on 05 March 1998, were redeployed with their equipment and materiel back to their permanent base outside the area

The Special Police Unit (PJM) is made up of the home OUPs (organs of internal affairs) police located in every municipality in Belgrade, and of personnel recruited from the ranks of the traffic police. They work together with members of the Special Antiterrorist Unit (SAJ). The assignments of the PJM include intervention in demonstrations and they also provide security for all types of public gatherings. The PJM have been deployed to protect institutions of state importance: the Federal, Republic, and City Assemblies, the Serbian Presidency, the RTS [Serbian Radio and Television] building, Radio Belgrade , and the POLITIKA building. The PJM's participate in all actions to disperse demonstrators, including those on 1 June 1993 and 9 March 1991. The February 1997 operation against demonstrators in the center of Belgrade, in which 5,000 policemen participated, was carried out by special police units of the Serbian MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] with the cooperation of the Intervention Brigade of the Belgrade SUP [Secretariat for Internal Affairs]. Their members, primarily squads from Kosovo, were also involved in the Bosnian war, and at that time they and the "Red Berets" were under the unified command of a high-ranking functionary with the Serbian secret service, Franko Simatovic Frenki [commander of the special forces of the SDB - State Security Service]. Kosovo is one of their priority deployment areas. When the situation in the Drenica area became complicated, a 700-strong special unit brigade was sent to Kosovo. They get per diems while they are in Kosovo. Members of the PJM train several times a year, whenever necessary. There is one exercise, and all the rest is drill. Usually they practice setting up crowd control cordons. This does not apply to demonstrations alone; they also train the same way for soccer games and for guarding important people. Cordons are not intended for use of physical strength or repression so long as its members are not threatened. While the average salary of a uniformed policemen is 1,700 dinars, the salary in special units is somewhat higher at 2,100 dinars on average. As of early 1997 the commander of all special police units (PJMs) was Major General Obrad Stevanovic. Gen. Stevanovic is one of Radovan Stojicic's closest associates and the only general in the Serbian MUP who completed Military Academy. During his police career, he has been both a patrolman and an inspector, and is also one of the coauthors of the book "Civil Unrest," which is used as a textbook by Police Academy cadets

During the war in Bosnian the White Eagles paramilitary formation, Zeljko Raznatovic [better known as Arkan] organized a private army, the Serb Volunteer Guard [SDG / SSJ] "Tigers" in 1992. Arkan's men were in the beginning incorporated in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the Krajina police owns the training center in Erdut in eastern Slavonia which was Arkan's main operating location) but with time they became a special unit with the Srem-Baranja corps. Arkan organized the SDG paramilitary forces first in Croatia and then in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, as such, committed many crimes. Arkan was the author of massacres in 1991 in Eastern Slavonia, and of a campaign of "ethnic cleansing" in the eastern area of Bosnia against Bosnian Moslems. Some 1400 Bosniaks were killed in various ways Foca [Srbinje], starting on 6 April 1992 with the arrival of Arkan"s and other paramilitary groups. During their expeditions in the area all Muslim villages and the city suburbs in which mostly Bosniaks lived were burned to the ground. At the end of May 1992 these paramilitary units withdrew from the area, and following the withdrawal from western Bosnia, the SDG has been stationed in Erdut. According to estimates of the Serbian Helsinki Committee, about 20,000 refugees from Krajina went through Arkan's camp in Erdut in the fall of 1995, after being arrested and taken there by the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs [MUP]. Arkan's forces withdrew from Erdut in April 1996. The process of liquidating those close to Arkan began soon thereafter, as the Serbian State Security Service began actions against the criminals who used to work for it, but are now only unpleasant witnesses to crimes. Aleksandar Knezevic, Bojan Banovic, Bane Grebenarevic, Zoran Dimitrov-Zuca, and Nebojsa Djordjevic, who was a pensioned-off "colonel" of Arkan's "Serb Volunteer Guard," were all involved in the recruitment of volunteers for paramilitary formations (predominantly from among the criminals, prisons, and poor parts of the country). They were all killed very professionally within a very short period of time. But Arkan was not on in the public list of 75 war crimes indictments issued by The Hague in 1996. In mid-1997, prompted by UN war crimes expert Serif Bajsuni's accusations in CNN's program "Wanted" that Interpol has seven warrants for Arkan, Interpol confirmed that Arkan was the subject of an international arrest warrant charging him with genocide.

Arkan, also wanted for robbery offences by several European police forces, led a high profile life in Yugoslavia, and was married to a glamorous folk singer, Ceca. In May 1998 Arkan was re-elected chairman of the Party of Serbian Unity (SSJ) for four years by the unanimous vote of the SSJ Assembly. In elections, the Kosovo Serbs chose Arkan as their parliamentary representative. He enriched himself from the spoils of these operations, and his holdings include at casino in Hotel Jugoslavija, and another two companies, one a transport company and the other a radio station. In January 1998 unconfirmed reports placed paramilitary forces led by Zeljko Raznatovic-Arkan and Captain Dragan in the Skenderaj [Srbica] county in Drenice, Kosovo. But Party of Serbian Unity (SSJ) Deputy Chairman Borislav Pelevic stated on 07 February 1998 that the Serbian Voluntary Guard and its commander Zeljko Raznatovic-Arkan was not in Kosovo. Pelevic also said that, if the need arose, the guard would be able to immediately mobilize 3,000 men. On 15 January 2000 assassins killed notorious Serb paramilitary leader and war crimes suspect Zeljko "Arkan" Raznatovic in a Belgrade hotel. Political opponents of Yugoslav President Milosevic said they thought Arkan's killers, who fired at least 38 bullets at close range in the hotel lobby on Saturday afternoon, would never be identified. A paramilitary who struck fear into hearts across the Balkans, Arkan was also a convicted bank robber and a former politician believed to have once had close ties to Milosevic's ruling circle. A surgeon from the city's Emergency Center said he had been hit at least three times in the face and was dead on arrival at the center. "He was hit in the mouth, eye and temple. "Arkan," had been indicted by the ICTY in 1997 in connection with incidents that occurred in Bosnia and the Eastern Slavonia region of Croatia between 1991 and 1995. British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook said he was not surprised that Arkan had died violently. "I regret his death because it prevents us doing justice to the victims of his atrocities by seeing him in the dock at the Hague tribunal," he said in London. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said in a statement during a visit to Panama: "We take no satisfaction in Arkan's murder and would have wanted him to stand trial in The Hague for his crimes." A week after the slaying of Serb warlord Arkan, police announced the arrests of three suspects Saturday and implied that the killing was probably a gangland hit, not a political move to keep the victim quiet about Yugoslav war crimes. The announcement followed widespread rumors that President Slobodan Milosevic’s security services had killed Arkan, because the warlord knew too much about high-level government involvement. Opposition groups questioned why this case was solved so quickly while others have remained unsolved for years and called on authorities to find out who ordered the killing and what the motives were.

Slobodan Miljkovic [called Luger as in the gun) was murdered in Kragujevac on 07 August 1998 by an employee of the Serbian interior ministry, Branislav Lukovic. Miljkovic was accused before the Hague tribunal for crimes committed in Bosanski Samac in 1992. Miljkovic was the deputy commander of the 2d Posavina brigade, a paramilitary unit from Serbia also known as Sivi Vukovi [the Gray Wolves] equipped by the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Miljkovic received the nickname Lugar after returning from the front, where his unit was registered with the Serbian Interior Ministry under the code named Lugar. Terror and crimes in the region of Bosanski Samac were, according to the indictment, part of a wide and systematic campaign against the civilian population in that municipality, which, according to the 1991 census, had 33,000 inhabitants, of which 17,000 were Croats and Muslims. In 1995 less than 300 of them were still there. The killing prompted speculation that the Serbian state security service had started to liquidate people who could testify regarding the activities of the Serb authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war. Miljkovic's attorney, Tatomir Lekovic, said that the murder of Miljkovic "was one more in a series of murders, individual liquidations which are carried out in the organization and under the watchful eye of the Serbian Interior Ministry and the state security service, in order to eliminate proof of the involvement of (Yugoslav president) Slobodan Milosevic and his services in the war in Bosnia."

The White Eagles were armed paramilitary formations, under the command of the Serb neofascist Vojislav Seselj, who were equipped by the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs during the war in Bosnian. Serbian Radical Party [SRS] Chairman Vojislav Seselj [who was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in April 1998] was the leader of these para-military groups, which reportedly were involved in war crimes committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to the Society for Endangered Peoples based in the Germany. Seselj, as leader of these Serbian paramilitary formations, reportedly took part in ethnic cleansing, mass tortures, and killings carried out in 34 municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Seselj's paramilitary units reportedly took part in mass killings in Bratunac, Brcko, Prijedor, Visegrad, Zvornik, and Bijeljina. Seselj's followers also ran Sonja detention camp in Vogosca. Since 1995 the Serbian State Security Service has been conducting a campaign against the criminals who used to work for it, but are now only unpleasant witnesses to crimes. The body of "White Eagle" Miodrag Djordjic-Johnny from Kragujevac, who in 1996 informed foreign media about the role of Radmilo Bogdanovic and SDB in supplying paramilitary formations, was pulled out of the Morava River in September 1996. He drowned after someone shot him with a 9 mm gun in the head while he was fishing. In late October 1996 Dragoslav Bokan, a leader of the "White Eagle," was arrested in connection with a robbery which took place four years previously.