Japan is a major world economic and political power, with an aggressive military tradition, resisting the development of strong armed forces. A military proscription is included as Article 9 of the 1947 constitution stating, "The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes." That article, along with the rest of the "Peace Constitution," retains strong government and citizen support and is interpreted as permitting the Self-Defence Forces (SDF), but prohibiting those forces from possessing nuclear weapons or other offensive arms or being deployed outside of Japan. The Defence Agency and the SDF both comprise the same defence organization. However the term Defence Agency is used to denote an administrative organization responsible for the management, operation, etc., of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, while the term SDF is used to mean armed organizations that conduct unit activities for the defence of the nation and for other purposes. The SDF are under control of the civilian Defence Agency, subordinate to the prime minister. Although highly trained and fully qualified to perform the limited missions assigned to them, the SDF are small, understaffed, and under equipped for more extensive military operations. Its activities are confined to disaster relief and limited UN peacekeeping efforts. Following World War II Japan’s Imperial Army and Navy were dissolved, and the old regime was replaced with a democratic government. Article 9 of the new Constitution of Japan renounced war or even possessing combat potential. However, the Cold War and the Korean War forced Japan to re-establish defensive capabilities. A constitutional interpretation of Article 9 grants Japan the inherent right of self-defence and the possession of the minimum armed strength needed to exercise that right. Having renounced war, the possession of war potential, the right of belligerency, and the possession of nuclear weaponry, Japan held the view that it should possess only the minimum defence necessary to face external threats. Within those limits, the Self-Defence Forces Law of 1954 provides the basis from which various formulations of SDF missions have been derived. The law states that ground, maritime, and air forces are to preserve the peace and independence of the nation and to maintain national security by conducting operations on land, at sea, and in the air to defend the nation against direct and indirect aggression.

To avoid the appearance of a revival of militarism, Japan's leaders emphasized constitutional guarantees of civilian control of the government and armed forces and used non-military terms for the organization and functions of the forces. The overall organization was called the Defence Agency rather than the Ministry of Defence. The armed forces were designated the Ground Self-Defence Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF), and the Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF), instead of the army, navy, and air force. Based on the Self-Defence Forces Law of 1954, the nation's defence establishment is organized to ensure civilian control of the armed forces. The result has been a unique military system. All SDF personnel are technically civilians: those in uniform are classified as special civil servants and are subordinate to the ordinary civil servants who run the Defence Agency. There is no military secrets law, and offences committed by military personnel whether on base or off base, on duty or off duty, of military or non-military nature are all adjudicated under normal procedures by civil courts in appropriate jurisdictions. The general framework through which these missions are to be accomplished is set forth in the Basic Policy for National Defence adopted by the cabinet in 1957; it remains in force. According to this document, the nation's security would be achieved by supporting the United Nations (UN) and promoting international cooperation, by stabilizing domestic affairs and enhancing public welfare, by gradually developing an effective self-defence capability, and by dealing with external aggression on the basis of Japan-United States security arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the UN. Japan's national defence policy has been based on maintaining the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the United States, under which Japan assumed unilateral responsibility for its own internal security and the United States agreed to join in Japan's defence in the event that Japan or its territories were attacked. Although the size and capability of the SDF have always limited their role, until 1976 defence planning focused on developing forces adequate to deal with the conventional capabilities of potential regional adversaries. Beginning in 1976, government policy held that the SDF would be developed only to repel a small-scale, limited invasion and that the nation would depend on the United States to come to its aid in the event of a more serious incursion. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the build-up of military forces in the Soviet Far East, including a group of islands to the north of Hokkaido, which were occupied by the Soviet Union but claimed by Japan, led Japan to develop a program to modernize and improve the SDF in the 1980s, especially in air defence and antisubmarine warfare. In the early 1990s, the government was revaluating its security policy based on reduced East-West tensions.

The very general terms in which military missions are couched left specifics open to wide interpretation and prompted the criticism that the nation did not possess a military strategy. In the 1976 National Defence Program Outline, the cabinet sought to define missions more specifically by setting guidelines for the nation's readiness, including specific criteria for the maintenance and operation of the SDF. Under these guidelines, in cases of limited and small-scale attack, Japanese forces would respond promptly to control the situation. If enemy forces attacked in greater strength than Japan could counter alone, the SDF would engage the attacker until the United States could come to its aid. Against nuclear threat, Japan would rely on the nuclear deterrence of the United States. To accomplish its missions, the SDF would maintain surveillance, be prepared to respond to direct and indirect attacks, be capable of providing command, communication, logistics, and training support, and be available to aid in disaster relief. The outline specified quotas of personnel and equipment for each force that were deemed necessary to meet its tasks. Particular elements of each force's mission were also identified. The GSDF was to defend against ground invasion and threats to internal security, be able to deploy to any part of the nation, and protect the bases of all three services of the Self-Defence Forces. The MSDF was to meet invasion by sea, sweep mines, patrol and survey the surrounding waters, and guard and defend coastal waters, ports, bays, and major straits. The ASDF was to render aircraft and missile interceptor capability, provide support fighter units for maritime and ground operations, supply air reconnaissance and air transport for all forces, and maintain airborne and stationary early warning units.

The Mid-Term Defence Estimate for FY 1986 through FY 1990 envisioned a modernized SDF with an expanded role. While maintaining Japan-United States security arrangements and the exclusively defensive policy mandated by the constitution, this program undertook moderate improvements in Japanese defence capabilities. Among its specific objectives were bettering air defence by improving and modernizing interceptor-fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles, improving antisubmarine warfare capability with additional destroyers and fixed-wing antisubmarine patrol aircraft, and upgrading intelligence, reconnaissance, and command, control, and communications. Most of the goals of this program were met, and the goals of the Mid-Term Defence Estimate for FY 1991 through FY 1995, although building on the early program, were considerably scaled back. The SDF disaster relief role is defined in Article 83 of the Self-Defence Forces Law of 1954, requiring units to respond to calls for assistance from prefectural governors to aid in fire fighting, earthquake disasters, searches for missing persons, rescues, and reinforcement of embankments and levees in the event of flooding. The SDF has not been used in police actions, nor is it likely to be assigned any internal security tasks in the future. In June 1992, the National Diet passed a UN Peacekeeping Cooperation Law which permitted the SDF to participate in UN medical, refugee aid, transportation, infrastructure repair, election-monitoring, and policing operations under strictly limited conditions. This law was used in 1992- 93 to authorize the deployment of 600 SDF and seventy-five police personnel for UN engineering and election-monitoring projects in Cambodia and again in the spring of 1993 to send fifty-three persons to participate in peacekeeping operations in Mozambique. The Defence Agency, aware that it could not accomplish its programs without popular support, paid close attention to public opinion. Although the Japanese people retained a lingering suspicion of the armed services, in the late 1980s antimilitarism had moderated, compared with its form in the early 1950s when the SDF was established. At that time, fresh from the terrible defeat of World War II, most people had ceased to believe that the military could maintain peace or serve the national interest. By the mid-1970s, memories of World War II had faded, and a growing number of people believed that Japan's military and diplomatic roles should reflect its rapidly growing economic strength. At the same time, United States-Soviet strategic contention in the area around Japan had increased. In 1976 Defence Agency director general Sakata Michita called upon the cabinet to adopt the National Defence Program Outline to improve the quality of the armed forces and more clearly define their strictly defensive role. For this program to gain acceptance, Sakata had to agree to a ceiling on military expenditures of 1 percent of the gross national product and a prohibition on exporting weapons and military technology. The outline was adopted by the cabinet and, according to public opinion polls, was approved by approximately 60 percent of the people. Throughout the remainder of the 1970s and into the 1980s, the quality of the SDF improved and public approval of the improved forces went up.

In November 1982, when the Defence Agency's former director general, Nakasone Yasuhiro, became prime minister, he was under strong pressure from the United States and other Western nations to move toward a more assertive defence policy in line with Japan's status as a major world economic and political power. Strong antimilitarist sentiment remained in Japanese public opinion, however, especially in the opposition parties. Nakasone chose a compromise solution, gradually building up the SDF and steadily increasing defence spending while guarding against being drawn beyond self-defence into collective security. In 1985 he developed the Mid-Term Defence Estimate. Although that program had general public backing, its goals could not be met while retaining the ceiling of 1 percent of GNP on military spending, which still had strong public support. At first the government tried to get around the problem by deferring payment, budgeting only the initial costs of major military hardware. But by late 1986, it had become obvious that the 1 percent ceiling had to be superseded. Thus, on January 24, 1987, in an extraordinary night meeting, the cabinet abandoned this ceiling. A March 1987 Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo] poll indicated that this move was made in defiance of public opinion: only 15 percent approved the removal of the ceiling and 61 percent disapproved. But a January 1988 poll conducted by the Office of the Prime Minister reported that 58 percent approved the defence budget of 1.004 percent of GNP for fiscal year 1987. During 1987 the Japanese government reviewed ways in which it could assist friendly forces in protecting shipping in the Persian Gulf. Several possibilities were seriously considered, including sending minesweepers to the gulf. But, in the end, the government determined that sending any military forces to the gulf would be unacceptable to the Japanese people. Instead, the Japanese government agreed to fund the installation of radio navigation guides for gulf shipping.

Appreciation of the SDF continued to grow in the 1980s, with over half of the respondents in a 1988 survey voicing an interest in the SDF and over 76 percent indicating that they were favourably impressed. Although the majority (63.5 percent) of respondents were aware that the primary purpose of the SDF was maintenance of national security, an even greater number (77 percent) saw disaster relief as the most useful SDF function. The SDF therefore continued to devote much of its time and resources to disaster relief and other civic action. Between 1984 and 1988, at the request of prefectural governors, the SDF assisted in approximately 3,100 disaster relief operations, involving about 138,000 personnel, 16,000 vehicles, 5,300 aircraft, and 120 ships and small craft. In addition, the SDF participated in earthquake disaster prevention operations and disposed of a large quantity of World War II explosive ordnance, especially in Okinawa. The forces also participated in public works projects, cooperated in managing athletic events, took part in annual Antarctic expeditions, and conducted aerial surveys to report on ice conditions for fishermen and on geographic formations for construction projects. Especially sensitive to maintaining harmonious relations with communities close to defence bases, the SDF built new roads, irrigation networks, and schools in those areas. Soundproofing was installed in homes and public buildings near airfields. Despite these measures, local resistance to military installations remained strong in some areas. On 24 May 1999, the Japanese Diet (parliament) passed, with partial amendments, a set of government-sponsored bills and a Japan-U.S. agreement, designed to ensure effective implementation of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation (the Guidelines legislation for short). The Guidelines legislation consists of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (the Law Ensuring Peace and Security in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan for short), which went into force on 25 August 1999; the Agreement to Amend the Acquisition and Cross- Servicing Agreement, which went into force on 25 September 1999; and the Amendment to Article 100-8 of the Self-Defence Forces Law, which went into force on 28 May 1999. The passage of the Guidelines legislation has put the final touches to the process of building a new framework of cooperation under the Japan-U.S. security arrangements after the end of the Cold War, a process that had been initiated by the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security of 1996.

With the passage of the Guidelines legislation, it has become possible for Japan to support, under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the activities of the U.S. forces in "situations in areas surrounding Japan that have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security" (situations in areas surrounding Japan), situations short of a direct armed attack on Japan. In coming years, a Japan-U.S. bilateral planning and work for building a "bilateral coordination mechanism," which are currently under way, will be carried out. Meanwhile, reactions and fears expressed by East Asian countries regarding the new framework of cooperation from the time the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security was issued and to the passage of the Guidelines legislation suggest the growing importance of promoting bilateral and multilateral security dialogue and cooperation with these countries. The Defence Agency, as part of the Office of the Prime Minister, is required by Article 66 of the constitution to be completely subordinate to civilian authority. Its head, the director general, has the rank of minister of state. He is assisted by two vice directors general (vice ministers), one parliamentary and one administrative; the Defence Facilities Administration Agency; and the internal bureaus. The highest figure in the command structure is the prime minister, who is responsible directly to the Diet. In a national emergency, the prime minister is authorized to order the various components of the SDF into action, subject to the consent of the Diet. In times of extreme emergency, that approval might be obtained after the fact. The internal bureaus, especially the Bureau of Defence Policy, Bureau of Finance, and the Bureau of Equipment, are often headed by officials from other ministries and are the main centres of power and instruments of civilian control in the Defence Agency. The Bureau of Defence Policy is responsible for drafting defence policy and programs, for determining day-to-day operational activities, and for information gathering and analysis in the SDF. The Bureau of Finance is instrumental in developing the Defence Agency budget and in establishing spending priorities for the Defence Agency and the SDF. The Bureau of Equipment, organized into subunits for each of the military services, focuses on equipment procurement. Before any major purchase is recommended to the Diet by the Defence Agency, it has to be reviewed by each of these bureaus. Below these civilian groups is the uniformed SDF. Its senior officer is the chairman of the Joint Staff Council, a body that included the chiefs of staff of the ground, maritime, and air arms of the Self-Defence Forces. Its principal functions are to advise the director general and to plan and execute joint exercises. The three branches maintain staff offices to manage operations in their branches. Although rank establishes echelons of command within the SDF, all three branches are immediately responsible to the director general and are coequal bodies with the Joint Staff Council and the three staff offices.

This structure precludes the concentration of power of the pre1945 general staffs, but it impedes interservice coordination, and there are few formal exchanges among commanders from various branches. Moreover, some dissatisfaction has been reported by high-ranking officers who feel they have little power compared with younger civilian officials in the bureaus, who most often have no military experience. To rectify this situation and to increase input by the SDF in policy matters, in the early 1980s the Joint Staff Council was enlarged to establish better lines of communication between the internal bureaus and the three staff offices. A computerized central command and communications system and various tactical command and communications systems were established, linking service and field headquarters with general headquarters at the Defence Agency and with one another. In the 1980s, efforts were also under way to facilitate a clear and efficient command policy in the event of a crisis. The government stood by the principle that military action was permitted only under civilian control, but in recognition that delay for consultation might prove dangerous, ships of the MSDF began to be armed with live torpedoes, and fighter-interceptors were allowed to carry missiles at all times. Although aircraft had long been allowed to force down intruders without waiting for permission from the prime minister, ships were still required to receive specific orders before interdicting invading vessels. The Defence Agency had recommended drawing up more complete guidelines to clarify what action SDF combat units could take in emergencies. Cooperation between the SDF and other civilian agencies in contingency planning is limited. No plans exists to ensure the support of civilian aircraft and merchant fleets in times of crisis, even though the SDF transportation capabilities are generally judged inadequate. In 1990 legislation was being studied to provide the SDF with the ability to respond in emergency situations not specifically covered by Article 76 of the Self Defence Forces Law. SDF training includes instilling a sense of mission. Personnel are provided with the scientific and technical education to operate and maintain modern equipment and with the physical training necessary to accomplish their missions. Modern equipment is gradually replacing obsolescent materiel in the SDF. In 1987 the Defence Agency replaced its communications system (which formerly had relied on telephone lines of the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) with a microwave network incorporating a three-dimensional transmission system using a communications satellite. Despite efforts to increase stocks, however, supplies of ammunition and maintenance and repair parts in 1990 remained at less than satisfactory levels. The Defence Agency relocated its main offices on 08 May 2000, leaving the entertainment district of Roppongi for a 247.3 billion yen complex on the former site of the Japanese Imperial Army's Imperial Headquarters in Ichigaya, near Shinjuku. At least 7,000 agency personnel with eight organizations e moved from the 40-year-old Minato-ku facility to the traditional Shinjuku-ku home of the military. The 23-hectare site is home to a daytime work force of 8,500. The new complex has five wings.

A-Wing is the home of the military's central nervous system, hosting the Joint Staff Council and the Staff Offices for each of the three branches of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) - Ground, Maritime and Air. The wing has 23 floors, 19 of which are above ground. The four basement floors house the central coordination centre. Atop the wing are two heliports where large helicopters can land.

B-Wing hosts the SDF's communications corps and contains a massive, 220-meter-high communications tower.

C-Wing is home to intelligence divisions. The two buildings each have eight floors and four basements.

D-Wing houses the Defence Facilities Administration Agency and the Defence Agency's Central Procurement Office.

The Bureau of Defence Policy is responsible for drafting defence policy and programs, for determining day-to-day operational activities, and for information gathering and analysis in the SDF. A research office in the DA's Bureau of Defence Policy was created in July 1998, responsible for making recommendations on security and defence policy. Although there is also a section in MOFA in charge of security policy, this new office reflected a change in the previous formula under which MOFA was in charge of policy, while the DA dealt with the operational backup. Previously, the DA was preoccupied with managing the SDF. The intent was that the DA will develop into a policymaking organ through its involvement with policy research.

Within the Bureau of Defence Policy, the First Intelligence Division in charge of domestic intelligence recently changed its name to the Intelligence Division, and the Second Division in charge of foreign intelligence changed its name to the International Planning Division.

Under the former organizational structure of the Defence Agency, intelligence-related divisions and sections were internal bureaus, such as the first and the second intelligence division, the intelligence department for each of the chiefs of staff for the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defence Forces [GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF], the Central Data Command Unit, the Joint Staff Council's Second Office, and each unit's information division. Each of these units separately mobilized communications posts, naval vessels, and airplanes to collect and analyse military intelligence pertaining to the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. Each unit was trying to collect information independently from images and published sources, as well as from its "own" officers stationed abroad. A plan to centralize intelligence-gathering activities by consolidating the intelligence departments of the three SDFs was proposed around 1988, when Seiki Nishihiro became the vice-minister. Thwarted by the lack of cooperation and subordination from the uniformed officers, centralization had to be postponed. The National Defence Program Outline which determines Japan's defence capabilities, was reviewed and newly established in December 1995. According to this review:

"Japan's defence structure must be capable of conducting warning and surveillance on a continuous basis to detect any changes in circumstances as soon as possible, so as to utilize this information for quick decision-making. It must be capable of high-level intelligence gathering and analysis, including strategic intelligence, through possession of diversified intelligence-gathering means and mechanisms, and highly able intelligence specialists. Additionally, it must possess a sophisticated command and communication capability and be able to quickly and effectively conduct integrated defence operations from a joint perspective."

In May 1996 Japan’s parliament passed a law authorizing creation of a central military intelligence agency, the first of its kind since the country’s WWII defeat. The Defence Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) collects, processes and analyses information from remote listening devices operated by Japanese defence forces in the air, on the ground and at sea, as well as satellite images, intelligence supplied by friendly countries and public information such as foreign media reports. The establishment of DIH in January 1997 was expected to enable the country to deal with the rising uncertainties of the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era. Information demand has been shifting from tactical information like movements of the Soviet Far Eastern Army to high-quality strategic information. Because the director of the headquarters can report directly to the prime minister's secretary, the risk management capability of the Prime Minister's Office will be improved. The intelligence headquarters is placed under the Joint Staff Council and is controlled by the "Defence Intelligence Committee," which consists of the permanent vice-minister, the director of the Defence Bureau, the chairman of the Joint Staff Council, and the chiefs of the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF. The committee determines the overall framework of international military intelligence to be collected, and based on this basic plan, each division of the intelligence headquarters will collect, analyse, and assess information gathered from radio waves, images, and publications. The Defence Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), the Japanese version of the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), integrates the five intelligence elements from its three services, the Japan Defence Agency (JDA) and the Joint Staff Council. Based in the new JDA headquarters in Tokyo's Ichigaya district, the organisation reports to the Joint Staff Council and is the armed forces' first fully integrated unit. At the time of its formation DIH strength was 1,580, both military and civilian, although this could rise to 2,000.

The organisation has five directorates:

The Administration / General Headquarters Division carries out administrative functions and provides logistic support.

The Planning Division is probably concerned with human intelligence collection. Over 40 SDF officers seconded from the Defence Agency to the Foreign Ministry and assigned to 33 overseas diplomatic missions as defence attaches are conducting related activities, such as collecting military information. The DIH draws on intelligence from a range of sources, including Japan's overseas defence attaché network and foreign intelligence organisations. While intelligence liaison is an important part of the Japan-US alliance, the DIH plans to develop bilateral relationships with a broader range of partners, although actively exchanging intelligence with other countries has only just started. The Imagery Division has 50 staff members. It was created by consolidating the Satellite Image Analysis Divisions of the three SDFs. It assumes a leading role in the newly created organization. For the time being, it buys images from commercial satellites in the United States, and primarily receives and analyses [visual data] at the GSDF's Central Geographical Command (in Tachikawa, Tokyo). In order to enhance the capability of analysing the information obtained by the reconnaissance satellite, Japan plans to increase the staff of the image information processing centre from the initially planned 200 to 321 people. As of late 1998 Japan only had about 30 satellite data analysts.

The Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) has 10 sections with 350 staff members, and is the largest division at the intelligence headquarters. The electronic intelligence unit at the GSDF facility in Ichigaya, with a staff of over 100, has three separate sections for monitoring North Korean communications. In addition to those working in Ichigaya, it oversees 970 staff members working at the two CDAA "elephant cages," as well as six other communications offices in Kobunato (in Niigata Prefecture), Oi (in Saitama Prefecture), Tachiarai (in Fukushima Prefecture), and Kikaijima (in Kagoshima Prefecture). Initially the SIGINT directorate provided most of intelligence collection, although in the future the Imagery Directorate would gain importance when Japan introduces its own reconnaissance satellites.

The Analysis [Assessment] Division is responsible for summarizing and assessing information, plus reports from resident defence officers in 40-some countries and information from the United States and other allies, as well as HUMINT from collaborators. It has eight sections and 120 specialists to analyse the meaning and value of information and determine the overall significance to the Defence Agency. The "Defence Secrets Registration Manual" supposedly contains crucial data on armaments and military affairs around the world. The Assessment Directorate, responsible for analysis, is intended to achieve improvement over the previous de-centralized system.

Although a large new organization was created, there has been almost no consolidation or unification of the internal bureaus or the former organizations and units under the SDFs. As the new organization was formed, the three SDFs consolidated their first and second intelligence divisions into a single intelligence division. But, only a handful of individuals from these SDFs had been transferred to the intelligence headquarters. Each SDF's intelligence division still continues to work on data analysis at the tactical level as before. The intelligence units other than the communications offices have also remained almost intact, still being kept under control of the director of each SDF

The Chosa Besshitsu (or Chobetsu), which analyses radio and other transmissions in and around Japan, was established in 1958. Chobetsu makes use of facilities built in Japan by the various arms of the NSA, including the affiliated Naval Security Group, Army Security Agency, and Air Force Intelligence operations. The Chobetsu, is part of the Self-Defence Forces, so its main focus is on military intelligence. This unit, operating under the highest level of secrecy, engages in the interception and decryption of North Korean communications. Digital pattern recognition technology is used to identify the voices of North Korean military commanders. Initially focused on the Soviet Far East, China and North Korea, the expansion of collection capabilities extended its area of interest to Taiwan, Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. By the early 1980s it was believed to operate nine signals intelligence ground stations with an estimated staff of nearly 1,000. A circularly distributed and arranged antenna (CDAA), the same model as the "elephant cage" that became famous at the communications office in Sobe in Okinawa, stands in Higashi Chitose in Hokkaido and another in Miho in Tottori Prefecture (they both belong to the GSDF). Chobetsu embarked on a major expansion in the early 1980s, and by the early 1990s operated a total of 18 or 19 ground stations with some 1,100 personnel. While under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chobetsu reported directly to the Cabinet Research Office. Although this "special intelligence unit" was organizationally attached to the GSDF, its chief had been successively assigned from the National Police Agency. Therefore, most of the collected information was reported directly to the Cabinet's Office of Intelligence. According to some accounts, Chobetsu is directed domestically at US installations and US companies in Japan, and at domestic Japanese companies.

The communications office in Tachiarai in Fukuoka Prefecture -- a detached force from the "special intelligence unit" on China-related information -- had the information on former Chinese Communist Party Vice Chairman Lin Biao's decision to defect aboard a Trident airplane and his subsequent demise due to the plane crash. Another success happened when the Korean Airlines' airplane was shot down. A detached force in Wakkanai from the special office of the second intelligence division of the GSDF's intelligence department, also known as the "special intelligence unit," was able to intercept and record the communications between the pilot of the Soviet fighter plane and the air strike control centre in Sakhalin, capturing the first-rate classified information pertaining to the incident. Through voice analysis, it even identified the name of the pilot, proving that its daily accumulation of data was useful. Japan's current intelligence system involves compiling, collating, analysing, and evaluating data from satellites, radio transmissions, and telecommunications gathered from both US and Japanese sources. Japan is a signatory to the UK-USA intelligence sharing agreement, but only at the level of a "Third Party", with substantial limitations on what information is shared and the timeliness of its delivery. And although Japan and the United States are bound by a defence alliance, this does not mean the United States is required to provide all of its reconnaissance information to Japan. This interaction with the US was illustrated when on 21 March 1998 the radio monitoring facility of the Self Defence Agency (SDA) in Tottori Prefecture detected an unidentified code transmitted from ships in the Sea of Japan. The activity of the two North Korean intelligence collection boats was detected by a US intelligence satellite. Based on this detection, an American EP-3 electronic intelligence aircraft identified the location of the two Morth Korean boats, and on 23 March Japanese SDA patrol planes found the two boats. The information from the US satellite was transmitted to DIA and CINCPAC. CINCPAC sent the information to the US base in Yokota City in Tokyo, and Japan's SDA Intelligence Office received it from the US base. The US Army Headquarter Office has three intelligence officers with liaison offices in SDA offices, and the SDA has counterpart officers at the US base in Yokota City.

The largest of the three services, the Ground Self-Defence Force (GSDF), operates under the command of the chief of the ground staff, based in the city of Ichikawa, east of Tokyo. Strategy is determined by the nation's elongated insular geography, its mountainous terrain, and the nearness of the Asian mainland. The terrain favours local defence against invasion by ground forces, but protection of the approximately 15,800-kilometer coastline of the four main islands would present unique problems in the event of a large-scale invasion. Potentially hostile aircraft and missile bases are so close that timely warning even by radar facilities might be difficult to obtain. Manoeuvre space is limited to such an extent that ground defences would have to be virtually in place at the onset of hostilities. No point of the country is more than 150 kilometres from the sea. Moreover, the straits separating Honshu from the other main islands restrict the rapid movement of troops from one island to another, even though all major islands are now connected by bridges and tunnels. Within each island, mountain barriers and narrow roads restrict troop and supply movements. The key strategic region is densely populated and highly industrialized central Honshu, particularly the area from Tokyo to Kobe. Japan has many places suited for landing operations and is geographically located close to neighbouring countries on the continent. It is expected that an aggressor will attempt to assure the safety of its landing forces by concentrating its naval and air assets to secure overwhelming combat power at the time and on the point they choose. It is extremely difficult, or practically impossible, for Japan to have enough defence capability to repel all troops of an aggressor on the sea. It would incur enormous and unbearable costs to build up such defence capability. Consequently, we need to preserve an adequate ground defence capability to destroy those aggressor troops on the ground who have succeeded in their landing operation. A robust ground defence capability to repel an aggressor, which might succeed in breaking through our maritime defence, will enable us to maintain solid defence posture required for effective deterrence against an aggression.

Intended to deter attack, repulse a small invasion, or provide a holding action until reinforced by United States armed forces, the ground element is neither equipped nor staffed to offer more than a show of conventional defence by itself. Antitank artillery, ground-to-sea firepower, and mobility were improved and surface-to- ship missiles were acquired in the Mid-Term Defence Estimate completed in FY 1990. The number of uniformed personnel is insufficient to enable an immediate shift onto emergency footing. Instead, the ratio of officers to enlisted personnel is high, requiring augmentation by reserves or volunteers in times of crisis. In 1992, however, GSDF reserve personnel, numbering 46,000, had received little professional training. Although allotted 180,000 slots for uniformed personnel, in 1992 the force was maintained at about 86 percent of that level (with approximately 156,000 personnel) because of funding constraints. The GSDF consists of one armoured division, twelve infantry divisions, one airborne brigade, two combined brigades, four training brigades, one artillery brigade with two groups, two air defence brigades with three groups, one helicopter brigade with twenty-four squadrons, and two antitank helicopter platoons. The GSDF is divided into five regional armies, each containing two to four divisions, antiaircraft artillery units, and support units. The largest, the Northern Army, is headquartered on Hokkaido, where population and geographic constraints are less limiting than elsewhere. It has four divisions and artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and engineering brigades. The North-eastern Army and the Eastern Army, headquartered in Sendai and Ichikawa, respectively, each has two divisions. The Central Army, headquartered in Itami, has three divisions in addition to a combined brigade located on Shikoku. The Western Army, with two divisions, is headquartered at Kengun and maintains a combined brigade on Okinawa. The National Defence Program Outline which determines Japan's defence capabilities, was reviewed and newly established in December 1995. Through a review of the troop structure, the Self-Defence Personnel of the GSDF was reduced from the current 180,000 to 160,000. Some units may be staffed by new Self-Defence Force Reserve Personnel (Ready Reserve Personnel) capable of being quickly mobilized and to create a high-quality and effective system, will be established by 15,000 Ready Reserve Personnel, and 145,000 Regular Personnel. A fundamental review of the troop structure, previously consisting of 13 divisions and 2 combined brigades stationed nationwide, resulted in a balanced deployment of divisions and brigades uniquely suited to the local circumstances of the area where each unit is deployed. Present 4 divisions and 2 combined brigades will be reorganized into new brigades. According to the Outline, the GSDF planned to reduce the four divisions belonging to the Northern Army (two divisions), the North-eastern Army (one division), and the Middle Army (one division) into brigade size and mobilize them, while maintaining the two divisions belonging to the Western Army as they are and turning the First Mixed Group into a brigade.

The previous Outline adopted the concept that Ground Self-Defence Force units to be deployed in peacetime should be deployed in conformity with Japan's geographical characteristics in a well-balanced way so that they can implement systematic defence operations from the outset of aggression in any part of Japan. Specifically, based on the concept that Japanese territory can be divided into 14 districts in light of Japan's geographical characteristics such as mountain ranges, rivers and straits, one division of the Ground Self-Defence Force was deployed in principle in each district while one combined brigade each was deployed in Shikoku and Okinawa. Accordingly, unit structure was of 12 divisions and two combined brigades. The new Outline sets forth the deployment of eight divisions and six brigades based on the concept that divisions are deployed in districts which are of great importance from the viewpoint of defence and brigades are deployed in districts of relative importance so that divisions and brigades are deployed in an appropriate combination. This setup continues to be the previous Outline's concept that the GSDF units are deployed in conformity with Japan's geographical and other characteristics in order to be capable of implementing rapid and effective systematic defence operations from the outset of aggression, by taking into account the characteristics of each region, such as its proximity to other countries and its political and economic importance, and thereby leaving no room for regional or functional deficiencies. Specifically, the new Outline sets forth the following deployment: Regions where divisions are deployed; Region located close to other countries and embracing important straits (Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima straits): northern Hokkaido, northern part of the Tohoku district and northern part of Kyushu; Politically and economically pivotal region (Kanto and Kansai districts); Region that serves as base for conducting mobile reinforcement operations for the above-mentioned regions which is important from the viewpoint of defence: southern part of the Tohoku district, the Tokai and Hokuriku district and southern part of Kyushu.

Regions where brigades are deployed: Regions considered of relative importance compared with above-mentioned regions from the viewpoint of defence (Eastern and central parts of Hokkaido and Okinawa), Other regions (Koshinetsu and Chugoku districts, and Shikoku).

A brigade is a unit combined with various types of forces, including combat units, such as infantry, armoured and artillery units, combat support units and logistical support units. It is a regionally independent and permanent entity. Though its function is similar to a division in that it possesses the capability to engage in operations on one front, it is smaller than a division in scale and has limited capability. (A division in principle consists of 6,000 to 9,000 personnel, whereas a brigade in principle consists of 3,000 to 4,000 personnel). To enable regionally deployed units and other units to exercise their defence capability effectively, they should be supplemented, whenever necessary, by the mobile striking capability possessed by tank units, the airborne transport mobility possessed by helicopter units and various airborne operation capabilities. Accordingly, the GSDF, just as it did previously, must possess at least one tactical unit of each of various types of forces used mainly for mobile operation so that it will leave no room for functional deficiencies. Specifically, the GSDF must possess one tank-based armoured division, one helicopter brigade equipped with a large type of transport helicopter and one airborne (parachute) brigade. The ground-to-air missile units of the GSDF engages in air defence operations for units in aggression fronts, as well as for strategical mobile divisions. It also engages in air defence for politically and economically pivotal areas. The GSDF will continue to possess eight anti-aircraft artillery groups as the ground-to-air unit.

From the viewpoint of indicating the basic framework of ground defence capability, the new Outline gives in an annexed table the organized strength of Self-Defence Forces personnel needed to maintain the GSDF defence posture at 160,000. This organized strength is required to maintain major units including divisions, brigades and other main units, as well as supply depots and other logistic support units. Compared with the previous ceiling of 180,000, the new strength has been determined through reorganization of divisions into brigades and other means. The GSDF units under the new structure are organized in principle by regular Self-Defence Forces personnel in order to maintain a high level of proficiency and to rapidly counter aggressions and other situations. However, from the viewpoint of maintaining personnel in an efficient manner in peacetime and ensuring the flexibility of smooth response to changes in situations, some units will be staffed mainly by high readiness Self-Defence Force Reservists (Ready Reserve Personnel). For example, three of four regiments of a division may be staffed by regular personnel which one regiment may be staffed mainly by Ready Reserve Personnel. Based on such a concept, 145,000 of the 160,000 members of the GSDF will be regular personnel and 15,000 will be Ready Reserve Personnel. In regard to equipment of the GSDF, the new Outline, from the viewpoint of specifically showing the framework of ground-defence capability, describes in the Annexed Table the number of battle tanks and main artillery (howitzers rockets and SSM launchers), which are main equipment for the GSDF, in addition to the number of main units. Through reorganization of divisions into brigades and other measures, the quota of tanks was set at about 900, compared with 1,200 set in the previous Outline, and that of main artillery at 900, compared with 1,000 in the previous Outline. In 1989 basic training for lower-secondary and upper-secondary school graduates began in the training brigade and lasted approximately three months. Specialized enlisted and noncommissioned officer (NCO) candidate courses were available in branch schools, and qualified NCOs could enter an eight-to-twelve- week second lieutenant candidate program. Senior NCOs and graduates of an eighty-week NCO pilot course were eligible to enter officer candidate schools, as were graduates of the National Defence Academy at Yokosuka and graduates of four-year universities. Advanced technical, flight, medical, and command staff officer courses were also run by the GSDF. Like the maritime and air forces, the GSDF ran a youth cadet program offering technical training to lower-secondary school graduates below military age in return for a promise of enlistment. Because of population density on the Japanese islands, only limited areas were available for large-scale training, and, even in these areas, noise restrictions were a problem. The GSDF tried to adapt to these conditions by conducting command post exercises and map manoeuvres and by using simulators and other training devices. In live firing during training, propellants were reduced to shorten shell ranges. Such restrictions diminished the value of combat training and troop morale.

Two kinds of operations are conducted by the Japan Maritime Self Defence Force [JMSDF] for the purpose of defending Japan: securing maritime traffic and securing Japanese territory. For Japan, which relies on foreign countries for the supply of almost all energy and food, the influence to national life is quite serious in case that maritime traffic is cut off. It can also be said that the impact to the world economy is significant in such case. Therefore, the JMSDF must be able to secure maritime traffic against attack by enemy submarines, surface ships and aircraft by effectively combining each operation such as surveillance, escort and defence of ports and straits. In case of aggression which aims at territorial occupation, it is necessary to stop it at sea in order to prevent direct damage to our territory. For that purpose, the JMSDF, in cooperation with the JGSDF and the JASDF, contributes defence of Japan by destroying enemy surface ships aircraft and, according to the situation, laying mines around the expected landing place. The nation is vitally dependent on maintaining access to regional and worldwide shipping lanes and fishing areas, but it is incapable of defending the sea routes on which it relied. Its energy supplies came primarily from Middle Eastern sources, and its tankers had to pass through the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, and the South China Sea, making them vulnerable to hostilities in Southeast Asia. Vulnerability to interception of ocean-going trade remained the country's greatest strategic weakness. Efforts to overcome this weakness, beginning with Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko's statement in May 1981 that Japan would attempt to defend its sea lines of communication (SLOC) to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles, met with controversy. Within the Defence Agency itself, some viewed a role for the MSDF in defending the SLOC as "unrealistic, unauthorized, and impossible." Even the strongest supporters of this program allowed that constitutional and other legal restrictions would limit active participation of the MSDF to cases where Japan was under direct attack. Japan could, however, provide surveillance assistance, intelligence sharing, and search-and-rescue support to United States naval forces.

The large volume of coastal commercial fishing and maritime traffic limits in-service sea training, especially in the relatively shallow waters required for mine laying, mine sweeping, and submarine rescue practice. Training days are scheduled around slack fishing seasons in winter and summer providing about ten days during the year. The MSDF maintains two ocean-going training ships and conducted annual long-distance on-the-job training for graduates of the one-year officer candidate school. The naval force's capacity to perform its defence missions varies according to the task. MSDF training emphasizes antisubmarine and antiaircraft warfare. Defence planners believe the most effective approach to combating submarines entails mobilizing all available weapons, including surface combatants, submarines, aircraft, and helicopters, and the numbers and armament of these weapons were increased in the Mid-Term Defence Estimate. A critical weakness remains, however, in the ability to defend such weapons against air attack. Because most of the MSDF's air arm is detailed to antisubmarine warfare, the ASDF has to be relied on to provide air cover, an objective that competes unsuccessfully with the ASDF's primary mission of air defence of the home islands. Extended patrols over sea lanes are also beyond the ASDF's capabilities. The fleet's capacity to provide ship-based anti-air- attack protection is limited by the absence of aircraft carriers and the inadequate number of ship borne long-range surface-to-air missiles and close-range weapons. The fleet is also short of underway replenishment ships and seriously deficient in all areas of logistic support. These weaknesses seriously compromise the ability of the MSDF to fulfil its mission and to operate independently of the United States Air Force and the United States Seventh Fleet. When two North Korean spy boats were later discovered in Japanese territorial waters, Japanese Naval Forces fired their guns in anger for the first time in 54 years.

The MSDF is commanded by the chief of the maritime staff and includes the maritime staff office, the self- defence fleet, five regional district commands, the air-training squadron, and various support units, such as hospitals and schools. The maritime staff office, located in Tokyo, serves the chief of staff in command and supervision of the force. The self-defence fleet, headquartered at Yokosuka, is charged with defence of all waters around the Japanese Archipelago. It commands four escort flotillas (two based in Yokosuka and one each in Sasebo and Maizuru), the fleet air force headquartered at Atsugi, two submarine flotillas based at Kure and Yokosuka, two mine-sweeping flotillas based at Kure and Yokosuka, and the fleet training command at Yokosuka. Five district units act in concert with the fleet to guard the waters of their jurisdictions and provide shore-based support. District headquarters are located in Ominato, Maizuru, Yokosuka, Kure, and Sasebo. Maritime Staff Office (Tokyo), Self Defense Fleet Headquarters (Yokosuka), main bases (Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru and Ominato), other bases (Yoichi, Hakodate, Kobe, Shimonoseki, and Katsuren) and air bases (Hachinohe, Ominato, Simofusa, Tateyama, Atsugi, Komatsujima, Tokushima, Iwakuni, Ozuki, Omura, Kanoya, Naha).MSDF recruits receive three months of basic training followed by courses in patrol, gunnery, mine sweeping, convoy operations, and maritime transportation. Flight students, all upper-secondary school graduates, enter a two-year course. Officer candidate schools offer six-month courses to qualified enlisted personnel and those who have completed flight school. Graduates of four-year universities, the four-year National Defence Academy, and particularly outstanding enlisted personnel undergo a one-year officer course at the Officer Candidate School at Eta Jima (site of the former Imperial Naval Academy). Special advanced courses for officers are also available in such fields as submarine duty and flight training. The MSDF operates its own staff college in Tokyo for senior officers.

The Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) had an authorized strength in 1992 of 46,000 and maintained some 44,400 personnel and operated 155 major combatants, including thirteen submarines, sixty-four destroyers and frigates, forty-three mine warfare ships and boats, eleven patrol craft, and six amphibious ships. It also flew some 205 fixed-wing aircraft and 134 helicopters. Most of these aircraft were used in antisubmarine and mine warfare operations. The MSDF's former unit structure emphasized anti-submarine and mine warfare. The National Defence Program Outline which determines Japan's defence capabilities, was reviewed and newly established in December 1995. After reorganization, the MSDF will become a more functionally balanced force capable of conducting a variety of operations ranging from surveillance and patrol in surrounding sea areas to such public welfare support as disaster relief activities. Through a review of the balance between rear and forward units, the MSDF determined the following organizational changes are necessary in order to maximize force effectiveness while optimising limited resources. First, the number of destroyer units of Regional Districts will be adjusted from ten to seven. Second, two Minesweeper Flotillas will be consolidated into one flotilla and last, the number of land-based patrol aircraft units will be adjusted from 16 to 13. In order to ensure the safety of Japan's maritime transportation when an emergency such as aggression at sea takes place, the MSDF must constantly keep at least one escort flotilla as a mobile operating ship unit so that it can be dispatched to sea areas where armed attacks take place. However, four escort flotillas will be needed in order to constantly keep at least one escort flotilla on a rapid response posture. This is because a considerable period of time is needed for basic training of personnel following relief of crew members of ships, as well as for repair of ships, and the period of time for an escort flotilla to maintain a high level of proficiency in performing duties under difficult conditions is limited. Consequently, the MSDF will maintain four escort flotillas. "Anti-submarine surface ship units" mentioned in the previous Outline were renamed "destroyer units" in the new Outline, because all patrol chasers (PC) exclusively engaged in mission of anti-submarine warfare were removed from service.

The previous Outline divided Japan's sea areas into five districts (defence districts) in conformity with the nation's geographic characteristics, for the purpose of coastal surveillance and defence. Two destroyer divisions were assigned to each regional defence district for surveillance and defence so that at least one destroyer division was always on a combat ready basis. Accordingly, the MSDF possessed a total of 10 destroyer divisions. Under the new structure of the MSDF, from the viewpoint that the MSDF must ensure such a posture at least to leave no room for deficiencies in our regions, it will possess seven destroyer divisions in order to be ready to deploy one each destroyer division in the five defence districts, as well as in the Tsugaru and Tsushima straits. Accordingly, the number of destroyers assigned to destroyer units (for mobile operations and regional districts units) will be reduced to about 50 compared with about 60 under the previous Outline. Submarine units engage in surveillance and defence in major straits. In order to ensure the safety of Japan's maritime transportation, the MSDF needs to maintain the posture capable of deploying two submarines each in the three straits of Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima, where necessary. In order to maintain such capability, it will be necessary to possess six divisions with 16 submarines, taking into account geographical relations between submarine bases and sea areas where submarines engage in surveillance and defence. The MSDF will maintain six divisions with 16 submarines. Under the previous Outline, minesweeping units, as ship units which engage in, as necessary, removal and disposal of mines laid in main harbours and straits, were maintained with two minesweeping flotillas one each assigned to the East Japan and West Japan Sea areas, in conformity with Japan's geographical characteristics. Under the new structure of the MSDF, the two flotillas will be unified into one from the viewpoint of maintaining minimum functions. Under the new Outline, the number of land-based patrol aircraft units was set at 13 squadrons, compared with 16 set in the previous Outline. Broken down into details, 1) fixed-wing patrol aircraft units engaging in surveillance in nearby seas will be reduced to eight squadrons from 10, and 2) land-based patrol helicopter units engaging in surveillance and defence in main harbours and straits will be reduced to five squadrons from six. Aircraft previously called "anti-submarine aircraft" are referred to as "patrol aircraft" in the new Outline because anti-submarine aircraft will engage in extensive surveillance patrols over the sea, not limited to anti-submarine missions.

As to fixed-wing patrol aircraft units, the MSDF previously possessed eight squadrons with 80 aircraft needed to conduct patrols at least once a day in Japan's nearby seas where necessary, and two squadrons with 20 aircraft capable of escorting ships. Under the new MSDF structure, the two squadrons with 20 aircraft engaging in the latter mission will be abolished because assignment of patrol aircraft for the escort of ships will no longer be considered from the viewpoint of defence build-up. As to land-based patrol helicopter units, the MSDF previously possessed six squadrons, one each assigned to the two straits of Tsugaru and Tsushima, as well as four regions of Keihan, Hanshin, Japan Sea and Okinawa, to provide defence for straits and harbours. Under the new structure, MSDF will possess five squadrons, one each to five defence districts, from the viewpoint of ensuring the minimum posture and not creating a lack of regional capability. Due to the MSDF structural changes, the number of combat aircraft will be reduced to about 170 from about 220 possessed under the previous Outline.

Japan has a long configuration from the north to the south with its population and industrial centres concentrated in particular regions. In addition, as the Japanese government maintains an exclusively oriented-oriented policy, Japan is forced to take a passive position at the early stage of the air incursions in which invaders take the initiative. In order to defend the life and the property of the Japanese people from invading aircraft and missiles under Japan's geographical characteristics and oriented-oriented policy, the Air Self-Defence Force should detect invading aircrafts and missiles as soon as possible and destroy them as far from Japan as possible. So the ASDF should have capability for vigilance and surveillance and for a quick counterattack to fight against invading aircrafts and missiles. The ASDF must possess aircraft control and warning units that consist of a network of radar sites and airborne early warning capable of vigilance and surveillance throughout the air space in and around Japan on a continuous basis, fighter units and ground-to-air missile units to take immediate and appropriate steps against violations of Japan's territorial airspace and air incursions, units capable of engaging in the interdiction of airborne or amphibious landing invasions and air-support for land forces as necessary, and units capable of effective operational supports including air reconnaissance, air transportation and other operations as necessary. Major units of the ASDF are the Air Defence Command, Flight Support Command, Flying Training Command, Air Developing and Proving Command, and Air Materiel Command. The Flight Support Command is responsible for direct support of operational forces in rescue, transportation, control, weather monitoring, and inspection. The Flying Training Command is responsible for basic flying and technical training. The Air Developing and Proving Command, in addition to overseeing equipment research and development, is also responsible for research and development in such areas as flight medicine. The Air Defence Command has northern, central, and western regional headquarters located at Misawa, Iruma, and Kasuga, respectively, and the South-western Composite Air Division based at Naha on Okinawa. All four regional headquarters control surface-to-air missile units of both the ASDF and the GSDF located in their respective areas. The ASDF maintains an integrated network of radar installations and air defence direction centres throughout the country known as the Basic Air Defence Ground Environment. In the late 1980s, the system was modernized and augmented with E-2C airborne early warning aircraft.

The nation relies on fighter-interceptor aircraft and surface-to -air missiles to intercept hostile aircraft. Both of these systems were improved beginning in the late 1980s. Outmoded aircraft were being replaced in the early 1990s with more sophisticated models, and Nike-J missiles were being replaced with new Patriot systems. Essentially, however, the nation relies on United States forces to provide interceptor capability. The ASDF also provides air support for ground and sea operations of the GSDF and the MSDF and air defence for bases of all the forces. Although support fighter squadrons started being modernized in 1989, they lack precision-guided weapons for support of ground operations and attacks on hostile ships, and ASDF pilots receive little flight training over oceans to prepare for maritime operations. The ASDF has an inadequate poor base defence capability, consisting mainly of outmoded antiaircraft guns and portable shelters to house aircraft. Base defences were being upgraded in the late 1980s with new surface-to-air missiles, modern antiaircraft artillery, and new fixed and mobile aircraft shelters. The Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) is the major aviation arm of the SDF. It had an authorized strength of 47,000 and maintained some 46,000 personnel and approximately 330 combat aircraft in 1992. Front-line formations include three ground-attack squadrons, nine fighter squadrons, one reconnaissance squadron, and five transport squadrons. The National Defence Program Outline which determines Japan's defence capabilities, was reviewed and newly established in December 1995. Aircraft Warning and Control system will be made more efficient and functional: for instance, as regards the aircraft warning and control units at radar sites throughout the country, 20 aircraft control and warning groups out of 28 shall be reorganized into the warning squadrons while the AWACS aircraft shall be introduced. One squadron of the fighter units shall be disbanded, with the remaining 12 fighter squadrons forming a more efficient and flexible system.

The Air Self-Defence Force must possess 28 fixed ground radar sites in 28 locations throughout the nation in conformity with its geographical characteristics so that it can maintain vigilance and surveillance throughout Japanese airspace on a continuous basis. Thus, the ASDF has possessed 28 groups of aircraft control and warning units. In addition, since there is a limit to the surveillance and detection capability of fixed ground radar sites against aircraft intruding at low altitude, the ASDF has also possessed one airborne early-warning squadron to engage in early-warning missions against aircraft intruding at low altitude. Under the new Outline, however, the ASDF will reorganize 20 of the 28 early-warning groups into smaller early-warning squadrons by enhancing the efficiency of control and warning mission considering the introduction of AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft. Thus the ASDF will now possess eight early-warning groups and 20 early-warning squadrons. In addition, one squadron of airborne early-warning aircraft will be maintained in order to supplement the limited capability of fixed ground radar against aircraft intruding at low altitude, and to maintain early-warning capabilities over ocean areas remote from the mainland. Under the previous Outline, the ASDF has possessed 13 fighter squadrons in order to maintain constant and continuous capability for scrambles and other appropriate responses against violations of territorial airspace and air incursions, in conformity to Japan's geographical characteristics. This posture was based on the idea that, while a total of 14 fighter squadrons two each in seven districts throughout the nation are needed, one squadron larger in size than other squadrons can be assigned to the district over South-western Islands.

In view of recent changes in the international military situation, however, partial reductions in the posture of the ASDF is considered to be possible. Accordingly, under the new structure, the ASDF will reduce one fighter squadron and possess a total of 12 fighter squadrons. The 12 fighter squadrons consist of nine interceptor units and three support fighter units. The main mission of interceptor units is to intercept intruding aircraft, while that of support fighter units is to counter landing invasions, and to support from the air the GSDF and MSDF units fighting against invading forces as necessary. The ground-to-air missile units of the ASDF counter air invasion together with the fighter squadrons. The ASDF will maintain six ground-to-air missile groups for the air defence of each area of political, economic and strategic importance _ central part of Hokkaido, area around Tsugaru Strait, Kanto district, Keihanshin district, northern part of Kyushu, and Okinawa. The ASDF must possess air reconnaissance and air transport units in order to provide effective support for air operations through air reconnaissance and air transport operations as necessary. The ASDF will maintain one air reconnaissance squadron to engage in air reconnaissance in case of aggression and other eventualities. At the same time, the ASDF will continue to possess three air transport squadrons to support mobile operations of fighter units and parachute operations of airborne units, as necessary, and to engage in transportation between main bases in peacetime. Combat aircraft are the main equipment of the ASDF. About 430 combat aircraft were to be possessed under the previous Outline, but following the changes in the structure of the ASDF as mentioned so far, the number of combat aircraft will be reduced to about 400. The number of interceptors will be reduced to about 300 from about 350. The Defence Agency has been seeking to introduce in-flight refuelling aircraft. In December 1999, the Security Council of Japan (SCJ) recommended that Japan introduce air tankers without delay in the next defence plan. The agency will therefore work out details about when and how many to introduce. After passing an entrance examination, recruits can enter several training programs. Lower-secondary school graduates are eligible to enter the MSDF's four-year youth cadet program to earn upper-secondary school equivalency and NCO status, or they can undergo twelve-week recruit training courses followed by technical training lasting from five to fifty weeks. Upper-secondary school graduates can also enter either two-year NCO or four-year flight courses. Specialized training is available for all NCOs, as are opportunities to enrol in officer and flight officer candidate courses. Graduates of the four-year National Defence Academy or four-year universities receive thirty to forty weeks of instruction in officer candidate schools. Advanced technical, flight, and command staff officer programs are available for officers.

The Intelligence Division of the Air Self-Defence Forces is Japan's primary imagery and imagery analysis organization. The ASDF possesses air reconnaissance units in order to provide effective support for air operations through air reconnaissance operations as necessary. The ASDF maintains one air reconnaissance squadron, based in Hyakuri, to engage in air reconnaissance in case of aggression and other eventualities. A total of 17 F-14EJ Kais will be converted to the reconnaissance role, all being assigned to the 501st Hikotai [Squadron] "Teisatsu Kokutai" based at Hyakuri. This unit also uses the 12 remaining RF-4Es, ten of which are to Kai standards. The national level police organizations are the National Police Safety Commission (NPSC) and the National Police Agency (NPA). Since the NPSC makes basic policy and the NPA administers police affairs, the NPSC has control over the NPA. The NPSC is a governmental body responsible mainly for the administrative supervision of the police and coordination of police administration. It also oversees matters relating to police education, communication, criminal identification, criminal statistics and police equipment. To ensure its independence and neutrality, not even the Prime Minister is empowered to direct and give orders to the NPSC. The mission of the National Police Safety Commission is to guarantee the neutrality of the police by insulating the force from political pressure and to ensure the maintenance of democratic methods in police administration. The commission's primary function is to supervise the National Police Agency, and it has the authority to appoint or dismiss senior police officers. The commission consists of a chairman, who holds the rank of minister of state, and five members appointed by the prime minister with the consent of both houses of the Diet. The commission operates independently of the cabinet, but liaison and coordination with it are facilitated by the chairman's being a member of that body.

Japan's police are an apolitical body under the general supervision of independent agencies, free of direct central government executive control. They are checked by an independent judiciary and monitored by a free and active press. The police are generally well respected and can rely on considerable public cooperation in their work. Officials involved in the criminal justice system are usually highly trained professionals interested in preventing crime and rehabilitating offenders. They are allowed considerable discretion in dealing with legal infractions and appear to deserve the trust and respect accorded to them by the general public. Conditions of public order compare favourably with those in other industrialized countries. The overall crime rate is low by North American and West European standards and has shown a general decline since the mid-1960s. The incidence of violent crime is especially low, owing in part to effective enforcement of stringent firearms control laws. Problems of particular concern are those associated with a modern industrialized nation, including juvenile delinquency, traffic control, and white-collar crime. Civil disorders occurred beginning in the early 1950s, chiefly in Tokyo, but did not seriously threaten the internal security of the state. Far less frequent after the early 1970s, they were in all cases effectively countered by efficient and well-trained police units employing the most sophisticated techniques of riot control

The Police Law, enacted in 1945, in conforming with principles such as rule of law and local autonomy, aims at providing an efficient police structure on a democratic base. The police structure consists of the national police and the prefectural police. Formerly, most police agencies functioned as guards for the imperial family. Now, there is a mix of centralization and decentralization in that police administration is the responsibility of prefectural governments. The national level police organizations are the National Police Safety Commission (NPSC) and the National Police Agency (NPA). Since the NPSC makes basic policy and the NPA administers police affairs, the NPSC has control over the NPA. As the central coordinating body for the entire police system, the National Police Agency determines general standards and policies; detailed direction of operations is left to the lower echelons. In a national emergency or large-scale disaster, the agency is authorized to take command of prefectural police forces. In 1989 the agency was composed of about 1,100 national civil servants, empowered to collect information and to formulate and execute national policies. The agency is headed by a commissioner general who is appointed by the National Public Safety Commission with the approval of the prime minister. The central office includes the Secretariat, with divisions for general operations, planning, information, finance, management, and procurement and distribution of police equipment, and five bureaus. The Administration Bureau is concerned with police personnel, education, welfare, training, and unit inspections. The Criminal Investigation Bureau is in charge of research statistics and the investigation of nationally important and international cases. This bureau's Safety Department is responsible for crime prevention, combating juvenile delinquency, and pollution control. In addition, the Criminal Investigation Bureau surveys, formulates, and recommends legislation on firearms, explosives, food, drugs, and narcotics. The Communications Bureau supervises police communications systems.

The NPA maintains Regional Police Bureaus as its local agencies throughout the country. There are seven bureaus in the major cities, excluding Tokyo and the northern island of Hokkaido. Police law stipulates that each prefectural government, which is a local entity, shall have its own Prefectural Police (PP). The PP is supervised by the Prefectural Public Safety Commission, which carries out all police duties within the boundaries of the prefecture. In practice, the PP forces are located in each of the 47 prefectures. The National Police Academy, the National Research Institute of Police Science and the Imperial Guard Headquarters are also organizations affiliated with the NPA. The National Police Agency has seven regional police bureaus, each responsible for a number of prefectures. Metropolitan Tokyo and the island of Hokkaido are excluded from these regional jurisdictions and are run more autonomously than other local forces, in the case of Tokyo, because of its special urban situation, and of Hokkaido, because of its distinctive geography. The National Police Agency maintains police communications divisions in these two areas to handle any coordination needed between national and local forces The Koban system provides local residents with safety and peace through daily contacts of police officers with residents in the area. Its success depends on the human relationship between the police officers and the community people. At times, there is an excess of intervention by police. The Koban system rests on approximately 15,000 police boxes (Hasshusho) and residential police boxes (Chuzaisho) located throughout the country. The NPA and the PP personnel forces are composed of police officers, officers of the Imperial Guard Headquarters, and civilian employees such as clerical workers and technical engineers. In 1990, there were about 258,800 authorized full-time police personnel. The ratio of police to population is about one officer to 556 citizens. The NPA is comprised of approximately 7,600 personnel, of whom 1,200 are police officers, 900 are Imperial Guards and 5,500 are civilian personnel. The 47 PP forces have a total strength of approximately 250,000, of whom 220,000 are police officers and 30,000 are civilians.

There are two types of police budgets: the national budget and the prefectural budget. The national police budget covers the expenditures of the NPA relevant to the execution of duties under its jurisdiction, including personnel costs, expenses incurred by the prefectural police which are shouldered by the state, and subsidies to the PP. Expenditures needed by the PP to carry out their duties are appropriated in the budget of each prefecture. In 1992, the NPA budget totalled 213,464 billion yen and the PP budget totalled 2,992,454 million yen (270 billion USD). The total National Police Agency Budget for the 1990 fiscal year was 198,420 billion yen, of which 41.5% (82,282 billion yen) went toward personnel expenses, 14.5% (28,870 billion yen) went toward equipment, communications, and facilities, 18.2% (36,149 billion yen) were allocated toward other expenses, and 25.8% (51,119 billion yen) went toward subsidies for Prefectural Police. In all, 74.2% of the total (147,301 billion yen) went toward NPA expenses.The Japanese government established a European-style civil police system in 1874, under the centralized control of the Police Bureau within the Home Ministry, to put down internal disturbances and maintain order during the Meiji Restoration. By the 1880s, the police had developed into a nationwide instrument of government control, providing support for local leaders and enforcing public morality. They acted as general civil administrators, implementing official policies and thereby facilitating unification and modernization. In rural areas especially, the police had great authority and were accorded the same mixture of fear and respect as the village head. Their increasing involvement in political affairs was one of the foundations of the authoritarian state in Japan in the first half of the twentieth century.

The centralized police system steadily acquired responsibilities, until it controlled almost all aspects of daily life, including fire prevention and mediation of labor disputes. The system regulated public health, business, factories, and construction, and it issued permits and licenses. The Peace Preservation Law of 1925 gave police the authority to arrest people for "wrong thoughts." Special Higher Police were created to regulate the content of motion pictures, political meetings, and election campaigns. Military police operating under the army and navy and the justice and home ministries aided the civilian police in limiting proscribed political activity. After the Manchurian Incident of 1931, military police assumed greater authority, leading to friction with their civilian counterparts. After 1937 police directed business activities for the war effort, mobilized labor, and controlled transportation. During the Pacific War (1941-45), the government created the Order Maintenance Law and the Special Police Force to control thought and religion. A considerable number of non-conformists including Individualists and Communists was put into jail until the end of the war. After Japan's surrender in 1945, occupation authorities retained the prewar police structure until a new system was implemented and the Diet passed the 1947 Police Law. Contrary to Japanese proposals for a strong, centralized force to deal with postwar unrest, the police system was decentralized. About 1,600 independent municipal forces were established in cities, towns, and villages with 5,000 inhabitants or more, and a National Rural Police was organized by prefecture. Civilian control was to be ensured by placing the police under the jurisdiction of public safety commissions controlled by the National Public Safety Commission in the Office of the Prime Minister. The Home Ministry was abolished and replaced by the less powerful Ministry of Home Affairs, and the police were stripped of their responsibility for fire protection, public health, and other administrative duties.

When most of the occupation forces were transferred to Korea in 1950-51, the 75,000 strong National Police Reserve was formed to back up the ordinary police during civil disturbances, and pressure mounted for a centralized system more compatible with Japanese political preferences. The 1947 Police Law was amended in 1951 to allow the municipal police of smaller communities to merge with the National Rural Police. Most chose this arrangement, and by 1954 only about 400 cities, towns, and villages still had their own police forces. Under the 1954 amended Police Law, a final restructuring created an even more centralized system in which local forces were organized by prefectures under a National Police Agency. The revised Police Law of 1954, still in effect in the 1990s, preserves some strong points of the postwar system, particularly measures ensuring civilian control and political neutrality, while allowing for increased centralization. The National Public Safety Commission system has been retained. State responsibility for maintaining public order has been clarified to include coordination of national and local efforts; centralization of police information, communications, and recordkeeping facilities; and national standards for training, uniforms, pay, rank, and promotion. Rural and municipal forces were abolished and integrated into prefectural forces, which handled basic police matters. Officials and inspectors in various ministries and agencies continue to exercise special police functions assigned to them in the 1947 Police Law.

The National Police Agency's Security Bureau formulates and supervises the execution of security policies. It conducts research on equipment and tactics for suppressing riots and oversaw and coordinates activities of the riot police. The Security Bureau is also responsible for security intelligence on foreigners and radical political groups, including investigation of violations of the Alien Registration Law and administration of the Entry and Exit Control Law. The bureau also implements security policies during national emergencies and natural disasters. The National Police Agency's First Public Safety Division investigates radical leftists. A secret unit in the Japanese National Police Agency was set up to deal with contingencies related to North Korea. It has recruited and trained North Koreans to gather intelligence on Japan's behalf. According to some reports, high-ranking members of Chosen Soren, the North Korean residents' organization in Japan, have been recruited to work for Japan, performing such tasks as exposing North Korean agents.

The Intelligence and Analysis Bureau takes charge of the following matters: general management of information on the international situation; general administration of research affairs; research and surveys on foreign countries (except matters under the charge of other bureaus), and; general analysis of the international situation and collection of necessary information. The Intelligence and Analysis Bureau is divided into the General Management Division, the First Analysis Division and the Second Analysis Division. In accordance with the rising international status of Japan, the volume of activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been sharply increasing even before the end of the Cold War, and this trend has become even more pronounced in recent years. For example, during the 15 years between 1976 and 1992, the number of diplomatic cables, the principal means of communication between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Japan's overseas establishments, increased by about eight times. The Ministry made efforts in 1993 to strengthen its organization, personnel and budget. The Information Analysis, Research and Planning Bureau was reorganized into the Intelligence and Analysis Bureau, which specializes in information and analysis, in order to strengthen and improve the intelligence function of the Ministry. The reorganized Bureau plans and formulates a comprehensive policy on how the Ministry as a whole collects, analyzes, manages and provides information. The analysis system has also been further improved: to meet the increasingly complex and volatile international situation, the functions of regional analysis and item-wise analysis such as analysis of security situations are being strengthened.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes charge of the planning of basic and middle or long term foreign policy from wider points of view and the coordination of policies formulated by other bureaus. Special emphasis is put on national security issues and issues related to the United Nations. It also plays a leading part in a serious emergency. It also takes charge of the following matters: arms control and disarmament; non-proliferation; nuclear energy, and; science cooperation and other scientific affairs. When increasing its personnel, the Ministry has placed priority on strengthening its crisis-management and security systems, which must enable the government to respond immediately. In spite of tight budgetary and recruitment restraints, the Ministry increased its staff by 72 during FY1998: 22 at the Ministry itself and 50 at overseas diplomatic and consular establishments. This brought staff totals to 5,169: 2,010 at the Ministry itself and 3,159 at overseas establishments. At the same time, the Ministry not only increased staff numbers but also made efforts to utilize its staff more effectively and to streamline administration, and in addition has implemented reforms to enhance staff recruitment and training.

The Ministry of Justice is in charge of a broad area of legal affairs, which include civil, criminal, immigration and other matters. In particular, it takes charge of nationality, family registration and registration of real estate, prosecution of criminal cases, correction and rehabilitation of offenders, litigations involving the interests of the State, immigration control and registration of foreign residents, and the protection of the rights of citizens in general. Thus the Ministry of Justice is primarily responsible for maintaining the legal order of the country in which the rule of law is ensured. While in the pre-war days the Ministry of Justice (called as "Shihosho") had jurisdiction over all matters of judicial administration including supervision over the court operation, after the end of World War II, with the enforcement of the New Constitution and the Court Organization Law as from May 3, 1947, the matters pertaining to courts, including their administration, have been transferred to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court independent of the Ministry of Justice. With the enforcement of the Law for Establishment of the Attorney General's Office as from February 15, 1948, the Attorney General's Office (called as "Homucho") was established as the Supreme Legal Advisor to the Prime Minister in charge of the administration of justice, replacing the Ministry of Justice (Shihosho). The new Office, in addition to the work of the Ministry of Justice (Shihosho), was them entrusted with the work of the examination of drafting of laws and regulations and international treaties which had been under the jurisdiction of the Legislative Bureau of the Cabinet, research and study of judicial and legal systems of other countries as well as matters pertaining to civil and administrative suits, and the work of the protection of human rights. Through a number of subsequent administrative reforms starting from the one of June 1, 1949 to that of August 1, 1952, the Attorney General's Office was abolished and the new Ministry of Justice (called "Homusho") was born, accompanied with considerable organizational reforms, which included the abolition of the Attorney General and Assistants system and the introduction of the system of placing the Minister of Justice as head of the Ministry and Vice Minister of Justice under him as in the case of other Ministries of the Government. Now, the Ministry is equipped with the Minister's Secretariat, and seven bureaus such as the Civil Affairs Bureau, the Criminal Affairs Bureau, the Correction Bureau, the Rehabilitation Bureau, the Litigation Bureau, the Civil Liberties Bureau and the Immigration Bureau. Although there have since been some changes, basically this is the organizational structure of the Ministry of Justice as it is today.

A small intelligence agency, the Public Security Investigation Agency of the Ministry of Justice, handles national security matters both inside and outside the country. Mainly involved in counter-espionage, its activities are not generally known to the public. The Koancho was set up in 1952 as an agency to investigate and control internal subversion. It is staffed by some 1,800 investigators. Its activities focus mainly on the far left and right, as well as the Japan Communist Party, which was its main target during its early years. In addition, it is probably the single group in Japan that is most responsible for surveillance of resident Koreans At present, it is focusing its surveillance on Aum Shinrikyo, partly in a move to gain increased legitimacy. With the Subversive Activities Prevention Law coming into force on 21 July 1952, Public Security Investigation Agency was established on the same date based on this law as an executive organization which is tasked to execute comprehensive duties that include conducting of investigations and requesting for action in reference to control of subversive organizations based on the provisions of the law. The Subversive Activities Prevention Law has objectives of taking such measures as control of activities or even dissolution of such organizations as deemed necessary, imposing appropriate penalty to individuals who committed violent subversive activities, and protecting democracy, basis of the Japanese people to enjoy peaceful and secured living. The Public Security Investigation Agency comprises internal departments, an institute, regional bureaus and prefectural offices. Internal departments are the General Affairs Department, First Investigation Department and Second Investigation Department, institute being the Training and Research Institute and there are eight (8) regional Public Security Investigation Bureaus and forty-three (43) prefectural Public Security Investigation Offices throughout the country as field offices.

The Public Security Investigation Agency is set up with the purpose of contributing to insuring security of the public. Among its key tasks are to conduct investigations based on the Subversive Activities Prevention Law into organizational structure and activities of organizations that harbour intentions of destroying the democratic system guaranteed by the Japanese Constitution through violent means, and in the event it was determined that the results of investigations meet the requirement of the law, and that some control measures including dissolution are necessary, it is the task of the Public Security Investigation Agency to forward a request for control measures to the Public Security Examination Commission. The control of organization is an administrative measures to be taken against an organization that ignored the fundamental law and order provided by the Constitution, carried out violent subversive activities, and there remains apprehensions that the organization may in the future carry out similar activities. The control of organization included restriction of specific activities and dissolution of organization. In order to conduct investigations needed for control of a subversive organization, Public Security Investigation Agency has public security investigators stationed throughout the country. The public security investigators are conferred an investigative authority by the Subversive Activities Prevention Law. This investigative authority has no compulsory power such as to seize evidence or to search houses, but limited to optional basis.

By the early 1990s, with internal ultra leftists' activities gradually fading, PSIA lost its main role. That was the time when AUM Supreme Truth caused Tokyo Gas Attack. PSIA, having no file and data about AUM in advance, rushed to investigate the cult and so, in 1995 winter, managed to be ready for applying "the Subversive Activities Prevention Law". PSIA has established a position as authority about AUM related problems. However, because of insufficient evidence, the Public Security Examination Commission eventually rejected PSIA's appeal to disband AUM. Under the administrative reform since 1996, the Japanese government decided that PSIA should be reduced in size and, in turn, a part of the staff should be allocated to other organizations -- that is, the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Those PSIA staff are to be sent to foreign countries in order to strengthen overseas intelligence activities of Japan. Current there are 1,700-1,800 members of PSIA, which will eventually be decreased to at most 1,100. The other 600-700 staff will be assigned to these other agencies. The Second Department of Investigation is in charge of foreign intelligence. The Division 2-2 has liaison contacts with over 30 intelligence agencies in the world, including CIA, FBI, MI6, MOSSAD and so on. The US Central Intelligence Agency has invited PSIA officials for training in Washington D.C., in the Intelligence Analysis Course. An "external organization" called Kyudankai had the function of analyzing information (and conducting espionage) on military movements in the Soviet Union. This group reportedly had knowledge of the impending 1980 invasion of Afghanistan, and communicated these suspicions to the Japanese government

In 1994 Japan began serious consideration of redefining its long-held policy prohibiting the use of space for military purposes. The Japanese Defence Agency, Japan's Space Activities Commission, and the non-governmental Defence Research Centre all issued findings that non-lethal, particularly photographic reconnaissance, military space missions were a logical extension of Japan's space and national defence activities. Japan's 1969 space law prohibits Japan participating in any military space activities. Should national policy be modified to allow military photographic reconnaissance systems, Japanese officials would decide whether to develop domestic spacecraft, procure a foreign space system, or merely purchase high resolution imagery products from commercial vendors. Japan currently operates the JERS spacecraft with optical and synthetic aperture radar sensors yielding 18 m resolution, which does not provide a militarily useful capability. One proposal in the early 1990s recommended a network of up to three Japanese spacecraft with resolutions of at least 5 m soon after the turn of the century. In 1997 Hitachi signed a deal to resell image data from US-based EarthWatch Inc., and Mitsubishi Corp. teamed with the Space Imaging Co. consortium led by Lockheed Martin and Eastman Kodak. Mitsubishi Corp. has announced its intention to build a commercial ground station for Ikonos, and NTT Data has signed an agreement with Orbital Imaging Corp. to receive and distribute data from the OrbView satellites. The Science and Technology Agency presented a budget request to the Ministry of Finance in August 1997. Following negotiations between the two ministries Cabinet approval was given in mid-January 1998. Despite complaints from the US, the budget allocated 5 million yen ($38,000) budget to start development of a Japanese intelligence satellite. The STA submitted to pressure from some politicians within the Liberal Democrat Party who wanted at least the possibility of such satellites put on the agenda. The US pointed out that Japan would not have professionals to operate a satellite or to analyze the data. A study by NEC of developing a Japanese system suggested a $2.4 billion price tag, and annual operating costs of $200 million.

The North Korean Taepodong missile launch in August 1998 provoked unanimous support in the Diet for development of an indigenous Japanese intelligence satellite system. Japan did not know of the launch until informed by the US military. Washington subsequently reversed course, and announced support for Japan's reconnaissance satellite efforts. Mitsubishi is the Japanese partner in the Lockheed-Martin Space Imaging Corporation IKONOS 1-meter resolution commercial satellite imagery system. The Mitsubishi Group proposed detailed plans for a series of four "information-gathering satellites". Two of the satellites would have optical sensors with 1-meter resolution, and the other two would have imaging radar capabilities. The proposed satellites would orbit at an altitude of 500 km, using a large satellite bus based on a standard commercial bus built by Mitsubishi. The potential role of US sub-contractors was unclear, given the potential for technology transfer to Japanese prime contractors. The system was characterized as a "multi-purpose information-gathering satellite" that could also monitor weather, natural disasters, smuggling and illegal immigration. These euphemisms were adopted to avoid provoking other countries in the region, and to avoid violating the 1969 parliamentary resolution on space policy. This re-interpretation of this vague space law would enable the program to proceed with ministerial authorization, rather than requiring a change in the law by the parliament. On 10 September 1998 Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi announced that Japan might launch its own reconnaissance satellite, to improve the Japanese military capacity and facilitate monitoring missile deployments in North Korea. "One possibility is launching our own satellite. We have instructed ministries and agencies to study what we would be able to launch and what functions it would be able to perform." The main opposition leader, Naoto Kan, endorsed the idea, and a task force in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party conducted a series of meetings with government officials and contractor representatives to develop an implementation plan.

On 06 November 1998 the cabinet decided to develop and launch four information-gathering satellites with reconnaissance capabilities by 2002, citing security concerns over North Korea's launching of a rocket over Japan. The government established a panel at the Cabinet Secretariat to discuss the budgetary and technical requirements for the satellites. The committee, headed by Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Teijiro Furukawa, involved representatives of the Cabinet Information Research Office and the Cabinet Office of National Security Affairs and Crisis Management. The Foreign Ministry, the Defense Agency, the Science and Technology Agency, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Posts and Telecommunications Ministry were also represented on the committee. Former Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama led a Liberal Democratic Party's satellite research team, visited the United States in November 1998 to gather information on whether the satellites will be produced domestically, imported from the United States or developed jointly with the United States. "U.S. technology is advanced and we hope both governments will discuss the issue," he said, implying the difficulties of developing satellites domestically. On 21 December 1998 Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's cabinet approved a draft budget for fiscal 1999 in which the Science and Technology Agency was allocated 6.8 billion yen for the plan. The agency will be in charge of making and launching the satellites. The Cabinet Secretariat, which will be in charge of the entire system, was allocated 1.4 billion yen in the draft budget. Related ministries were directed to "work in close cooperation" because the plan involves a considerable amount of funds and systematic backup. The Self Defence Agency convinced the Ministry of Finance to allocate up to $1.7 billion for the program. After gaining cabinet approval, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's government would include funding for a study into the project in the supplementary budget for the fiscal year to March 2000.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka told a news conference it "will not be a reconnaissance satellite for defence." Japan may consider launching a "multi-purpose satellite" which could also be used for environmental protection and monitoring natural resources. Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi opened the 145th session of the Diet on 19 January 1999 with a speech in which he spelled out his views on the major issues facing the nation in the final year of the 20th century. The Prime Minister said "... in order to ensure the security of our nation in the international environment which surrounds us, I will take measures beginning with the introduction of information-gathering satellites in order to collect, analyze, and transmit information which can be of use in ensuring our national security and in managing crises." Whether the satellites would be developed domestically or imported from the United States was initially undecided. The government wanted to develop the satellites domestically, while the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) wanted to import them to save time. In May 1999 the Japanese Government decided not to buy American satellites, but to have make Japanese industry develop the satellites. According to Secretary Nonaka, the reasons were that faster reaction would be possible, NASDA has the necessary technologies, and 1 meter resolution imagery would provide significant information. The US government had unofficially asked Japan to buy a US-made satellite. The Japanese government may eventually have to buy some US-made parts.

US Defense Secretary William Cohen said on 28 July 1999 that the US would support Japan's plans. In a Tokyo meeting with Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka, Cohen said the US will cooperate in the development of the intelligence-gathering satellites and wanted to discuss details at a working level. In October 1999, the Japanese government had an exchange of notes with the US government on Japan's purchase of satellite parts and components from the United States. Reportedly the satellite parts and components Japan bought from the United States include: the device for controlling the optical sensor angle designed to locate ground objects; the data memory device for transmitting the image to the ground station and making analysis; and optical lens materials. The Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) released its 1999 white paper on 27 July 1999. The paper said that the Government was working vigorously toward the introduction of Information Gathering Satellites. This satellite will orbit the Earth at an altitude of 400-600km and gather information on the Earth's surface. The launch of four satellites of two types—two with optical sensors and two with synthetic aperture radar (SAR)—is planned. A frequency of more than one observation of any given location by each type of satellite each day will be possible. The proposed system would cost $1.3 billion. The optical sensors work like cameras in that they collect light from an observed object in a lens and gather information on the object's shape and other features. The Government intends to introduce optical sensors with resolution of 1m. (This is an indicator of sensor performance. In simple terms, a resolution of 1m means that objects of a size of 1m and larger can be recognized.) The SAR hits the Earth's surface with microwaves from the satellite. By observing the reflection, the device obtains information on the shape of the object reflecting the microwaves. This radar can make observations unaffected by the weather or nighttime darkness. The Government intends to introduce SAR with a resolution of 1-3m.

By using imagery data with a resolution of 1m, the Government believes it will be able to detect ballistic missile sites and to distinguish major maritime and air military assets such as warships and fighting aircraft from commercial ships and aircraft. If, at the time when such a satellite starts being utilized, its functions are deemed to be used commonly, then it will not be considered to be in violation of the aim of the Resolution on the Peaceful Use of Space, even if the SDF also uses it. Therefore, the Defense Agency believes that imagery data from the Information Gathering Satellites will be useful for assuring the security of Japan and looks forward to its commencement with great anticipation. The budget for Japan's reconnaissance satellite may be as great as high as 260 billion yen (around US$2.6 billion, including expenses on R&D, launch, land requisition and construction). The research and development is undertaken by Japan's space development work group, with some technologies provided by the United States. The satellites will be LEO birds at orbits of 500 Km, and will make use of large satellite buses that could be partly based on a standard commercial bus or be used as a test bed for Mitsubishi's first commercial bus. After April 2002, H-2A rockets carrying information-gathering satellites and others will be launched, weighing in at 1.5 metric tons are expected to be launched by early 2003. The most likely sites for the reception stations are Tomakomai, Hokkaido, and an unspecified site in Kyushu's Kumamoto Prefecture. The control centre, which handles operations and control, and the image information processing centre, is to be set up in Japan's Defence Ministry's new commanding building completed in May 2000 in Ichigaya, Tokyo. A sub centre to back up the main control centre would be built on a prefectural government lot in Kitauramachi, Ibaraki Prefecture. The government gave up the idea of building facilities in Okinawa Prefecture because of the military nature of the activities.