Ministerstvo Bezopasnosti Ruskii, The MVD and The Ministry of Internal Affairs
Ministerstvo Bezopasnosti Ruskii
|Following the breakup of the Soviet Union the KGB Second Chief Directorate became the Russian Security Ministry (MBR). The MBR was directed by Colonel General Viktor Barranikov, a career law-enforcement officer who joined the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) in 1961. Barranikov reported to the Russian Federation Security Council (established in April 1992). Press reports placed the number of MBR staff members at 137,900 as of mid-1992. In December 1991 Yeltsin issued a decree merging the MBR (then called the Federal Security Agency) with the MVD. The two agencies would co-exist under the name of the Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs. However the Russian Constitutional Court reviewed the merger decree, declared it unconstitutional and advised Yeltsin to annul it, and Yeltsin complied. In February 1992, the parliament undertook a study to recommend the manner in which effective political control over the MBR could be ensured. The Russian Security Ministry was responsible for analyzing threatening foreign situations, conducting counter-intelligence, and the collection of intelligence in co-operation with the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, monitoring and protecting joint economic ventures, and defending the military forces and foreign establishments in Russia as well as space, engineering, army and strategic assets. However despite its broad mandate the MBR was said to not monitor the political activity of Russian citizens. After President Yeltsin became uncertain of the Ministry's loyalties during his struggle with parliament, the MBR was disbanded in December 1993 and replaced by the Federal Counterintelligence Service [Federal'naya Sluzhba Kontr-razvedky - FSK]. This 75,000-person agency was subsequently redesignated the Federal Security Service (FSB).|
The Ministry of Internal Affairs
|The MVD, which
encompassed the regular, or nonpolitical, police, had a long history in
the Soviet Union. It was first established as the NKVD on November 18,
1917. It has undergone several organizational and name changes since
then. When the MVD was established in 1954, the security police was
separated from the regular police. The MVD was originally established as
a union republic ministry with headquarters in Moscow, but in 1960 the
Khrushchev leadership, as part of its general downgrading of the police,
abolished the central MVD, whose functions were assumed by republic
ministries of internal affairs. Then, in 1962 the MVD was redesignated
the Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order (Ministerstvo okhrany
obshchestvennogo poriadka--MOOP). This name change implied a break with
the all-powerful MVD created by Beria, as well as a narrower range of
functions. The changes were accompanied by increasing criticism of the
regular police in the Soviet press for its shortcomings in combating
crime. Following Khrushchev's ouster, Brezhnev did
much to raise the status of the regular police. In 1966, after placing
one of his protégés, Nikolai A. Shchelokov, in the post of chief,
Brezhnev reinstated MOOP as a union-republic ministry. Two years later,
MOOP was renamed the MVD, an apparent symbol of its increased authority.
Efforts were made to raise the effectiveness of the MVD by recruiting
better-qualified personnel and upgrading equipment and training.
Brezhnev's death, however, left the MVD vulnerable to his opponents,
Andropov in particular. Just a month after Brezhnev died, Shchelokov was
ousted as its chief and replaced by the former MVD chairman, Vitalii
Fedorchuk. Shchelokov was later tried on corruption charges. A similar
fate befell Brezhnev's son-in-law, Iurii Churbanov, who was removed from
the post of first deputy chief in 1984 and later arrested on criminal
charges. After bringing several officials from
the MVD and from the party apparatus into the MVD, Andropov sought to
make it an effective organization for rooting out widespread corruption;
Gorbachev continued these efforts
The MVD had a wide array of duties. It was responsible for uncovering and investigating certain categories of crime, apprehending criminals, supervising the internal passport system, maintaining public order, combating public intoxication, supervising parolees, managing prisons and labour camps, providing fire protection, and controlling traffic. Until early 1988, the MVD was also in charge of special psychiatric hospitals, but a law passed in January 1988 transferred all psychiatric hospitals to the authority of the Ministry of Health. As a union-republic ministry under the Council of Ministers, the MVD had its headquarters in Moscow and branches in the republic and regional government apparatus, as well as in kraia and cities. Unlike the MVD, the internal affairs apparatus was subject to dual subordination; local internal affairs offices reported both to the executive committees of their respective local soviets and to their superior offices in the MVD hierarchy. The MVD headquarters in Moscow was divided into several directorates and offices. The Directorate for Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation was established in the late 1960s to control such white-collar crime as embezzlement and falsification of economic plan records. The Criminal Investigation Directorate assisted the Procuracy, and on occasion the MVD, in the investigation of criminal cases. There was a separate department for investigating and prosecuting minor cases, such as traffic violations, and the Maintenance of Public Order Directorate, which was responsible for ensuring order in public places and for preventing outbreaks of public unrest. The members of the militsiia (uniformed police), as part of the regular police force, were distinguished by their gray uniforms with red piping. The duties of the militsiia included patrolling public places to ensure order and arresting persons who violated the law, including vagrants and drunks. Resisting arrest or preventing a police officer from executing his duties was a serious crime in the Soviet Union, punishable by one to five years' imprisonment. Killing a policeman was punishable by death.
The Office of Visas and Registration was charged with registering Soviet citizens and foreigners residing in each precinct of a city and with issuing internal passports to Soviet citizens. Soviet citizens wishing to emigrate from the Soviet Union and foreigners wishing to travel within the Soviet Union had to obtain visas from this office. The Office of Recruitment and Training supervised the recruitment of new members of the militsiia, who were recommended by work collectives and public organizations. The local party and Komsomol bodies screened candidates thoroughly to ensure their political reliability. Individuals serving in the militsiia were exempt from the regular military draft. Although a component of the armed forces, the Internal Troops were subordinate to the MVD. Numbering approximately 260,000 men in 1989, they were one of the largest formations of special troops in the Soviet Union. The Internal Troops were first established in 1919 under the NKVD. Later they were subordinated to the state security police, and then in 1934 they were incorporated into the expanded NKVD. They were back under the authority of the security police in the early 1950s, but when the MVD was established in 1954, control of the Internal Troops shifted to the MVD. The chief of the Internal Troops from 1954 to late 1987 was Ivan Iakovlev. Iakovlev's successor was Iurii Shatalin. Like the regular army, the Internal Troops for the most part were composed of conscripts, who were obliged to serve for a minimum of two years. The Internal Troops accepted candidates for commission both from the ranks of the armed forces and from civilian society. The MVD had four schools for training members of the officer corps, as well as a separate school for political officers. The Internal Troops supported MVD missions by supplementing the militsiia in ensuring crowd control in large cities and, in emergencies, by helping to fight fires. These troops also guarded large-scale industrial enterprises, railroad stations, certain large stockpiles of food and material, and certain communication centres that were strategically significant. One of their most important functions was that of preventing internal disorder that might threaten the regime's political stability. They took a direct role in suppressing anti-Soviet demonstrations in the non-Russian republics and strikes by Soviet workers. In this capacity, the Internal Troops probably worked together with the MVD Security Troops. There was little evidence to support the theory that the Internal Troops would serve as a counterweight to the regular armed forces during a political crisis. Most Internal Troops units were composed of infantry alone and were not equipped with artillery and tanks; in 1989 there was only one operational division of the Internal Troops in Moscow. According to some Western analysts, the Internal Troops were to perform rear security functions in the event of war, just as they did in World War II.
The September 1992 law 'On the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' defines their responsibilities as: assisting Internal Affairs organs in maintaining public order and public safety and in providing the necessary lawful procedures during a state-of-emergency; protecting important state facilities, communications installations and special cargo as well as assisting in accidents involving nuclear material; guarding forced labour institutions, escorting convicts and prisoners.
In November 1993 the VVMVD had nearly 234,000 men, and following the breakup of the Soviet Union the Internal Troops became a component of the MVD entirely separate from the Armed Forces of Russia. As such, they are state organs intended to provide domestic security in peacetime which do not possess the organizational structure for conducting ground combat actions against a foreign enemy. Functions carried out by Russia's Internal Troops include disaster relief and security, counter-drug and counter-terrorism efforts, and peacekeeping operations.
Internal Troop organizational elements include: operational large units (divisions and brigades) and troop units (regiments, separate battalions) comprising; the MVD federal mobile reserve; special motorized troop units which support public order in most of Russia's large cities; large units and troop units for guarding important state facilities, including nuclear arms and nuclear energy complexes and also special cargo; large units and troop units for guarding forced labour institutions [this responsibility, involving some 100,000 men, has been transferred to the criminal punishment system].
As of 1994 large units and troop units were subordinated to seven Internal Troop districts. Two company sized MVD units, the Special purpose company (RSN) and the Special purpose militsiia detachment (OMSN), were created in December 1978 and 1980, respectively, from the MVD Dzerzhinskii Division as counterterrorist units. Under Gorbachev both companies grew to battalion size. The OMON [Detachments of Special Designation] were created in 1987. By 1991 there were an estimated 9,000 OMON troops deployed throughout the USSR, while another estimate suggested that as of late summer 1992, there were 5,500 OMON personnel organized into 20 detachments around Russia. Created to deal with terrorist incidents, serious criminal activities and the "maintenance of public order," OMON units are organized like SWAT teams or light infantry, depending on their roles. These units also are deployed to conflicts beyond their immediate operating areas. OMON units gained notoriety for their repressive and lethal activities in the Baltic republics and are based in many other republic areas. In the face of growing drug-cultivation problems the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, the Ministry of Internal Affairs Militia OMON were employed starting in 1992 in drug-eradication efforts.
Internal troop spetsnaz units fell under the control of the MVD in 1992, and they continue to be deployed to trouble spots and are among the most experienced and effective of all Russian forces in dealing with interethnic conflict. Activated in 1978, these forces have grown substantially and are currently organized in brigade, battalion and company increments. The MVD published a vast amount of popular literature devoted to the glorification of the MVD in order to attract well-qualified cadres to its ranks. The fact that MVD salaries were considerably lower than those for the MVD and that working conditions were generally poor (long hours and out-of-date equipment) made recruitment somewhat difficult. The MVD underwent an extensive purge in the mid-1980s as part of the party's effort to rid the organization of corruption and inefficiency. Over 170,000 police officers were fired between 1983 and 1988 for irresponsibility, lack of discipline, and violations of the law. The chief vehicle for party control over the MVD was the State and Legal Department of the Secretariat, which had a special section for supervising the MVD. This section presumably participated in the selection of MVD personnel and evaluated the MVD's work in terms of how well it carried out party directives.
Another means through which the party exercised control over the MVD was the Political Directorate of the MVD. This directorate, a network of political organs existing throughout the MVD, was established in 1983 and operated in a way similar to that of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. The Political Directorate was created because local party officials were not exercising sufficient control over the activities of internal affairs officials but rather were colluding with them in committing economic crimes. Its chief until April 1988 was Viktor Gladyshev, a former section chief in the Administrative Organs Department (present-day State and Legal Department). Gladyshev was replaced by the former personnel chief of the MVD, Anatolii Anikiev. The minister of internal affairs was usually a member of the Central Committee but as of 1989 had never enjoyed membership on the Politburo. Thus the regular police executed party policy but had little voice in policy formulation at the national level. At the local level, however, the police chief may have had more impact on decision making in the law enforcement realm because he was generally included on both the local soviet executive committee and the local party committee.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Judicial Organs, and Nonpolitical Crime
|The Soviet Union had two
separate legal systems. The first maintained law and order on a daily
basis, enforced the law, and adjudicated disputes that arose among the
citizenry. This system was administered by the organs of justice: the
MVD, the Procuracy, the Ministry of Justice, and the courts. The other
legal system, administered by the MVD on behalf of the party leadership,
was arbitrary and repressive and was used to suppress and punish critics
of the Soviet regime. Some cases did not fall neatly into one category
or another. There was a gray area in which a seemingly ordinary case
took on a political character. As Western expert Gordon B. Smith pointed
out, "Soviet legal policy must bridge these two systems, providing
a framework for the functioning of each." Soviet law displayed many special
characteristics that derived from the socialist nature
of the Soviet state and reflected Marxist-Leninist ideology. Lenin
accepted the Marxist conception of the law and the state as instruments
of coercion in the hands of the bourgeoisie and postulated the creation
of popular, informal tribunals to administer revolutionary justice.
Alongside this utopian trend, a dictatorial trend developed that
advocated the use of law and legal institutions to suppress all
opposition to the regime. The latter trend reached its zenith under
Stalin, when the administration of justice was carried out mainly by the
security police in special tribunals. During the deStalinization of the
Khrushchev era, a new trend developed, based on socialist legality, that
stressed the need to protect the procedural and statutory rights of
citizens, while still calling for obedience to the state. New legal
codes, introduced in 1960, were part of the effort to establish legal
norms in administering laws. Although socialist legality remained in
force after 1960, the dictatorial and utopian trends continued to
influence the legal process. Persecution of political and religious
dissenters, in flagrant violation of their legal rights, continued, but
at the same time there was a tendency to decriminalize lesser offences
by handing them over to people's courts and
administrative agencies and dealing with them by education rather than
By late 1986, the Gorbachev regime was stressing anew the importance of individual rights in relation to the state and criticizing those who violated the procedural laws in implementing Soviet justice. This signalled a resurgence of socialist legality as the dominant trend. It should be noted, however, that socialist legality itself still lacked important features associated with Western jurisprudence. In particular, the ultimate control of the legal system lay with the party leadership, which was not democratically elected by, and therefore not responsible to, the public at large The Procuracy was the most powerful institution in the Soviet system of justice relating to nonpolitical matters. It was a hierarchical organization representing all public prosecutors, all the way down to the city or village level. As specified in the Soviet Constitution, the procurator general of the Soviet Union was appointed by the Supreme Soviet and controlled Procuracy officials throughout the system. Employees of the Procuracy were not subject to the authority of their local soviets, but they were subject to the authority of the party. The Procuracy had a wide range of functions, involving itself at all stages in the criminal process. Procurators carried out investigations of the majority of cases; supervised investigations carried out by the MVD, the MVD, and the Procuracy's own employees; authorized arrests; prosecuted offenders; and supervised prisons. In addition, procurators supervised parole and the release of prisoners and referred judicial decisions to higher courts for review. Procurators also oversaw the operation of all government bodies, enterprises, officials, and social organizations to ensure that they were observing the law. Although the Procuracy possessed the formal authority to supervise the MVD in carrying out arrests and investigations in political cases, there was little evidence that the Procuracy actually exercised this function. Military justice in the Soviet Union was administered by the Main Military Procuracy, which was subordinated to the procurator general and responsible for ensuring that laws were observed within the military. It also supervised criminal investigations of armed forces personnel carried out by its employees, as well as by the MVD (in cases of political crime). Military cases were tried in military tribunals, which were under the authority of the Supreme Court.
The court structure in the Soviet Union, set forth in the Constitution and governed by several all-union and republic statutes, was quite complex. In courts of first instance, one judge sat with two elected people's assessors (lay judges), who were ordinary citizens, elected at general meetings of factories, offices, collective farms, or residential blocks for a term of two years. Appellate and review procedure came before a bench of three judges. Although a legal education was not required and any citizen over the age of twenty-four could in principle be elected to the post of judge, more than 95 percent of all judges had higher legal education. The party carefully screened candidates for election to the position of judge, which had a term of five years. Most judges above the local level were party members. In addition to determining innocence or guilt, judges performed an important function of socialization, often lecturing defendants for failing to uphold socialist values. Judges were part of the union-republic Ministry of Justice and the fifteen republic ministries of justice. There was no system of binding precedent, but supreme courts at all-union and republic levels gave "guiding explanations" to be follow Advocates, or defence attorneys, were controlled by the Ministry of Justice at the all-union and republic level and at the local level by the justice department of the local soviet. Advocates were usually law school graduates with some practical training. The Soviet Union had approximately 18,000 advocates, organized into colleges of around 150 attorneys each. These colleges maintained consultation bureaus, each with a staff of about twenty, in most towns and cities. The bureaus provided legal advice on a variety of issues, such as divorce, custody, inheritance, property rights, and housing disputes. The bureaus also offered legal defence for persons accused of criminal offences. According to the 1977 Constitution, all defendants had the right to legal counsel. Legal fees were set by the state and were low enough for most people to afford. According to Soviet émigrés, however, many defence lawyers expected additional payments or gifts "under the table."
Legal advisers to government agencies and departments, enterprises, factories, and state farms were called iuriskonsul'ty. Numbering approximately 29,000 in 1989, they represented their employer in court and drafted internal rules, contracts, and commercial documents. The fundamental principles of the civil and criminal branches of Soviet law were established at the all-union level and then set down in the legal codes of the republics. The Civil Code dealt with contract law, tort law, and law governing wills and inheritance. Separate codes existed for family law and labour law. The Criminal Code concerned itself with all aspects of criminal behaviour. The Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Republic were revised completely (along with the codes of the other republics) in 1960, incorporating the 1958 Fundamental Principles of Criminal Procedure, approved by the Supreme Soviet. These codes represented a sharp departure from the Stalinist criminal codes, which had provided a formal legal basis for the arrest and prosecution of innocent citizens on groundless charges. Under the Stalinist code, for example, an individual could be prosecuted for committing an act not specifically prohibited by the criminal code but "analogous" to such an act. The 1960 codes abolished the principle of analogy. The 1960 codes defined political crimes in a more restricted form and made punishments considerably less severe. They also established procedural rules to govern the arrest and detention of suspected criminals. According to the law, a suspect could not be detained for more than three days without a warrant. Thereafter, permission for detention had to be obtained from the procurator or from the courts. The maximum period of pretrial detention was nine months. At the end of such detention, the accused was entitled to the services of a defence lawyer. The trial itself was supposed to be public, with the prosecution conducted by the procurator, who could recommend sentencing.
Despite the existence of formal laws to protect the rights of the accused, ample evidence indicated that these laws were not adhered to when political or other interests of the party came into play. The party was the ultimate authority in the administration of justice, and party officials frequently interfered in the judicial process to protect their own interests. Party approval was required before appointment to any important position in the legal apparatus, and this control over personnel appointments gave the party substantial power. The party also exerted influence in the oversight of the legal and judicial organs. The party sometimes interfered in the administration of justice. CPSU officials put pressure on procurators, judges, and defence attorneys in the conduct of individual cases. In some instances, party officials pressed members of the legal system to arrest and convict innocent persons who were viewed as politically unorthodox. (In these cases, the MVD was often the agency exerting such pressure on behalf of the party.) At other times, party officials arranged to have crimes covered up or ignored to protect their personal or economic interests. This situation frequently occurred with corruption and bribery offences. The Soviet Union did not publish comprehensive crime statistics, so it is difficult to compare its crime rates with those of other countries. According to Western observers, robberies, murders, and other violent crimes were much less prevalent than in the United States. This was explained by the large police presence, strict gun controls, and the relatively low incidence of drug abuse. By contrast, white-collar economic crime was extremely common. Bribery and covert payments for goods and services were universal, mainly because of the lack of goods and services on the open market. Theft of state property was practiced routinely by employees, as were other forms of petty theft. In 1989 the Gorbachev leadership was making a concerted effort to curtail such white-collar crime. Revelations of corruption scandals involving high-level party employees appeared in the Soviet media on a regular basis, and there were many arrests and prosecutions.
The death penalty, carried out by shooting, was applied in the Soviet Union only in cases of treason, espionage, terrorism, sabotage, certain types of murder, and large-scale theft of state property by officials. Otherwise, the maximum punishment for a first offender was fifteen years. Parole was permitted in some cases after completion of half of the sentence, and periodic amnesties sometimes also resulted in early release. The Soviet Union had few prisons in 1989. About 99 percent of convicted criminals served their sentences in labour camps, supervised by the Main Directorate for Corrective Labour Camps (Glavnoe upravlenie ispravitel'no-trudovykh lagerei--Gulag), which was under the MVD. The camps had four regimes of ascending severity. In the strict-regime camps, inmates worked at the most difficult jobs, usually outdoors, and received meagre rations. Jobs were less demanding and rations better in the camps with milder regimes. The system of corrective labour was regarded by Soviet authorities successful in that the rate of recividism was quite low. Prisons and labour camps, in the views of former inmates and Western observers, however, were notorious for their harsh conditions, arbitrary and sadistic treatment of prisoners, and flagrant human rights abuses. In 1989 new legislation, which emphasized rehabilitation rather than punishment, was being drafted to "humanized" the special system. Nevertheless, in 1989 conditions for many prisoners had changed little.